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ABSTRACT 
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF EDUCATIONAL 
DECENTRALIZATION IN CHINA AND KOREA, 1985-1995: 
MOTIVES, ACTIONS, AND RESULTS 
FEBURARY 2008 
YEON HAN CHUNG 
M.A., STANFORD UNIVERSITY 
Ed. D., UMIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Directed by: Professor Jeffrey W. Eiseman 
Theoretically, the benefits of decentralization include the enhancement of 
democratic participation and managerial efficiency, and the reduction of financial 
deficiencies. Empirically, however, there is little consistent evidence supporting this 
premise. The consequences of reform vary in accordance with country-specific 
conditions: they appear to be successful, mixed, or failed. 
This study seeks to shed light on how the goals, strategies, and consequences of 
decentralization interact with each other. It focuses on educational governance reform in 
China and Korea, which have different historical, economic, and political backgrounds. 
Two main themes are identified in this work: how different problems were addressed by 
the same policy instrument, decentralization, and how the results differed depending upon 
environmental conditions. 
This led to three areas of investigation: the motivating forces for the 
decentralization of education, the manners of actuation, and the consequences in China 
and Korea between 1985 and 1995. A comparative approach was used involving a 
mixture of longitudinal (vertical) and cross-sectional (horizontal) analyses, which had 
been proposed and developed subsequent to the work of Bereday, Hilker, and Noah. 
These longitudinal and cross-sectional analyses identified several isomorphic and 
idiosyncratic aspects of the educational governance reforms in China and Korea. The 
major similarities found include: 1) the economic and political crises as motivating 
forces, 2 ) the establishment of legal infrastructures, and the utilization of the incremental 
v 
and asymmetric approaches in the manner of reform actuation, and 3) some positive 
consequences of reform such as increased educational funds and local educational 
autonomy. 
However, coupled with these similarities were three important differences: 1) the 
key objectives to be solved: the financial problem in China versus the political problem in 
Korea, 2) the major actuation strategies: restructuring fiscal authority by decentralization 
and diversification in China, versus rearranging political power for public education 
between the central and local governments in Korea, and 3) the main consequences of 
educational decentralization: improved fiscal efficiency in China, versus enhanced 
political autonomy in Korea. Both countries experienced some side-effects or limits of 
decentralization such as financial disparities in education among regions in China, and 
rhetorical decentralization and citizen apathy regarding local educational autonomy in its 
early stage in Korea. 
vi 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Decentralization has long been viewed as attractive by many policy makers who 
perceive it as a nostrum for the problems in education. Chief among the problems include 
structural inefficiencies, financial deficiencies, and legitimacy crises in education 
policies. Policies of decentralization typically are implemented with a shift of power and 
responsibility over decision-making and financial resource management from the central 
government to lower level institutions. 
This type of governance restructuring has occurred in many countries around the 
world, independent of the level of national advancement. For example, many Latin 
American nations with their long histories of highly centralized systems have 
enthusiastically introduced decentralization in education since the 1970s. It began in 
Argentina in 1976, and was followed by Chile and Brazil in the 1980s. Other countries - 
El Salvador, Colombia, Mexico, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Guatemala, Honduras, and Paraguay 
- soon joined the movement, embracing decentralization during the 1990s (Winkler, 
1999). 
During the same period, many member countries of the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) have also pursued the restructuring of their educational govemancse 
systems in the belief that it would improve efficiency, equity, and quality of education. 
While developing countries pursued decentralization, some industrialized countries have 
shown recentralization at the macro level in the areas of the national assessment and 
1 
curriculum, for example (Cummings & Riddell, 1994; Caldwell, 2004; Hanson, 1995). 
This worldwide trend toward decentralization was driven by various socio-political and 
economic forces such as globalization, neo-liberalism and international aid policies. In 
particular, international agencies such as the World Bank and IMF have exercised some 
critical influence on the education decentralization movements in many developing 
countries (Amove, 2003; Camoy & Rhotes, 2002,). 
Some Northeast Asian countries such as China and Korea, which traditionally had 
highly centralized systems, were no exception. They have been moving toward 
decentralization since the 1980s. 
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
The assumed benefits of decentralization fall into three categories. First, political 
participation is supposed to increase as a result of the empowerment of local stakeholders 
such as teachers, parents, and community leaders, hence reshaping the level and fashion 
of grass-root democracy. Second, managerial and administrative efficiency is supposed to 
improve as a consequence of procedural renovation including the reduction of abstraction 
in decision-making, quick problem identification and response, and facilitation of 
innovation. Third, financial deficiencies are supposed to decrease by generating new 
sources of educational funding from newly empowered local governments, organizations, 
private institutions and individuals (Brown, 1994; Fiske, 1996; Kemmerer, 1994; 
Rondinelli, 1981; Sharpe, 1996). 
Empirically, however, due to a lack of baseline data and the contextual sensitivity 
of policies, there has been little consistent evidence that the actual impact of 
decentralization matches its theoretically claimed advantages (Winkler, 1999). While the 
2 
results of studies vary, some show positive (Spain, Nicaragua), others mixed (Colombia, 
New Zealand), and some negative effects (Venezuela, Mexico, Argentina, Zimbabwe) 
(Rondinelli 1981, Prawda 1993, Fiske 1996, Hanson 1998, Winkler 1999). Some assert 
that the impact is contingent upon the specific policy designs, implying that 
decentralization in and of itself might be neither good nor bad for solving problems in 
education. It only provides a window of opportunity for improvement without 
guaranteeing any specific outcomes (Litvac et al., 1998; Sharpe, 1996). 
Therefore, the virtue of decentralization in education needs to be confirmed and 
validated by research that is both systematic and comparative in various situations and 
circumstances. Cross-national comparisons may yield some important policy implications 
on the relationship between governance style and its performance (Swanson 1989, Sharpe 
1996). This study is based on two basic issues:(l) how different problems such as 
financial deficiency (China), and political participation (Korea) are addressed by similar 
policy ideas like power transfer in the different settings, and (2) the extent to which the 
policy consequences in the two countries are isomorphic or idiosyncratic with each other. 
The necessity for a cross-country comparison of educational policies is identified 
by the admonition of Stephen et al. that “there is a lesson (and a warning) for policy 
makers: a common policy idea can be interpreted and acted upon differently when it is 
transferred to a different setting” (Stephen et al., 2004 p.l 11). 
China and Korea share some unique historical relationships in the evolution of 
their education systems. The Chinese education system in the modem period (pre-1949) 
was established under the influence of the western model. The Korean system was also 
considerably affected by the American system since the establishment of modem Korea 
3 
in 1948. As of 2003, a number of statistics illustrate the keen educational relationship 
among the two countries. China and Korea are among the top four sender countries of 
international students to the United States, along with Japan and India. Overseas students 
from Korea make up 47 percent of all international students in China. More than half (51 
percent) of the international students studying in Korea are from China and the United 
States (Guo and Cummings, 2005). These two countries, however, appear to have 
evolved different courses of development in terms of their education governance systems. 
Comparing and contrasting governance reforms in these two countries will help to answer 
some of the above questions. 
1.3. Purpose of the Study 
Although the benefits to be derived from the relocation of authority are 
theoretically clear in terms of enhancing efficiency, popular participation, and the 
generation of financial resources, the actual consequences of decentralization may vary 
considerably from one country to another due to specific social and political contexts. 
Rhetoric and reality are not necessarily on the same line: studies have revealed a range of 
isomorphic and idiosyncratic features in governance reforms over the world (Prawda, 
1993). The range of policy dynamics needs to be investigated by examining the 
motivating forces underlying the current movements, and specific aspects of the changes 
in the governance structure and school financing. 
The purpose of this study is to identify some convergent and divergent aspects of 
the changes that have occurred in educational governance in the two selected countries - 
China and Korea, focusing on the watershed cases in each country. In these two 
4 
countries, a similar policy, decentralization, has been designed and implemented for 
different purposes under different social settings between 1985 and 1995. 
1.4 Research Questions 
Toward the end described above, this study will be directed at answering the 
following four questions. 
(1) What were the primary motivating forces behind the decentralization movement 
in China and Korea ? 
(2) How was the reform idea implemented between 1985 and 1995 in China and 
Korea ? 
(3) What were the major consequences of decentralization in China and 
Korea? 
(4) What were the similarities and differences in educational governance reform 
between the two countries? 
1.5 Significance of the Study 
This comparative study has at least three attributes that will make it significant. 
First, it will provide policy makers with salient lessons in understanding how a common 
policy agenda is implemented similarly or differently in different settings. The result will 
help them understand the importance of contextual conditions on policy making and it 
will suggest the extent to which a certain policy that has flourished in one country can be 
transferred to another nation (Stephen et ah, 2004). 
Second, the findings of this comparative analysis may be of interest to educational 
administrators in the case countries. They can use this information on governance 
reforms in these the socio-politically related countries. I hope to draw some conclusions 
5 
regarding strategies or conditions for effective design and implementation of 
decentralization policies. 
Finally, this research can contribute to the development of theory-based policies. 
As Wirt clearly identifies, the relation of comparison to theory is interactive in nature for 
the mutual development of both. “Without theory, it cannot be explained why a certain 
policy is devised and implemented in a given system. By the same token, the theory 
wouldn’t be appropriately tested and developed without systematic comparisons” (Wirt, 
1986, p.252). I hope to be able to develop guidelines and strategies for successful 
decentralization in developing countries. 
1.6 Limitations of the Study 
For the most part, this study will examine the macro-level changes of educational 
decentralization in the case countries, rather than the changes in classroom and school 
settings. It will mainly cover the changes in the governance structures and in the 
educational financing systems, focusing on the seminal reforms that occurred between 
1985-1995 in China and Korea. 
As is the case with most cross-national comparison studies, this study may not be 
free from the following general limitations: (1) some difficulties in gathering baseline 
data from different countries, and (2) cultural bias in the process of this research such as 
in making inferences and drawing policy implications (Coombs, 1985; Noah, 1985; 
Raivola, 1986). Therefore, appropriate caution is needed in the design of this study. 
6 
CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF PREVIOUS WORKS 
This section will describe three strands of past and current literature associated 
with educational governance reform. First, it will give an overview of the literature on the 
conceptual and theoretical frameworks related to decentralization in education. This will 
cover the meanings, models, and motivating forces underlying decentralization. Second, 
it will look at empirical studies that illustrate the variation among efforts for rearranging 
governance in different settings in terms of goals, strategies, and consequences, including 
the side effects of decentralization. Third, the global characteristics of decentralization 
will be briefly reviewed from the geographical and temporal perspectives. 
2.1 Conceptual and Theoretical Frameworks 
2.1.1 Concepts and Meanings 
Decentralization has various meanings depending upon its setting. In general, it 
connotes “the transfer of legal and political authority to plan, make decisions and manage 
public functions from the central government and its agencies to field organizations of 
those agencies, subordinate units of government, semi-autonomous public corporations, 
and area-wide or regional development authorities” (Rondinelli 1981, p. 137). 
Decentralization has often been conceptualized as being either functional or 
territorial, depending upon whether the power shifts are horizontal or vertical, 
respectively. Functional decentralization means that the power shifts from a single 
authority to two or more other units of governance that operate in parallel. For example, 
the education functions in China are horizontally divided and managed by two or more 
ministries in the central government. “Each ministry operates its own comprehensive 
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system of education... more than a third of higher education institutions in China were 
administered by ministries in the central government” (Cheng, 1997, p. 397). Territorial 
decentralization refers to the vertical redistribution of authority and responsibility to a 
lower level of organization within a system such as a state, province, region, 
municipality, district, or school site. 
Territorial decentralization is subdivided into three subcategories according to the 
degree of the power-shift: deconcentration, delegation and devolution (Bray, 2003; 
Rondinelli, 1981). 
Deconcentratioir. the process through which a central authority establishes 
field units or branch offices, staffing them within its own offices. Thus personnel 
of the ministry of education may all work in the same central building or some of 
them may be posted out to provinces and districts. 
Delegation: a stronger degree of decision-making power at the local level. 
Nevertheless, powers in a delegate system still basically rest with the central 
authority, which has chosen to Tend’ them to the local one. The power can be 
withdrawn without resort to legislation. 
Devolution: the most extreme of these three forms of territorial 
decentralization. Powers are formally held at subnational levels, the officers of 
which do not need to seek higher-level approval for their actions. The 
subnantional officers may chose to inform the center of their decisions, but the 
role of the center is chiefly confined to the collection and exchange of information 
(Bray, 2003, p. 206). 
2.1.2. Theoretical Models 
There are three theoretical models to explain the dynamics of decentralization, the 
political, economic and social perspectives. 
2.1.2.1 Economic Models: Public Choice Theory and Liberalism 
Public choice theory provides an avenue for the presentation and analysis of 
decentralization (Rondinelli, 1989). According to this approach, the efficiency and the 
quality of public services including education are better improved when a number of 
8 
providers, namely the individual local governments, are involved in the provisional 
mechanism than when a monopolized provider such as the central government dominates 
the market (Ostrum & Ostrum, 1977). That is, decentralization provides citizens with 
more opportunities to choose various options according to their preferences and needs, 
thus enhancing the quality of public services and increasing consumer satisfaction 
(McGinn & Welsh, 1999; Levin & Belfield, 2002). 
Liberalism is based on a belief in the value of the functional efficiency of liberty 
and individual freedom. It assumes that the market may function to increase personal 
freedom, thus resulting in the enhancement of societal freedom as a whole. It serves as an 
ideological framework for strong local government, puts an emphasis on market based 
competition in public organizations, and encourages the non-governmental provision of 
education. 
Liberalism favors individual freedom and the wide dispersal of authority. It 
rejects the concentration of political power, and calls for strong local government. 
Liberals apply the function of the ‘invisible hand’ of the market to the public sector in the 
belief that the marketization of public service will result in enhanced quality and 
efficiency through competition. It also facilitates the privatization of education. By 
breaking the monopoly of the public provision of education, the quality and efficiency of 
education are supposed to improve (Lauglo, 1995). 
2.1.2.2 Political Models: Federalism and Populist Participation 
Federalism allows different states or provinces of a nation to have considerable 
power to make their own decisions. There are two forms of federal government systems. 
Constitutional federalism as seen in the United States is articulated in the national 
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Constitution as a key mechanism to prevent central authoritarianism by reserving power 
for each state in areas such as education. In contrast, political federalism is established as 
a result of political compromise between the central government and provincial 
governments These negotiations try to obtain national unity for the central government 
while giving considerable self-governance to provincial authorities Political federal: sss : 
found in Canada and Belgium (Lauglo, 1995). 
Populist participation in political expression fosters local democracy and 
empowers ordinary people to participate in making decisions for their community. This is 
viewed as a challenge to dominant groups of the society like technocrats and professional 
experts, by the populace. Populism for education means that "schools should be local, 
community-based institutions, and run by local government in small population units ' 
(Lauglo 1995, p. 8). 
2.1.2.3 Social Origin Model: Restriction and Substitution 
According to Archer’s work on the social origin of the education system (T984), 
the education system did not emerge until the eighteenth century, contrary to the popular 
belief that it has had a long history of existence. Since then it has evolved through socio¬ 
cultural and political interactions. Archer examined the origin of educational 
decentralization in the evolutions of the education systems in selected European countries 
including France, England, Denmark, and Russia. 
This evolution was intertwined with the social conflicts between the dominant 
groups and the assertive groups in education. The dominant groups were represented by 
the Catholic church in France, the Anglican church in England, the Danish Lutheran 
church in Denmark, and the Orthodox church in Russia. The assertive groups had 
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emerged against the monopoly of the dominant groups in education. The opposition 
groups were led by the bourgeoisie, the working class, professional commercial groups, 
and political and economic elite groups in each country. Two major strategies used by 
assertive groups to attack the dominant groups were the activities of restriction and 
substitution. 
The restriction strategy was employed to exercise coercion by the political elite - 
led groups through the legislative process, to damage the dominant groups in education in 
order that “school building may be appropriated, education funds confiscated, or 
personnel excluded from teaching and administration.” Assertive groups led by the 
economic elite utilized the substitution strategy to devalue the dominant groups “by 
building and maintaining new schools and recruiting, training, and paying new 
teachers”!Archer 1984, pp.104 -107). 
According to Archer, while substitution evolved into decentralization 
characterized by differentiation and specialization, restriction led to centralization 
epitomized by unification and standardization (Tang and Bray, 2000). 
2.1.3 Motivating Forces Behind Decentralization 
Why has decentralization happened? A host of studies have identified several 
driving forces that have led to the decentralization movement. McGinn and Welsh (1999) 
examined three global forces that account for the decentralization movement that began 
in the late part of the 20th century. These include changes in the economic paradigm, the 
educational environments, and in information technology. 
First, the paradigm change in the economic policies resulted from the collapse of 
government-driven economic policies. This gave rise to a market-driven policy scheme. 
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This, in turn, weakened the authority of the central government and strengthened local 
power. Second, during the 1970s and 1980s, student enrollment all over the world 
doubled, thus increasing the number of teachers. These increases outstripped the 
government’s financial capacity to provide quality public education, which in turn 
caused pubic dissatisfaction regarding education. These public complaints pushed the 
central government to shift power to local authorities. Third, the revolution in 
information and communication technology (ICT) has functioned to promote 
decentralization. A quality IT infrastructure allows a central government to effectively 
control local systems, even when they are decentralized. 
Swanson (1989) analyzes the origin of educational governance reform. From his 
point of view, the reform movement reflected a worldwide trend in economic, political, 
and technological changes. From an agricultural society through an industrial stage to the 
information society, societal changes have led to changes in governance structures. He 
argues that there has been a cyclic pattern of centralization and decentralization with 
societal changes: both the agricultural and the information societies were characterized 
by decentralization while the industrial society was characterized by centralization. The 
growth of decentralization in the information age is supposed to go hand in hand with the 
decline of industrial society. 
Camoy and Rhotes (2002) view globalization as a major impetus toward 
decentralization because it diminishes the power of nation-states. Increased global 
economic competition leads the nation state to adopt output-oriented policies rather than 
input-based ones. Consequently, the nation-state transfers power to local governments 
and organizations in the belief that decentralization may result in higher productivity and 
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efficiency in the market. This strengthens local decision-making power (McGinn and 
Welsh 1999). Globalization also has an impact on educational finance, forcing 
governments to seek new sources of school funds, which results in decentralization of 
authority for financing education (Cheng ,1997; Hawkins, 2000). 
Astiz and his associates (2002) maintain that neoliberalism facilitates 
globalization, and leads to “privatization, retreat of the state, and localization.” Neoliberal 
policies emphasize decentralization and privatization of the school system. They argue 
that neoliberalism has several virtues as follows: “(1) being democratic, efficient, and 
accountable; (2) being more responsive to the community and to local needs; (3) 
empowering teachers, parents, and others in the education community while improving 
the effectiveness of school reform; and (4) being able to improve school quality and 
increase funds available for teachers’ salaries through competition” (p.70). 
2.1.4 Perceived Advantages and Disadvantages of Decentralization 
The assumed benefits of decentralization fall into three categories. First, political 
participation is supposed to increase as a result of the empowerment of local stakeholders 
such as teachers, parents, and community leaders, hence reshaping the level and fashion 
of grass-roots democracy. Second, managerial and administrative efficiency is supposed 
to improve as a consequence of procedural innovation including the reduction of 
abstraction in decision-making, quick problem identification and response, and 
facilitation of innovation. Third, financial deficiencies are supposed to decrease by 
generating new sources of educational funding from newly empowered local 
governments, organizations, private institutions and individuals (Brown, 1994; Fiske, 
1996; Kemmerer, 1994; Rondinelli 1981; Sharpe, 1996). 
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Decentralization is not free of shortcomings. The most commonly argued concern 
is that decentralization deteriorates equity among the provinces, despite increasing 
administrative efficiency (Brown, 1994; Kemmerer, 1994; Winkler 1991,). Considering 
that different provinces have varying capacities to generate financial resources, the 
quality of public services including education will be considerably diverse among 
regions. 
Another concern is that the economic rationalism that emphasizes financial 
efficiency and leads to budget-cutbacks, pays less attention to the quality of schooling. It 
is regarded as ‘a shift of the blame and responsibility without power’ (Barcan, 1992; 
Sharpe, 1996). Some argue that decentralization in education imposes heavy workloads 
on local school actors such as the teachers and the principals, and their priorities 
involving teaching and managing in school sites may get distorted (Watkins, 1991; 
Sharpe, 1996). 
Some also warn that decentralization advocates are likely to be misled by 
economic liberals despites its advantages. Liberals attempt to privatize and deregulate the 
activities or provisions of public services in the name of efficiency and productivity. In 
reality, however, they hand their roles over to undemocratic and unaccountable bodies 
(Hirst, 1994). 
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2.2 Empirical Evidence 
An extensive review of the application of decentralization policies worldwide 
reveals considerable variations in the major objectives, strategies of power relocation, 
and consequences. 
2.2.1 Major Objectives of Decentralization 
Many empirical studies have used comparative research to examine the dynamics 
of shifting power in educational governance. Decentralization policies appear to focus on 
several different issues depending on country-specific situations. These situations include 
five major issues: political, financial, administrative, educational and social problems. 
First, the political rationale for decentralization is that a good government is that 
which is closer to the people, which reflect the basic principle of participatory democracy 
(Litvac et al., 1998; Bray, 2003). In many cases, decentralization policies have been 
motivated primarily by the political need to respond to the people’s demands to 
participate in important decision-making processes. The case of Colombia in the 1980s 
provides a good example of decentralization in response to political pressure. The main 
objective was securing national stability and legitimacy for the central government 
amidst the countrywide chaos that resulted from corrupt drug cartels and terrorist armies. 
Education was one part of a larger decentralization process. Educational decentralization 
resulted in a political compromise between the militant teacher union and the government 
(Fiske, 1996). 
Spain’s experience illustrates the dynamics of political decentralization 
(Hanson, 1995). After the death of General Franco, the Spanish government rapidly 
distributed its power to the seventeen provinces, particularly three important 
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industrialized regions that were demanding political autonomy — Catalonia, Galicia, and 
the Basque Territory — to discourage their independence movements (Hanson 1998). 
Education was an important part of the larger decentralization. This, however, is 
considered to be a great success and is widely known as “the miracle of Spain” (Fiske, 
1996, p.14). 
Second, financial constraints often push a central government to seek new sources 
of educational funding. The central government shifts the financial authority and 
responsibility for education to lower-level governments and encourages the local 
authorities and private organizations to generate new sources of revenue. In 1985, China 
transferred financial authority from the central government to the provincial governments 
to support elementary and secondary education, as a brand new device to solve a 
financial problem that was supposed to be caused by the implementation of a 9-year 
compulsory education reform plan. Argentina also had a similar experience when it 
shifted the burden of primary and secondary school finance to the provinces. This, 
however, ended in failure when the governors of many provinces strongly rejected it. 
Many other developing countries experienced decentralization triggered mainly by 
financial problems (Bray, 2003; Cheng, 1997; Fiske, 1996; Hawkins, 2000). 
Third, it is argued that managerial and administrative efficiency is a formal goal 
of decentralization. Decentralization is viewed as an effective means of deleting 
ambiguity in decision-making, clarifying lines of accountability, identifying problems 
and solutions, and facilitating renovation (Kemmerer, 1994). The case of New Zealand is 
a typical model of administrative decentralization. In 1989, the reform initiative called 
“Tomorrow’s School Project” greatly reduced the size of the central government staff. 
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eliminated provincial administration, and decentralized to the school sites considerable 
responsibilities, related to personnel employment, budget allocation, and other education 
matters (Fiske, 1996). 
Fourth, in some cases, educational improvement is stated as an official objective 
of decentralization. In the United States since the 1980s, parental dissatisfaction with 
public education has prompted governance reform that empowers local actors such as 
parents and teachers. Chief among proposals to address these concerns include school- 
based management, school choice, voucher programs, and charter schools. In the latter 
part of the 1980s, the Illinois state government undertook a radical reform to enhance 
student achievement in the Chicago school by decentralizing authority for personnel 
administration and school finance to the principals, the parents, and the communities 
(Hess, 1995; 1999; Levin & Belfield, 2002; McGinn & Welsh). 
Finally, the management of legitimacy crises or social conflict is regarded as an 
important cause of decentralization. According to Weilesr, decentralization often appears 
to fail to accomplish the stated objectives because the real goal of the governance 
restructuring is socio-political rather than administrative or technical. This type of 
decentralization occurred in France in 1968. When student protests against government 
policy gave rise to massive disturbances, the French government restructured the 
organization of the University of Paris into many decentralized entities. West Germany 
used similar strategies when serious conflicts occurred over the introduction of the 
comprehensive school system in the 1970s (Weiler, 1990). 
17 
2.2.2 Strategies of Decentralization 
Countries that pursued governance reform demonstrate various strategies of power 
transfer. These can be grouped into two major categories: vertical and horizontal 
decentralization. As explained in the previous section, vertical decentralization is 
classified into “three - D types” such as deconcentration, deregulation, and devolution. 
Horizontal decentralization is seen in the case of China, in which education 
matters are taken care of by multiple authorities along with the ministry of education in 
the central and local levels. 
Theoretically, decentralization is usually undertaken in the name of efficiency or 
effectiveness of the marketization of public services under the assumption that 
localization may increase the quality of service and customer satisfaction. However, in 
reality, the power shift during decentralization is aimed at strengthening the central 
authority, meaning that “the real reason for decentralization is not to distribute power but 
to maintain central effectiveness” (McGinn and Street, 1986, p. 472). McGinn and Street 
explain decentralization based on two hypotheses. One is that it is initiated and supported 
by some groups, but impeded by other groups, both groups being within the same 
government. The other is that a certain group supports decentralization mainly because it 
is in their interests to do so. 
Decentralization is power redistribution among interest groups, rather than 
between the central and the local governments. Consequently, the objective of this power 
shift is to strengthen central interest and power (McGinn & Street, 1986; Prawda, 1993). 
The central government is likely to share power with a group that keeps similar ideology 
and supports its interests (McGinn & Street, 1986). 
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2.2.3 Consequences of Decentralization 
As Winkler (1999) argued that there is no consistent evidence of impacts from 
decentralization. Any examination of changes associated with decentralization should 
consider observed outcomes from the process. Three major areas of impacts — 
educational, financial, and political — are considered below. Regarding educational 
quality, a host of studies have examined the impacts of decentralization on student 
achievements in terms of test scores, but the results are inconclusive. As King and Guerra 
(2005) have written, “...because educational development is rarely the rationale for 
decentralization, there is no guarantee that the reform will, in fact, improve educational 
outcomes” (p. 180). For example, some cases — Chicago and Memphis in the United 
States — provide positive impacts of decentralization by showing increased student test 
scores. However, other cases in Latin America — Chile, Nicaragua, Brazil, and El 
Salvador - have shown ambiguous and inconsistent results (King and Guerra, 2005). 
As for financial accomplishments, the cases of the Latin American countries 
illustrate a wide gap between what was predicted and what was achieved. A group of 
South American nations initiated decentralization in the 1980s as a way of gamering 
additional revenue for education. The results varied among countries. Some showed 
positive effects while others demonstrated negative effects. Before the reform during 
1971-1982, Mexico had an average growth rate of 13-14% in its education budget with a 
7.2 % GNP growth rate. However, from 1982 onward, federal spending in education 
sharply declined with an annual decrease of 9.1%. This was mainly due to a rapid 
decrease of teacher salaries. Chile also experienced a similar development to Mexico. 
Before reform in 1985, the total education expenditure in Chile was 6.8 % of GNP, but 
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this decreased to 2.5% in 1990. Columbia joined the same path when education budgets 
as percentage of GNP decreased from 5.6% in 1985 to 5.4% in 1990. Only Argentina 
showed some positive results. When reform was launched in 1975, education budgets in 
Argentina were 16.7% of the total government budget, or 3.9% of GNP. After reform in 
1980, this amount was increased to 18.7% of the government budget and 4.9% of GNP 
(Prawda, 1993). 
The shift of financial burden from the central to local governments as an objective 
of decentralization was not the case in either Mexico or Chile. Mexico demonstrated an 
increased share of financial responsibility for the central government for education during 
the reform period 1971 - 1982. The central government paid 79% of the total expenses in 
1987, while it paid only for 66% before the reform in 1971 (Prawda, 1993). 
In terms of distribution of political power and participation in education, the 
OECD survey (2004) reveals varying results. It appears that instructional matters are 
largely controlled by school sites, while issues of planning and structure are decided by 
central authorities. However, decisions on personnel management and resource allocation 
are shared with local and central authorities. Schools have only partial authority 
regarding these decisions. The PISA study by OECD (2004) shows a change in power 
distribution and participation in OECD and participating countries between 2000 and 
2003: industrialized countries toward centralization, and developing countries toward 
decentralization. 
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2.3 Global Characteristics of Decentralization 
2.3.1 Geographical Scope and Political system of Decentralization 
Castles and his associates (1993) identified, among the industrialized European 
nations and the United Kingdom’s daughter nations, families of nations in industrialized 
society: groups of countries that show cultural isomorphic aspects. Each family of nations 
demonstrates similar aspects in its policy making dynamics and decision-making patterns 
based on some particular set of historical and cultural traditions. They identified four 
families of nations. The Anglo-American family consists of countries such as Australia, 
Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The German 
family includes Austria, Germany, and Switzerland. The Latin family is comprised of 
France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. Finally, the Scandinavian family is 
represented by Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. 
Regarding the governance structure, the Anglo-American family has a tendency 
to emphasize the importance of individual and regional authority in decision-making; this 
leads to highly decentralized systems. In contrast, the Scandinavian family is viewed as 
having a more collectivist tradition that emphasizes the role of central intervention, which 
leads to the evolution of centralized systems. The German and Latin families are 
intermediate between the Anglo-American and the Scandinavian families. The German 
family is deeply associated with the federalist approach to political organization; this 
discourages the involvement of the central government in public policy making. The 
Latin family, however, is closer to the Scandinavian family; it supports the idea of big 
government and expanded central authority. The Latin family has a long history of strong 
and powerful central authority that has resulted from the social demand to outperform 
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Northern European countries in economic and military capacity. In decreasing order, the 
degree of centralization in the four country families is Scandinavian, Latin, Germany and 
Anglo-American family. 
Many other countries all over the world are initiating decentralization for various 
reasons. The major rationales for these power shifts from central to lower level of 
governments reflects the regional characteristics such as: (1) the emergence of multiparty 
political systems in Africa, (2) the advancement of democratization in Latin America, (3) 
the transition of the national economic system from a planned communist system to a 
market economy in Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union, (4) the demand to 
enhance the quality of public services in the centralized systems of East Asia, and (5) the 
resolution of problems of geographic and ethnic diversity in South Asia (Litvac et. al., 
1998, p.l). 
There are also variations on decentralization based on the political system, the 
geographic size, and the degree of linguistic pluralism (Bray 2003). According to whether 
their political systems are federal, unitary or confederal, the types of governance vary. 
For example, the countries with federal systems like Australia, Canada, India, Nigeria, 
and the United States are the mostly highly decentralized. In these countries, each state or 
province has substantial power to create its own educational policies; accordingly, 
policies differ considerably from one state to another. The nations with confederal 
systems also have a high degree of decentralization. For instance, Switzerland has 
devolved educational power and responsibilities to each of its 26 cantons. Every canton 
has the power to make important decisions on education in term of curriculum, structure, 
and organization, independent of the central government. 
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However, countries with unitary systems have both centralized and decentralized 
systems. Some like the United Kingdom have highly decentralized governance structures, 
while many others such as China and Korea have centralized structures. 
Geographically large countries such as India, Russia, Canada, and the United 
States tend to be decentralized. However, this is not the case in China and Indonesia. 
Furthermore, small countries are not always centralized as shown in Malta and Brunei 
Darussalam. Countries that use plural languages appear to have decentralized systems. 
Such nations include Nigeria, Canada, Switzerland, and Belgium. Belgium, a small 
nation, operates two different education systems separately according to linguistic 
pluralism, i.e., French speakers and Flemish speakers. Alberta and Quebec in Canada are 
like Belgium, each showing a territorial decentralization of its educational structure, 
within which the former is operated in English, and the latter in French (Bray, 2003). 
2.3.2. Temporal Oscillation of Decentralization 
Decentralization changes over time, sometimes showing a cyclic pattern. For 
example, Swanson (1989) identified a mega-trend of the oscillation of centralization and 
decentralization. As society evolved from being agricultural to industrial, and now it to 
informational, the social governance structure has changed from decentralized to 
centralized, and now it is changing back to decentralized. Industrial society is 
characterized by top-down management with center-oriented systems. In contrast, 
agricultural and information societies are much more decentralized. 
Schesinger (1986) presented a compelling analysis of the oscillating policy 
pattern in the United States. He observed that a cycle of liberalism and conservatism has 
occured every 30 years in American politics since 1900. He found that conservatism 
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pervaded in the 1920s, 1950s and 1980s, while liberalism dominated in the 1900s, 1930s 
and the 1960s. When conservatism predominated, the ideals of excellence and 
centralization were honored. During the periods of liberalism, society encouraged equity 
and decentralization. This policy pendulum was also seen in the pattern of the education 
policy. 
Cuban (1990) provided a more comprehensive analysis of this recurring education 
reform patterned by centralization and decentralization. Education governance reform in 
American shows a cyclic pattern. He describes a five-stage oscillation of governance 
reform. At the turn of the 20th century, there were more than 100,000 school districts 
across the country, demonstrating a highly decentralized system of school operation. The 
progressive movement in the early 20th century, which emphasized the value of efficiency 
and scientific management, drove reformers to consolidate school districts. This 
movement resulted in centralization and empowered local school boards to hire well 
trained professionals for education, in the hope that they could enhance educational 
efficiency. This mood of centralization changed when civil right activists argued that 
schools should be sensitive and responsive to local needs, particularly educational needs 
of students from poor regions in the 1960s. This led school governance back to 
decentralization again. “Values of participation and equity lay at the core of the impulse 
in decentralizing authority to govern schools” (Cuban, 1990, p. 5). 
In the 1980s, with the report “A Nation at Risk” in 1983, centralization again 
became the theme of the policy agenda. It stressed that the federal and state government 
should be actively involved in school operations in order to maintain the world 
competitiveness of its education systems and programs. However, it was soon recognized 
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that the centralized system was not working well. This facilitated the emergence of 
alternative governance structures including School - Based Management, the most 
decentralized form of governance. This was influenced both by research results regarding 
the importance of individual schools as the unit of change, and business leaders who 
argued for the efficiency of site-based decision-making. The late 1990s has witnessed yet 
another trend in governance change, so called recentralization, during which the federal 
government sought fragmented centralization and decentralization. In other words, 
decentralization existed at the micro-level, with centralization at the macro-level (Tyack, 
1990). While the US education system further developed the traditional mode of 
decentralization, the state and federal governments became involved in school education 
policy in terms of the curriculum and the evaluation of student achievement. Chief among 
them were two seminal federal initiatives — the Goals 2000: Educate America Act in 
1994, and No Child Left Behind in 2000. 
China also is seen in cyclic changes in policy and governance structures. 
According to Hawkins (2000), the Chinese education system, a highly centralized 
structure throughout its history, experienced a radical change in the mid-1980s. When the 
Chinese political leaders proclaimed the importance of economic reform and an open- 
door policy for national development, education, along with science and technology, was 
regarded as a key sector to be renovated. Education leaders in China initiated educational 
decentralization in 1985. The power and responsibility for providing primary education 
were transferred from the central and provincial governments to regional and local 
governments. This decentralization then saw another change toward recentralization in 
1993 when the central government took some of tax authority back from the local 
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governments in the name of protection of equality among regions. Cuban (1990) believes 
that educational reform policies oscillate for several reasons: 
Reforms return because policy makers fail to diagnose problems and 
to promote correct solutions. Reforms return because policy makers use poor 
historical analogies and pick the wrong lessons from the past. Reforms return 
because policy makers fail to think seriously about educational purpose or 
question the mindlessness of schooling. Reforms return because policy makers 
cave in to the politics of a problem rather than the problem itself. Reforms return 
because decision makers seldom seek reliable, correctly conducted evaluations of 
program effectiveness before putting a program into practice, (p.6) 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODS 
3.1 Some Technical Issues in Comparative Studies 
When it conies to comparative analysis, several issues regarding research methods 
arise. They pertain mostly to issues of comparability, the dimensions of comparison, and 
the relationship between theory and comparison. 
The concept of comparability can be understood in two ways. One is defined as 
the condition existing when two measures are expressed in the same units thus making 
possible direct comparison. The other is a general agreement that there is no need for a 
definition of comparison, that it is enough and sufficient if a point of reference is 
available for comparison (Edward, 1970; Raivola, 1986). 
Comparing involves several types of equivalence or correspondence (Edward 
1970). According to Edward, comparisons cannot be based on absolute similarity and 
identicality. His dimensions of comparability include cultural, contextual, functional, 
correlative and generic equivalences (Raivola, 1986). 
Regarding the relation of comparison to theory, one of the common purposes of 
the comparative research approach is to contribute to the establishment of 
generalizations, thus conceptualizing the existing phenomena. The relation between the 
two is clearly identified by Wirt (1986): 
...the explanation of why something happens in a given system requires the 
application of a theory. The development and testing of theory requires explicit 
comparison. Without the systemic cross-system comparisons, we won’t develop 
the theories we need; without these theories we won’t explain much of anything, 
even within a single system. [ p. 252] 
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This study will be consistent with the above-described properties that are required 
in comparative analysis. The points of reference for comparison (comparability) will be 
motives, implementation, and effects of decentralization, focusing on the reforms of the 
governance structures and the financial systems. The dimensions of comparison will be 
contextual and functional ones. Theoretically assumed advantages of decentralization will 
be examined by the comparison of equivalent qualities in the two cases. 
3.2 Case Countries 
I have selected the case countries China and Korea for three reasons. First, these 
countries have initiated education reform based on a common policy idea - governance 
restructuring - to solve various problems facing each society during the latter part of the 
20th century. Second, reforms that occurred in the two countries in the 1980s resulted 
from similar situations, with econo-political system changes in a state of transition: China 
moved from a planned national economy toward a socialist market economy, and Korea 
moved from a military-authoritarian government toward a democratic political system. 
Third, however, each country has an idiosyncratic social setting in terms of its economic 
and political conditions. Regarding those economic conditions, China and Korea are 
lower and upper middle-income societies, respectively. As for the political systems, these 
countries are characterized as a developing democratic society and a developing socialist 
state in transition, respectively. Examining how a policy idea is interpreted and 
implemented differently depending upon contextual conditions may provide policy 
makers with valuable lessons (Broadfoot,2002; Amove, 2003; Stephen et al., 2004). 
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3.3 Data Collection 
3.3.1 Data Gathering Strategies 
Rust and his associates (1999) conducted a comprehensive analysis of 
comparative data collection strategies appearing in three major international journals - 
Comparative Education, Comparative Education Review, and the International Journal 
of Educational Development - between 1955 and 1994. They found that the two major 
approaches among the nine data collection methods commonly used in comparative 
education research, were literature review and the search of existing data bases (Rust et 
al., 1999, p.98). They reported that “More than half of the articles were exclusively based 
on literature reviews or included literature review with some other strategy” (p.97) and 
many studies that utilize the literature review strategy are based on secondary data 
sources and are consequently seen as interpretive studies grounded in various previous 
work in related fields. 
Studies that employed the search of existing databases use numeric data (survey 
and census data) from, primarily, international agencies and organizations such as OECD, 
the World Bank, and UNESCO. According to the analysis by Rust et al., the dominant 
research method in comparative study is qualitative, while the quantitative approach 
plays a ‘minor though important’ role in the field. (Rust et al., 1999). This study employs 
a combination of various data gathering strategies including literature review and 
statistical tools. 
3.3.2. Data Sources 
Most of the data used for this study has been gathered from the following sources. 
(1) International Agency data: OECD, World Bank, IMF, UNESCO, and APEC 
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(2) Government documents: policy proposals, implementation reports, evaluation 
documents by central and local governments, and statistical data published by 
each government 
(3) News media - daily newspaper, weekly, monthly, and yearly magazines 
(4) Published books, articles, and dissertations. 
3.4 Analytical Framework 
This study employs a mix of cross-sectional (horizontal) and longitudinal 
(vertical) analysis based on the “Comparative Problem Approach” developed by Bereday 
and used by many since 1964 (Bereday, 1964; Hilker, 1965; Edward, 1970; Noah, 1985; 
Raivola, 1986; Rust et ah, 1999). The problem approach is a research method that centers 
on certain key problems in the comparative study, while the total approach covers all 
aspects of education in the different countries. This problem approach will be 
supplemented by the five-stage analysis of the policy process: agenda setting, policy 
formulation, decision-making, implementation, and evaluation (Adolino & Blake, 2001). 
In this study, four steps will be taken in carrying out the analysis of collected data (See 
Table 3.1). 
3.4.1. Longitudinal (Vertical) Analysis 
The first step will begin with an overview of problem-related factors. Some core 
factors and characteristics of the educational systems and policy practices will be 
described from a historical perspective. This description will be based on data collected 
from various sources mentioned in the previous section, including primary, secondary, 
and auxiliary data. Sometimes the isotypes and cartographic methods will be used. 
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The second step will be interpretations of the data and the situations, focusing on 
key reform programs in China and Korea in the period 1985-95. It will include an 
analytic explanation of what the driving forces behind the observed and gathered 
information on reform policy are. These interpretations are based on country-specific 
idiosyncratic conditions, and the different social, political, economic, and historical 
perspectives. 
The first two steps mentioned above are conducted as vertical descriptions. Each 
describes and interprets the phenomenon and factors, focusing on seminal cases of 
education governance reform. For the two countries to be considered in this work, the 
reforms occurred in China in 1985 and 1993, and Korea in 1987 and 1991. To be more 
specific, these steps result in an overview of the chronological arrangement of these 
educational policies that reveals for each country: (1) the environmental context of the 
reform, (2) the structure of the education system, (3) the historical review of education 
reform (See Table3.1). 
3.4.2 Cross-Sectional (Horizontal) Comparison 
The third step, the actual beginning step of the comparison, focuses on the 
establishment of criteria for comparison. In seeking answers to the research questions, 
several key facts need to be arranged according to the multi-stage policy analysis model 
such as (1) problem identification and agenda setting, (2) policy formulation and 
decision-making, (3) implementation, and (4) evaluation (Adolino and Blake, 2001). In 
this study, focus will be placed on agenda setting (Motives), implementation (Actions), 
and evaluation (Results). The agenda setting stage will deal with why and how the two 
countries put decentralization on the national agenda. The implementation and effects of 
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reform will largely cover two major areas. One is the changes in the governance 
structures in terms of the relationship between the central and local governments. The 
other is changes of the basic financing system for education in terms of revenue and 
expenditure, the vertical imbalance of finance, and the effect of relocation of financial 
authority on education. The final step consists of evaluations of the results of the 
comparison. It will draw some lessons for policy makers and administrators, establishing 
strategies and conditions for effective decentralization. 
Table 3.1 Comparative Analytical Framework 
Dimension Steps Major Tasks 
Longitudinal Description Depiction of the seminal cases of education 
decentralization in China and Korea between 1985 
and 1995, focusing on 
- the environmental context of the reform 
- the structure of the education system 
- the historical review of education reform 
• Seminal cases of the two countries 
- CHINA: 
(1 )“Decision of the CPC Central Committee 
for Reform of Educational Structure” 
(Communist Party of China), May, 1985 
(2)“The Compulsory Education Law” (National 
People’s Congress), 1986 
Table 3.1 continued on next page 
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Table 3.1 continued 
(3)“The Program for China’s Education 
Reform and Development (State Education 
Commission), March 1993 
- KOREA: 
(1) “Eight-Points Proposal for Reform” 
(Democratic Justice Party: DJP), Jan. 1987 
(2) “Education Reform toward 21 Century” 
(Presidential Commission for Education 
Reform), December 1987 
(3) “Law on Self-Governance for Education” 
(The National Assembly), 1991, 1995 
Interpretation Analytic explanation and reasoning for the key 
reform policies from various perspectives 
Cross-Sectional Juxtaposition Establishment of criteria for comparison regarding 
decentralization policy process 
Agenda setting (Motives) 
Evaluation (Results) 
Comparison Analysis of similarities and differences among the 
compared countries and some inductive statements 
Source: Beredey, G. (1964), Edward, R. (1970), Raivola, R. (1986), Adolino and Blake 
(2001) 
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CHAPTER 4 
LONGITUDINAL EXAMINATIONS OF REFORM IN CONTEXT 
IN CHINA AND KOREA 
This chapter presents a preliminary procedure for the comparative analysis of the 
main themes of this research - Motives, Action (Implementation), and Consequences of 
education reform in China and Korea. In order for this comparison to be more effective, it 
needs to examine and describe the three main contexts of education reform in each 
country. 
The first of these is the environmental context of reform viewed from the socio¬ 
political perspective. This is followed by a description of the basic frameworks of the two 
educational systems, which developed under different idiosyncratic circumstances. 
Finally the education reform movements in the two countries are reviewed from the 
historical perspectives. 
4.1 China 
China has developed a peculiar system of educational governance that has 
fluctuated over time. The fluctuation was largely associated with the ever-changing 
circumstances, including its political and economic conditions. This section describes 
China’s education reform from the longitudinal perspective. 
4.1.1 Environmental Context 
During the past half century, China has witnessed two fundamental changes in its 
socio-economic environment. First of all, the nation was transformed from a semi-feudal 
and semi-colonial state to a socialist state in the 1950s. Then, in the late 1970s, the 
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Chinese government tried to shift its economic system from one that was centrally 
planned and controlled to a socialist market economy. These socio-economic changes, 
along with its cultural tradition, have had a crucial influence on the education reform 
movements in China (Henz, 1992; Guo and Cummings, 2005). 
China is known as a country' with varying characteristics in terms of its political, 
socio-economic, and cultural perspectives. This can be better understood by glancing at 
its past and present trends. China has a unique cultural tradition that still has strong 
influence, particularly on education. It appears that one of the effective ways of 
understanding Chinese education is by looking at the relationship between Confucius and 
its educational tradition. The Confucius spirit in education plays as a springboard for 
national development; it is characterized by a saying like “the trinity of the king, the 
father and the teacher.” It led to a tradition of reverence for education. Education is 
viewed as the most important way to achieve success (Lewin et al, 1994). 
As in most developing countries after World War II, China experienced several 
radical reform movements covering the whole range of the socio-political arena since the 
establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. Reforms during that 
period mostly resulted from ideological competition between radicals and moderates that 
gave rise to the dialectic development of the nation. This struggle was led by Mao 
Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, respectively (Tsang, 2000). 
The radicals were ideologically devoted to communism and human liberation, and 
“redness” was recognized as a symbolic entity. They assumed that national development 
could be realized by continuing the class struggle and revolution to change social 
relations involved in production. Education was viewed as a primary mover for 
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facilitating social equality. They strongly opposed social stratification and elite- 
orientation in education. In contrast, the moderates set key goals, most crucial among 
them being the improvements of the material and moral fundamentals of people’s lives. 
In addition, “expertise” was a respected symbol. Their approach to national development 
was economic and technical rather than political and ideological. Education was expected 
to play a key role in human resource development, leading to the advancement of science 
and technology. Moderates favored and encouraged social stratification based on 
performance, as evidenced by key schools1 and university entrance examinations. This 
competitive struggle resulted in a pendulum-like policy pattern for national development 
since the inception of PRC (Tsang, 2000). 
China presently has unique features that attract world attention, mainly because of 
its huge potential for development and possible impacts on world society, including 
education. China is geographically the third largest country, after Russia and Canada, 
covering 9.6 million square kilometers, for 6.5 percent of the global land area. It is the 
world’s most populous nation with a population of 1.3 billion as of 2005, one fifth of the 
world’s total, and its annual population growth rate in 2004 was 5.7 percent. Its economic 
development during the past five decades has been remarkable, particularly since the mid 
-1970s when economic reform was initiated (PRC, 2005). 
Since the fundamental reform of Chinese society in the mid-1970s, China has 
been in transition from the communist-planned national economy to a socialist market 
economy. The annual growth rate in China’s GDP per capita during 1975-2002 was 8.2 
! It was a symbolic school of education reform led by Deng Xiaoping and his followers 
because the entrance was based on student performance/test scores in the provincial and 
national levels. It was abolished during the period of the Cultural Revolution, 1966-1976. 
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percent, while the world average was 1.3 percent. The scale of its economy in terms of 
import/export was fourth in the world in 2003. Its GNP (Gross National Product) during 
the economic reform of 1978-2003 increased 32 times from 3,624 billion yuan to 116, 
898 billion yuan (Guo and Cummings, 2005). 
These economic accomplishments were accompanied through advance in other 
areas of society including education, science and technology. The successful completion 
of China’s first manned space flight in 2003 proved its capacity and potential for science 
and technology. With that accomplishment, China received world recognition as the third 
most advanced nation in space science. In education, China has achieved another 
accomplishment, primarily quantitative but, with some qualitative aspects. China operates 
the world’s largest education system. The enrollment totals 340 million, accounting for 
more than one fourth of the country’s entire population. It has increased 850 percent 
since the inception of the PRC in 1949. The expansion of education was triggered by 
“The Compulsory Education Law” in 1986. Along with this quantitative growth, Chinese 
education has demonstrated its qualitative excellence in international student math and 
science competitions (Teng, 1994; Guo and Cummings, 2005). 
While China accomplished the outstanding achievements described above, it has 
suffered various socio-economic problems. These include the regional disparity in 
development, the population increase problem, and the overwhelming financial burden on 
the central government for this reform. In order to cope effectively with this financial 
issue, the Chinese government initiated a radical governance reform, shifting the power 
and responsibility of the central government to provide social services including 
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education to local governments, communities, private institutes and even individual 
citizens. 
4.1.2 Educational System 
China runs the world’s largest education system. The goals of this system are 
based upon a broad national direction provided by the Communist Party of China (CPC). 
The political direction of China is primarily rooted in four cardinal principles: socialism 
through proletariat dictatorship, the leadership of the Community party, adherence to 
Marxism-Leninism, and the ideology of Mao Zedong (Tsang, 1996; Hawkins, 2000). 
Other fundamental guidelines of the Chinese government include the economic reform 
and an open door policy to the outside world. The role of education is critical in the 
realization of these national goals. The link between education and national development 
was clearly stated when the State Council announced the direction of education reform in 
1985, saying “education must serve the purpose of socialist construction and socialist 
construction must rely on education” (Hawkins, 2000). 
To be more specific, education in China is expected to play a key role in 
establishing socialist modernization and expected to be “integrated with practical work in 
order to ensure the all-round moral, intellectual, and physical development of the builders 
of socialism and their successors” (Deng, 1985). The general objective of the Chinese 
education system, as promulgated in government reform documents, emphasizes both the 
establishment of a modem education system to meet the increasing demand of society 
and keeping Chinese traditional characteristics in terms of cultural and societal 
perspectives (CPC, 1985). 
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4.1.2.1. Basic Systems of Education in China 
Education in China has two major tracks: regular and formal education, and non 
formal and adult education. The basic structure of the Chinese formal education system 
consists of preschool, primary school, junior secondary school, senior secondary school, 
higher education institutes, and postgraduate institutes. As in many countries, the basic 
system has a 6-3-3-4 ladder, six years of primary school, three years each of junior and 
senior secondary school, and two to four years of higher education. Compulsory 
education is provided through 9 grade; both six + three and five + four systems exist. 
The senior secondary school is divided into two tracks, regular schools and vocational- 
technical schools. Higher education includes two to three years of junior college and four 
to six years of university. Graduate education has two levels such as master’s and 
doctoral programs with durations of education of two to three and three to four years, 
respectively (Teng, 1994). 
Along with regular education, education for adults is one of the characteristic 
features of education in China in terms of its variety and the principle of “same level, 
same standard.” The adult education program is provided for each level of school. Full¬ 
time adult education requires the same standard and length of schooling as the regular 
schools, while the part-time program is a bit different from the regular course (Tsang, 
1994). 
It is evident that enrollment in adult education is rapidly increasing, helping to 
achieve the universalization of senior secondary education. There was a considerable 
increase in adult institutions and schools in China in 1991. At that time, there were 1,321 
higher-education institutions with an enrollment of 1.56 million adult students, 58,501 
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secondary schools with 15.29 million adult students, and 258,134 elementary schools 
with 22.82 million adult students (Teng, 1994). 
4.1.2.2 Administrative Structure of Education 
Like the administrative system in the general government in China, the system of 
educational administration consists of a three-tiered structure: major governance levels 
consisting of the central, provincial, and local-level, including township and village, 
government. There are 22 provinces, 4 municipal cities under the jurisdiction of the 
central government (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Chongching), and 5 autonomous regions 
(Inner Mongolia, Guanxi Zuangxi, Ningxia Hui, Xinjang Uygure, and Tibet). 
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Figure 4.1 continued next page 
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Figure 4.1 continued 
< Level of administration > 
primary & secondary schools 
rural vocation education 
spare-time education ▼ 
< Function of administration> 
- planning 
- finance 
- personnel, teachers’ training 
Education Commissions 
At Township Level 
< Level of administration > < Function of administration > 
preschools - planning 
primary & secondary schools - finance 
rural vocational schools - personnel 
spare time education - teacher’s training 
Figure 4.1 Administrative Structures of Education in China. Source: Wang (2003) 
Education in China since 1976, p. 26 
Each province has a number of cities and prefectures. Each unit of the 
government has its own governance structures and functions to handle public affairs 
under the control of the central government. The government affairs in each level are 
conducted under the principle of the division of labor. The central authority largely takes 
care of the macro-level planning and designing according to the national policy, while the 
local governments focus on the implementation of these policies (Hawkins, 2000). The 
education function is shared by the different levels of the governments. 
The National People’s Congress (NPC) and State Council show a unique central 
power structure in China; administration is “a direct action of the state including the 
lawgivers.” In contrast, most western countries have a threefold power mechanism - 
executive, legislative and judicial - that keep a check and balance on each other. The 
National People’s Congress undertakes an important role in administering national 
education policy, primarily by discussing and determining important educational policy 
after listening to the report from the State Council on pending issues on education. It also 
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has the power to appoint and dismiss the chief of education administration in the central 
government (e.g. the Minister of Education). 
The State Council (SC) manages state educational matters under the control of 
NPC. The major function of the SC is to report education matters to the National People’s 
Congress and its standing committees. Drawing, issuing and implementing educational 
law and regulations are another important function of the SC. 
The role and title of the Ministry of Education, the central authority in education, 
can be seen to have changed over time. From the inception of the PRC (People’s 
Republic of China) in 1949 to 1985, the Ministry of Education had taken charge of 
national education. It was replaced with the State Education Commission (SEC) by the 
National People’s Congress in June 1985 when education reform was initiated. Since 
then, the SEC has played a key role in guiding, organizing, and adjusting educational 
matters covering a range of national and provincial issues. It also initiated a whole range 
of education reform including the rearrangement of the educational governance structure 
by reallocating the authority for decision making and financial accountability between the 
central government and local governments. This was reversed by reinstatement of the 
Ministry of Education in March 1998 after the death of Deng Xiaoping (Wang, 2003). 
The provincial level government for education in China consists of 31 different 
provincial authorities (22 provinces, 4 municipalities and 5 autonomous regions). The 
educational commissions of the provincial governments have broad power to administer 
education matters. Crucial among them are overall planning, financing, and personnel 
administration for the improvement of higher education, primary and secondary 
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education, vocational and adult education, teachers’ education, and all other kinds of 
education within their areas. 
The county governments administer rural education, a very important part of 
Chinese education. About 866 million people, 70% of the total population of China, 
resides in the rural areas. The education commissions of the county governments take 
care of various roles in education. Their major functions include planning and 
administering primary, secondary and vocational education, and managing the illiteracy 
problem in rural areas. In addition, personnel administration and school financing are also 
part of its major duties. 
The township governments are not stipulated as units of governance in the 
Chinese law. However, with the decentralization of decision-making authority, the 
township government became responsible for taking care of education matters. 
Consequently many of them established their own education commissions to perform 
administrative functions. The size of the education commission of a township 
government is quite smaller than that of the county, but the major function is almost the 
same. 
4.1.2.3. Characteristics of the Education System 
The educational administrative system in China has several unique features which 
are not easily found in other countries. Most interesting among them are territorial 
decentralization, functional decentralization, and non-governmental involvement in 
education. 
First, regarding territorial or vertical decentralization, China is historically known 
as a country with a highly centralized system. It was heavily influenced by the Confucian 
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and center-oriented culture which is manifested in the name of “China” which literally 
means “the key country in the world, the central part of universe.” Stimulated by the 
national economic innovations of the mid-1970, education leaders, following the market- 
oriented president Deng Xiaoping, introduced a radical governance reform in 1985 that 
resulted in shifting power and responsibility from the central government to localities. 
Before that reform, providing educational services was mainly the responsibility of the 
central and provincial governments. 
This educational innovation program had dismantled the traditional governance 
structure by emphasizing the involvement of local stakeholders in education. In turn, this 
involvement induced the engagement of village and township authorities, farmers, and 
private enterprises. More specifically, the authority for preschool and primary education 
was moved from township to the village governments, and junior secondary education 
was transferred from the county to township governments. Senior secondary education 
was decentralized from the central government to county governments, and the 
responsibility for higher education was also devolved from the central to local 
governments. As shown in the table 4.1, China joined the global trend of decentralization 
by shifting power and rearranging its intergovernmental relationship in education. 
Table 4.1 Educational Governance Before and After Reform in 1985 
—.-.-.-.-.—...-.Level 
Before reform After reform 
Secondary central government upper secondary: county 
lower secondary: township 
Primary county/city gov’t village 
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Second, horizontal or functional decentralization makes the Chinese 
administrative system quite unique. The Ministry of Education has the responsibility for 
managing education matters. Even though it has the dominant voice regarding 
educational issues, other ministries in the central government frequently develop their 
own educational policies. Some ministries operate their own schools and education 
programs, while other ministerial departments influence decision-making related to 
education policy. For example, the Ministry of Labor runs its schools and universities in 
order to train skilled workers for various sectors of industry. The Ministry of 
Transportation does this also. This horizontal division of educational power is not often 
found in counterpart countries. However, it raises the issue of effectiveness and 
efficiency in management. 
Third, the multiple involvement of educational actors is one of the most intriguing 
strategies for the successful implementation of reform. It carries potential implications for 
other developing countries that are pursuing similar reform, particularly to those suffering 
from problems of financial deficiency. This can be called an ‘all-in strategy’ in which 
every institution and individual takes accountability for supporting education. 
This approach, advocated by China’s leaders, is better understood by capturing 
the Chinese-specific cultural context. China, as like many other Asian countries 
including Korea, highly regards education as a primary mover not only of individual 
advancement but also of national development. Education is viewed as a most important 
instrument for social mobilization and a barometer of individual success in life. This 
cultural foundation make political leaders pay closer attention to the all-in approach. 
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4.1.2.4 Financial System in Education 
The educational finance system in China has evolved over time. The greatest 
change has occurred since the mid-1980s with the emergence of the market economy 
which emphasized efficiency and productivity. During the pre-reform period, educational 
finance was the responsibility of the central government, and most expenses and budgets 
were borne by the Ministry of Education and Finance. However, this system failed to 
effectively meet the increasing financial demands for education such as the rapid increase 
of population; there was a chronic shortage of funds for education. In the reform period, 
the government took measures like multi-channelization and diversification for 
generating educational resources. 
Financial management includes raising, distributing, and utilizing funds. 
Historically, the generation of revenues has been a paramount issue in Chinese education. 
The GNP per capita of the country was just around $300 when Chinese leaders 
introduced the 9-year compulsory education system in 1986. It was an ambitious reform 
unparalleled among countries in a similar stage of their economic development (Tsang, 
1996). 
Since that reform, Chinese education has suffered chronic financial shortfalls due 
to increasing financial demands, primarily the result of the expansion of schooling and 
the growth of the population. Thus, China developed a unique financial system for the 
generation of revenues. The traditional system of financial revenue relies primarily on 
government taxes and levies. The new system has adopted some multiple and diversified 
channels for generating financial resources in both the government and nongovernmental 
sectors. 
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The administrative system in education finance has a three tiered structure: the 
central government, the local government, and the non-government sector. 
At the central level, the Ministry of Finance allocates funds for public services 
including education. The Ministry of Education is responsible for its implementation. 
Among 18 departments, the financial division covers the broad function of managing 
education expenses and generating revenues. 
In the local level, each government has its own education commission for the 
support of local education; in general these have 16 offices and departments. The Office 
of Planning and Finance takes care of educational finance of its province, municipality or 
autonomous region. Under the control of the Ministry of Education and the local 
education commission, several sub-local governments have offices or departments of 
education finance that manage the matter of school funding. 
The government funding sources are classified into several categories such as 
governmental appropriations, education taxes, special education funds, and student loans. 
The non-governmental sectors are newly vitalized as critical alternative sources to 
government funds for public education. Major sources of non-govemment funds come 
from a wide array of education stakeholders: tuition and fees from students, donations 
from parents and citizens, income from school-run companies, work-study programs, 
private enterprises, and NGOs (Hawkins, 2000; Delany & Paine, 1991). 
The education finance system in China shows some intriguing aspects. First, it 
adjusted to a rearrangement of the governance structure by shifting power and 
responsibility from the central government to localities. Second, it introduced an “all-in 
strategy” for education (“education finance by the people”) that made all individuals and 
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various levels of governments responsible for providing public education. Third, it 
effectively developed a strategy for resource generation by increasing and diversifying its 
sources of funds. 
Despite these positive points mentioned above, China’s educational funding 
system suffers from several shortcomings. First and most significant is the low level of 
total public expenditures on education as a percentage of GNP. China spent 2.55 % of 
GNP in 1998, whereas the world average is 4.9%. Next, China maintains an imbalanced 
education investment between pre-collegiate and higher education. The ratio of per 
student expenditures between them is 1: 60, while the world average ranges from 1:3 to 
1:7. Finally, China has an inefficient system of resource utilization under the budget 
constraint (Wang, 2003; Tsang,1996). 
For example, teacher salaries in primary and secondary education are 84.5% and 
75.4 % of the total budget, respectively, while those in higher education are only 46.8% 
of their budgets. It is often said that the finance system does not catch up with the 
changes in the market oriented economy, thus failing to meet the ever-increasing 
financial needs in education (Wang, 2003). 
4.1.3 Historical Review of Education Reform 
The history of education reform in China can be classified as occurring in several 
phases. These phases depend on focal points such as leadership changes. Like historical 
momentum in other social changes, education reform shows a rise and fall according to 
political changes epitomized by regime restructuring. Since the establishment of the 
People’s Republic of China in 1949, Chinese education has witnessed three major phases 
in its reform movement. In addition to the year of the pre-PRC, these may be termed as 
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the years of Mao Zedong, the years of Deng Xiaoping, and the years of Jang Zemin 
(Wang, 2001). 
4.13.1 Phase I: The Pre-PRC Period (1905-1949) 
The first phase came in 1905 when the traditional education system based on 
Kuje, a traditional system for selecting government officials, was abolished. The central 
authority, the Ministry of Education, was established, and adopted 6-3-3-4 education 
system. Education leaders in this period took the American education system as a model 
for the Chinese system, as seen in their motto “learn from America” and “learning 
Chinese as essential, learning western as utilization”(Sun, 1990). 
4.13.2 Phase II: The Mao Zedong period (1949-1976) 
Education reform under the leadership of Mao Zedong occurred in three waves. 
The first wave (1949-1956) began with the establishment of the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) in 1949. The school system, under highly centralized control, was 
restructured by abolishing private schools. The major education goal was to train the 
working class cadre needed for the construction of a new country. Education leaders 
adopted the Soviet Union system as the education model in this beginning stage of PRC, 
and the catch phrase “learn from the Soviet Union” replaced the motto “learn from 
America.” The new education system, transplanted directly from the socialist 
superpower, emphasized cognitive skill and knowledge in science and technology. In this 
wave, China imported the Soviet model indiscriminately without modification. 
The second wave (1957-1965) is characterized as the period in which China 
abandoned the Soviet model to seek a new model better suited to the Chinese culture, 
historical background, and socio-economic situation. The goal of the reform in this period 
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was to rear workers with the abilities and skills necessary for nation building. Unlike the 
Soviet model, which sought to develop gifted learners to lead their nation in world 
competition, the Chinese model pursued mass progress epitomized by the popularization 
of compulsory education rather than stratification of groups. It also stressed ideological 
and political training. Schools were encouraged to run factories and farms. Educational 
professionals were forced to merge with the general public. 
The third wave (1966-1976), also called “the period of the Cultural Revolution,” 
displayed the most devastating features in the history of modern China throughout 
society, particularly in the education sector. Political elites led by Mao and his four 
followers began to criticize the current education system as a capitalist institution and 
tried to restructure the governance system by altering leadership in education. Farmers, 
workers, and soldiers displaced educational professionals. Education leaders like 
professors, teachers, and the intelligentsia were forced to go to the countryside, to 
factories, and to military camps to learn from the new power holders. In education, the 
entrance examinations were cancelled. Thus “Chinese education sustained a great loss 
during the Cultural Revolution.’’(Delany and Paine, 1991). 
4.1.3.3 Phase III: The Deng Xiaoping Period (1976-1997) 
The education reform initiated in the mid-1980s is regarded as a most 
comprehensive and paramount innovation. It appeared to focus on three wares for 
educational restructuring: the education system as hardware, the curriculum and 
operation as software, and personnel management as humanware. Deng Xiaoping ordered 
the recovery of the education system of the pre-cultural revolution period. This resulted 
in rehabilitation of private schools, and the resumption of the entrance examinations for 
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universities. The motto with wide currency during this period was “Learning from the 
West.” This motto had resurged again as it had in 1905. 
Deng’s reform was symbolized by two key words - kaifang (open) and gaige 
(reform)-, these connote the nature of the reform policy. The government in this period 
was based upon those dominant principles: “the four modemizations”of industry, 
agriculture, national defense, and science & technology, and “three orientations” toward 
modernization, the world, and the future (Cheng, 1998). 
The education reform in the 1980s consisted primarily of quantitative growth. 
Schooling expanded as the 9-year compulsory education law was enforced, and the scale 
of educational finance increased correspondingly. 
4.1.3.4 Phase IV: The Jiang Zemin Period (1998-2002) 
The education reform in the 1990s sought to increase the quality of education by 
improving teacher education, highlighting student achievements, developing school 
policy, and so forth. The educational leader in the Jiang period has the same basic policy 
framework as former President Deng, both based upon marketization in the public sector 
and an open door policy to western society. 
Major policy goals, according to the announcement of the Ministry of Education 
(1996), include (1) facilitating non-government schooling like private education, (2) 
reforming the management and structure of higher education, (3) furthering innovation in 
the rural education, (4) reforming teacher education and curriculum, and (5) 
modernization of the education system and its codification in law (Wang, 2003). 
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Table 4.2 Societal and Educational Trends and Changes in China 1977- 1993 
Years Society Education 
1977-1985 Deng Xiaoping returns Redevelopment of higher 
education 
Four modernization Closures of revolutionary 
• 
Rural responsibility system 
schools 
Reintroduction of key schools 
De-collectivization Examinations reintroduced 
Pragmatism: the only truth Academic over ideological 
is practice Growth of vocational-technical 
education 
Economic rehabilitation Universalization of basic education 
1985 Decision on Education 
1986- 1988 Open door policy Over- expansion of higher education 
Industrial responsibility Student loans 
System Commissioned students 
Special economic zones More autonomy to principals 
Joint venture company Professionals dominant over party 
Higher economic growth Overseas study 
Inflation Mismatches with job 
placement 
1989- 1991 Recession Growth halted 
Ideological conflict Politics classes reintroduced 
Leftist conservatives Military service for some 
Politics in control Party dominant over 
professional 
International isolation Recentralization 
1992- 1993 Return to high growth Higher education growth 
Freeing labor market Self funding students 
International reintegration Large scale school funds 
raising 
Rapidly expanding credit Elite orientation, promotion of key 
‘Socialist market economy’ schools 
Deng Xiaoping visit Shezhen Development of private 
tuition 
Source: Levin et al. (1994) modified, p. 4-5 
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4.2 Korea 
Coupled with longitudinal description of decentralization in China, this section 
presents the case of Korea. It will focus on the reform background that was intertwined 
with various environmental, educational systemic, and historical variables. 
4.2.1 Environmental Context 
Korea has achieved both remarkable economic development and educational 
advancement in a short time. In particular, it is said that its economic success can be 
attributed to its evolving system of education. That education is a primary mover of 
national development is not new to world history. Plato stated directly that “his republic 
would prosper to the extent that the proper kind of education was provided.” (McGinn et 
al., 1980, p. 60) 
Education in Korea has shown unprecedented development during the past 
decades, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Quantitatively, the enrollment at the pre- 
collegiate stage in 1995 was more than 90% of its age group, in sharp contrast to the 
situation in 1945, the time of national independence after World War II, when the 
absolute majority of Korean population, 86%, were left uneducated by the colonial policy 
(Moon, 1998). McGinn et al. (1980) have observed an intriguing aspect of Korean 
education: 
In 1960, with a per capita income of $90, Korea stood fairly close to the normal 
pattern of human resource development for a country with a mean per capita GNP 
of nearly $200.” In 1965, with a per capita income of $107, Korea’s pattern of 
human resource development was equivalent to that of countries with a GNP per 
capita of $380.[p. 62] 
Qualitatively, students from Korea showed their excellence in mathematics and 
science in various international student achievement tests, such as PISA (Programs for 
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International Student Achievements) and TIMSS (Trend In Math and Science Studies). 
While the Korean education system attracted worldwide attention as an example of 
success in student achievement, the general public in Korea has long remained 
dissatisfied with it. They appear to believe that education in their country has serious 
problems such as (1) an overheated educational fever and (2) endlessly rising expenses 
for out-of-school learning activities, creating unreasonable financial burdens for parents. 
Despite the sharp contrast between home and abroad in the assessment of 
education in Korea, many have paid close attention to the driving force of Korean 
education. What made this educational growth possible? Also, what characteristics of this 
education led to the Korea’s rapid economic advancement? 
The general explanations for national advancement in developing countries 
including Korea are based on two theories: the modernization theory and the human 
capital theory. The modernization theory is premised on the idea that education is “an 
integral part of the modernization process.” As Adams and Gottlieb (1993) identify, 
Modernization refers to a particular conceptualization of social change which 
describes development as a transition from a traditional society whose roles are 
ascribed, functionally diffuse and focused on particularistic goals, to a modem 
society characterized by clearly identifiable specific roles which are acquired 
through the application of achievement criteria and are oriented toward 
universalistic norms. Modernization is ...strongly influenced by education.[p.l63] 
The human capital theory maintains that education is an investment for creating 
rich human capital both for the individual and for society as whole. Investment in 
education is supposed to increase individual productivity and income, consequently 
improving the national capacity for production and wealth (Cohen & Geske, 1980). 
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It might not be possible to understand how Korea could achieve such a 
remarkable growth in education in such a short period of time without looking at the 
socio-cultural context that goes beyond the two theoretical explanations mentioned 
above. There are several attributes that can account for the rapid expansion of education 
in Korea since the inception of the Republic of Korea in 1948. They are political, socio¬ 
economics, and cultural. 
A common tradition has prevailed for long time in Asian countries. That is a 
reverence for education and educated people. It appears to have originated from 
Confucianism, and Korea was no exception. In the early history of South Korea, this 
legacy had a stronger influence on educational growth than did the various government 
policies. 
As reflected in the phrase Gun Sa Bu II Che (King, teacher, father are one body), 
teacher and teaching were highly revered. The Confucian legacy left a zeal for 
learning, an image of a cultured, accomplished person and a drive for education at 
all costs. Education became a widely accepted and unquestioned goal. [Adams & 
Gottlieb 1993, p. 164] 
Sorrensen( 1994) identifies some interesting points regarding how Korea has 
accomplished the quantitative aspect of its educational achievement. He observed two 
features of education in Korea: the low level of resources and the high level of social 
capital. 
Korea’s low level of educational resources is evidenced by its level of financial 
investment in education. Korea invested less than 4% of its GNP on education since the 
establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948; other countries budgeted greater 
percentages for education than Korea. In fact, Korea could not afford to invest much of 
its national treasury in education because of the low capacity of its national economy. 
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This low level of resources could be seen in the teaching force in the early stages of 
industrialization in Korea. The average level of education in the teaching force was less 
than two years of college. 
Secondly, when it comes to Korea’s educational achievement, non-school factors 
were often discussed as the key element responsible for its extraordinary performance. 
That is, Korean education is based on a high level of social capital such as strong family 
structure, norm of frugality, hard work, and high valuation of education. The educational 
growth of Korea cannot be accounted for by a single factor. Sorrensen (1994) goes on to 
argue: 
Educational success is a complex interplay of values, institutions, 
economic resources, and accumulation of knowledge... [and] is less a matter of 
curriculum, class-size, and educational technique than a consequence of how 
education is embedded in the fabric of Korean society. [ p. 13 ] 
Coupled with the Confucian ideology apparent in the high valuation of education, 
the family structure of Korea is often viewed as a crucial clue toward understanding the 
characteristics of education in this country. Unlike the American family, according to 
Sorrensen, the Korean family is a kind of corporation. This is associated with parental 
enthusiasm, the so-called Chima Baram (skirt wind) for their children’s education. The 
family commitment for its member’s education is unique in its intensity and duration. 
4.2.2 Educational System 
4.2.2.1 Overview 
Influenced by the American model, Korea adopted the 6-3-3-4 education system 
in 1952. This happened 3 years after the first 6-6-4 school ladder system was 
implemented in 1949. The system consisted of 6 years of primary school, 3 years of 
57 
middle school, 3 years of high school, and 4 years of college or university. The system 
contains various types of schools and institutions such as teacher colleges and colleges of 
education, junior colleges, air and correspondence colleges and open universities, trade 
schools and higher trade schools, civic schools and higher civic schools, special schools, 
kindergartens, and miscellaneous schools. 
Enrollments have rapidly increased since 1945 at all levels of schooling. Primary 
school enrollments nearly tripled, from 1,366,685 in 1945 to 3,622,685 in 1965. The 
fraction of students in the 6-to-12-year-old cohort was 45 percent in 1945, but it had 
increased sharply to 90 percent by 1960, and was almost 100 percent (universalized) in 
1970. Even though the number of elementary students decreased in the 1980s because of 
the falling birth rate, similar growth was seen in secondary and tertiary education (Guo 
and Cummings, 2005). 
Table 4.3. Enrollment Rates by School Level and by Sex 
Junior high Senior high Tertiary institutions 
M F Total M F Total M F Total 
1985 100.5 99.6 100.0 83.2 75.5 79.5 48.0 21.4 35.1 
1990 87.9 98.5 98.2 90.5 85.4 88.0 50.0 23.9 37.4 
1995 101.4 101.8 101.6 92.4 91.3 91.8 69.9 38.6 57.9 
Source: Kim, Y.H. (1999), p. 58 
The education law required a minimum number of school days per academic year. 
For instance, at least 220 school days per year are required at the pre-collegiate level, 
while a minimum of 32 school attendance weeks are required at the tertiary level. There 
are two semesters per academic year at the tertiary level. The first (spring) semester 
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begins on March 1 and closes at the end of August, whereas the second (fall) semester 
starts on September 1 and ends on February 28. 
4.2.2.2 Educational Administration 
Educational administration in Korea has a three tier structure: central government, 
■ 
municipal or provincial government, and local government. The central authority is 
( 
represented by the Ministry of Education, which is responsible for seeing that the 
Constitutional missions for national education are fulfilled. The Ministry takes 
responsibility for i) planning macro-educational policy based on the national government 
standards, ii) composing and submitting various laws associated with education to the 
legislature, iii) managing the generation and allocation of the education budget, iv) 
coordinating subordinate agencies for policy design and implementation, and v) 
supervising the educational practices of municipal/provincial governments and those of 
higher educational institution such as universities and colleges. The ministry has a 
number of bureaus and departments executing each function mentioned above. Major 
departments among them are the planning and management office, the supervision and 
i| 
textbook compilation office, the university education office, and other five bureaus. 
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MINISTRY OF EDUCATION 
Minister of Education 
T 
Vice Minister ▼ 
Colleges & Universities_ 
BOARD OF EDUCATION 
9 provinces & 7 metropolitan areas 
Superintendent ▼ 
Vice Superintendent ▼ 
High Schools 
OFFICE OF EDUCATION 
186 towns 
Head Officer 
T 
Elementary/Middle Schools 
Figure 4.2 Education Administration System in Korea. Source: Adams and Gottlieb 
(1993), Ministry of Education, Korea (1991) 
As shown in Figure 4.1, under the leadership of the Minister of Education in the 
central government, the provincial and municipal governments administer various 
educational affairs, focusing on elementary and secondary schools. There are 7 
metropolitan city offices - Seoul, Busan, Daegu, Incheon, Daejeon, Gwangjoo, Ulsan - 
and 9 provincial offices of education. The provincial/metropolitan education office is 
60 
under the control of both the Ministry of education and the board of education in each 
area. 
Each board of education in the provinces and municipalities is responsible for 
local ordinances, the review and approval of school finance, and the inspection of the 
district education offices. The members of a board were selected by a provincial or 
municipal assembly until this was changed to an electoral college system in 1994, 
consisting of representatives from parents, teachers, and community leaders. The 
superintendent of each province/municipality had been elected by the relevant board of 
education, but this also changed in 1994 to the same electoral college system used to elect 
the board members. 
SUPERINTENDENT 
T 
Vice Superintendent 
▼ Planning and Inspection Div 
General Affairs Div 
School Affair Bureau Administration Bureau 
Elementary Education Div. 
Secondary Education Div. 
Science and Tech Edu Div. 
Non-Formal Education Div. 
Physical Education Div. 
Administration Div. 
Financial Affairs Div. 
Education Facilities Div. 
Construction Div. 
Figure 4.3 Organization of the Provincial/Municipal Office of Education in Korea. 
Source: Adams & Gottlieb(1993), Ministry of Education (1990) 
The district office is the lowest unit of education administration under the 
jurisdiction of the provincial/municipal education government. It has the authority to 
supervise all education affairs in each district regarding kindergarten, elementary, and 
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middle school education. The authority includes planning, budgeting, and regulation 
within the standards set by higher level authorities. There are 180 district offices of 
education in Korea. As seen in Figure 4.3, the district office has two main divisions of 
administration and school affairs. Their subdivisions and functions are similar to those at 
the provincial /municipal organization. 
Officer of Education 
T 
School Affairs Division Administration Division 
T 
Elementary Education Section 
Secondary Education Section 
Science and Tech Edu Section 
Non-Formal Education Section 
Physical Education Section 
School Affairs Section 
T 
General Affairs Section 
Management Section 
Planning and Inspection Section 
Accounting Section 
Finance Section 
Facility Section 
Figure 4.4 Organization of a District Office of Education in Korea. Source: Adams & 
Gottlieb (1993), Ministry of Education (1990) 
4.2.2.3 Educational Finance 
There are three major sources of funding for education in Korea: the central 
government, local authorities, and private contributions. The central government (the 
Ministry of Education) has two accounts - a general and a special account - for national 
education. The general account is used for the operational costs of the headquarters of the 
Ministry of Education, grants for local education, and subsidies for national universities 
and public educational institutions, including its annexed organizations. The special 
account is established for the improvement of the educational conditions in pre-collegiate 
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schools, for a special education tax, for a special private education fund, and for national 
university hospitals. 
The general account receives revenues from property, sales of goods & services, 
sales of capital assets, and foreign borrowing. The special account includes revenues 
from the transfer tax for local education, the education tax, carry-over from the previous 
year, and transfers from other accounts (Ministry of Education, 1999). 
Ministry of Education 
[ General Account ] 
- Operational cost 
- Grants for local education 
- Subsidies for national 
university and public schools 
T 
[ Special Account ] 
- The special educational tax account 
- A special account for education conditions 
- A special account for national university 
hospitals 
Provincial Government 
[ Grants from Central Government] 
- Grants from general account 
- Transfers for local education 
- Special account for improvement 
of educational conditions 
- Government subsidies 
[Transfer from Local Government] 
- Special account for teachers’ salary 
- part of the cigarette consumption 
tax 
- other subsidies 
[ Other Sources ] 
students’ tuition 
sales of properties 
Figure 4.5 Structure of the Educational Budget for Central and Provincial Governments 
in Korea. Sources: Lee (1995), Ministry of Education (1996) 
The revenues for the provincial 
treasury and the provincial government. 
office of education come from the national 
The major sources of revenues are from the 
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central government: grants from the general account, grants from the special account for 
improvement of education conditions, and government subsidies. The revenue is 
supplemented by allocations from the local government: special accounts for teachers’ 
salaries, part of the tobacco consumption tax, and other subsidies. The expenditures of the 
provincial office of education cover the expenses of educational administration, school 
operation, facilities and equipment, subsidies for private schools, and an emergency fund. 
In addition, the educational expenditures pay for the educational programs and 
services provided by the provincial/municipal government of education, as well as the 
salaries of teachers and employees in elementary, middle, and high schools in each area. 
Among the crucial sources of education funding in Korea is the education tax. It 
was first introduced in 1958 as the source of educational finance, and abolished in 1961 
when the law of education funding for compulsory education was enacted. The 1961 law 
made the local governments dependent on the central authority because it promulgated 
the national government’s power and responsibility for providing education finance. 
Since the 1980s, the law has earmarked 11.8 percent of the national internal taxes for 
educational outlays in order to secure financial stability in national education. 
The national government’s budget for education has increased steadily since the 
inception of the Republic in 1948 as shown in Table 4.4. While the ratio of the 
educational budget to the total government budget in 1962 was 14.9 %, it reached 22.8 
% in 1995. 
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Table 4.4 Government Budget vs. Ministry of Education Budget by Year (In thousand 
won) 
Year Government Budgets(A) Education Budgets (B) B/A *100 
1962 69,481,150 10,367,630 14.9 
1965 94,652,348 15,331,155 16.2 
1970 446,273,301 78,478,212 17.6 
1975 1,586,931,050 227,925,711 14.4 
- 1980 5,804,061,441 1,099,159,170 18.9 
1985 12,532,361,835 2,492,308,215 19.9 
1990 22,689,432,968 5,062,431,258 22.3 
1995 54,845,022,310 12,495,810,267 22.8 
1999 88,302,427,989 17,456,265,315 19.8 
Source: Ministry of Education (1999). Education Statistical Yearbook, p.873 
4.2.2.4 Uniqueness of Korea’s System of Education 
Many studies have sought to identity the features underlying the expansion of 
education in Korea. They seem to agree that education in Korea is different from that of 
other countries with similar conditions. Three areas that are unique to Korea are 
substantial private contributions, low unit cost, and automatic promotion policy (McGinn 
et al., 1980; Adams & Gottlieb, 1993; Sorrensen, 1994; Guo and Cummings, 2003). 
First, Korea has a unique social background including community support for 
private schools and family support for education. The expansion of education in Korea 
since 1945 was made possible through private contributions. This was based on the fact 
that, with its limited resources and commitment to primary education, the Korean 
government relied heavily on private schools for providing secondary and higher 
education. As shown in the Table 4.5, while the private schools’ share of the total 
enrollment in primary schools is only 1.3 %, their shares of high school and junior 
college enrollment are 54 and 96 percent, respectively, in 2001. 
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Table 4.5 Enrollments of Korea by School Type, 2001 (unit: %) 
Level National Public Private 
Primary School 0.3 98.4 1.3 
Middle School 0.4 77.8 21.8 
High School 0.9 45.3 53.8 
Junior College 1.4 2.5 96.0 
College/Umv. 36.4 0.9 62.7 
Source: Guo (2003) p. 83, Ministry of Education (2002) 
Financial support from students and their families is another feature of Korean 
education. Korea is an outlier among developing countries where the non government 
sectors usually contribute little to education: “In Korea, parents have traditionally been 
expected to make a financial contribution to education above their contribution through 
taxes.”(Guo and Cummings, 2005, p.87) Table 4.6 shows the family contributions to 
education, by levels. Family support covers almost half of the total educational outlays, 
and these percentages increase as students advance, from 40.6 % in middle school to 72 
% at the college level. 
Table 4.6 Revenue Sources for Education-Family/Private Contributions in Korea, 1989 
Source Average Primary Middle High College/Univ. 
Public Sources 56.04 97.84 59.32 26.87 27.60 
- central gov’t 46.99 97.59 45.55 18.57 9.54 
- local gov’t 
& others 
9.05 0.25 13.77 8.30 18.07 
Private Sources 43.85 2.16 40.68 72.62 72.40 
- Tuition/Fees 30.73 0.98 30.51 58.81 43.08 
- PTA Fees 13.12 1.18 10.17 13.81 29.32 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Ministry of Education (1989), Adams & Gottlieb (1993), p. 168 
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Second, educational development was enhanced in the beginning stages by the 
low unit cost for education. For example, the per pupil expenditures (PPE) per year in 
1965 were $7 in primary, $18 middle, and $152 in high schools respectively. In the same 
year, the PPE in Iraq were $81, $98, and $608, respectively (McGuinn et al., 1980). 
This low unit cost was the result of domestic policy and foreign aid. The domestic 
factors were low teachers’ salaries and large class size. Teacher salaries in 1965 were W 
6,220 per month for primary school, W7,690 for middle school, and W8,860 for high 
school teachers (exchange rate: 1$ = W250). How low the teacher salaries were can be 
seen by comparing them with the cost of living at that time: the average expenditure for a 
family of five living in Seoul was W 12,270 per month. With the rapid increase in 
enrollment after the end of World War II, the class size went the same path with a large 
number of students. A large class size means a low per pupil expenditure. For example, 
in 1965, 11 percent of the primary school classrooms held more than 90 students, and 
another 26 percent had between 81 and 90 students. 
Foreign aid also played an important role in keeping Korea’s expenses for 
education low. Financial support from the US military government between 1945 and 
1947 covered almost two thirds of the operational cost of running the primary schools. 
Foreign aid to Korea from 1952 to 1966 totaled about $100 million. About half of this 
money was invested in classroom construction for primary and secondary schools, 
facilitating the expansion of education after the Korean War in 1950. 
What is clear is that foreign assistance made it possible to build a great 
many classrooms (23,000 either new or rebuilt) specifically intended for 
instruction that probably would not have been constructed as such a rapid rate 
without the availability of capital and materials. [ McGinn et al., 1980, p. 70] 
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Third, Korea is one of the few countries that has maintained a policy of automatic 
promotion at all school levels. This policy had the effect of increasing both the 
enrollment rate and the advancement rate to the next levels, consequently resulting in the 
expansion of education from the early stages. This expansion was accelerated further by 
the open-door policy initiated in 1968 which allowed every elementary graduate to enter 
middle school without examination. In practice, there was a clear increase in the 
promotion rate as a result of this policy. For example, while 75.6% of the males and 
55.8% of the female students went to middle schools in 1964, these percentages were 
83.0% and 67.1% percent in 1974, respectively (Kim, 1973). 
4.2.3 Historical Review of Education Reform 
Korea has kept its own traditional and historical roots of education. At the same 
time, it has been sharing experiences with neighboring countries like America, Japan, and 
China in that those countries had considerable influence on the establishment of 
education in Korea in the modem period. The history of education reform can be better 
understood by considering each stage of national development. It is usually thought that 
there are five stages for this. 
4.2.3.1 The First Phase: the Period of US Military Government (1945-1948) 
With the end of World War II, the United States Military Government (USMG) 
took charge of education until the establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948. The 
educational policy of the USMG was to replace the Japanese system with the US system. 
American military administrators believed that education should play a key role in 
democratizing and modernizing Korean society. To this end, they issued three mandates 
for education: i) the education system should provide equal opportunity for all, ii) it 
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would be controlled at the local level to reflect the heterogeneity of the population, and 
iii) it would strive to develop students with self-reliance and a sense of responsibility 
(McGinn et al., 1980). 
In order to initiate educational innovation in the freed Korean society, the military 
government established two committees: the Korean Committee on Education (KCE) in 
September, 1945 and the National Committee on Educational Planning (NCEP) in 
November of the same year. These committees were composed mainly of Korean 
educators and educational professionals: the US military camp recognized that it knew 
very little about Korean education. The NCEP designed three important education 
policies that became the basis for the education system in modem Korea: i) setting a 
national education goal such as Hongik Ingan (devotion to the welfare of the human 
being), ii) introducing six-year compulsory education, and iii) establishing the 6-3-3-4 
school ladder system (Presidential Commission for Education Reform, 1997). 
4.2.3.2 The Second Phase: the Period of Syngman Rhee (1948-1960) 
The USMG transferred the authority for education to the Korean government 
when the first Republic of Korea was established in 1948. The three years of USMG was 
fraught with political instability and economic difficulties. Furthermore, the Korean War 
between the South and the North that broke out in 1950 made all situations terribly 
worse, and conditions for education were no exception. Nevertheless, this period is 
credited for establishing the foundation of the education system which remains to the 
present. Under the First Republic led by Syngman Rhee, the father of modern Korea, 
many educational measures were planned and implemented. Critical among them were as 
follows. 
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The first education law was enacted in 1949, one year after the inception of the 
Republic. This enactment called for a 6-year free compulsory education program, 
discussed first under the USMG by many Korean education experts, to be implemented. 
The introduction of compulsory education reflected the ever increasing demands for the 
education of the general public which could not be met during the previous regime. A 5- 
year plan for the completion of compulsory education at the primary level was created in 
1954 and was implemented from 1954 to 1959. The plan universalized primary 
education, with an enrollment rate of 96.64% in 1959 (Presidential Commission for 
Education Reform, 1997). 
Local educational autonomy was institutionalized in 1952, a first in the history of 
education in Korea. The law created the provincial and the local boards of education, and 
the local school districts. The provincial boards were composed of representatives from 
counties and controlled secondary education matters. The local boards represented the 
various wards and townships and controlled primary schools. This system of autonomy in 
education survived until the military regime suspended it in 1961. 
During the Korean War, although the destruction was enormous in terms of 
school buildings and teachers, education reform continued. For example, the education 
law was amended to implement educational decentralization in 1951. The wartime 
tertiary education program - War Time Union Colleges - was introduced to sustain 
higher academic education. Therefore, despite the unprecedented hardship confronted 
during the war, the level of enrollment in primary education was maintained with the 
financial assistance of international organizations such as the UN and USAID (McGinn et 
al., 1980). 
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4.2.3.3 The Third Phase: the Period of Chung Hee Park (1961-1979) 
The 1960s were a period of a rapid economic development in Korea. President 
Park Chung Hee, who took power through a military coup in 1960, announced the 
priorities of national policy: the number one agenda item was economic development; 
other major agenda items were national defense, national unity, and the development of 
Korean culture. Every public policy was supposed to be closely linked to the economic 
policy. This direction was translated into concrete policy in education. During this 18- 
year period, education policy was characterized by the following major features: 
strengthening the role of the central government, quantitative expansion of education, and 
universalization of secondary education. 
The central government actively began to involve itself in every aspect of policy. 
The government designed a series of the Five Year Economic Development Plans, the 
first of which covered the period 1962-1966. In conjunction with these economic plans, 
five year educational reconstruction plans were also prepared. 
While Korea achieved the universalization of primary education during the 1950s, 
it strived to accomplish the universalization of secondary education by the end of the 
1970s, achieving an enrollment rate of 95% for the junior high schools by 1980. This 
expansion of the school enrollment rate was attributed to two education reforms. One was 
the open-door policy for middle schools: the entrance exam to junior high school was 
abolished in 1968. As a consequence, all elementary school graduates were expected to 
enter middle school in their school districts without tests. The other reform was the high 
school equalization policy of 1973 which terminated the high school entrance exam. This 
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policy helped to increase high school enrollment from 28.1% in 1970 to 63.5% at the end 
of the 1970s. 
4.2.3.4 The Fourth Phase: the Post-Park Authoritarian Regime (1980-1992) 
While quantitative expansion was the major focus of education policy through the 
1970s, education in the 1980s showed a departure from the former stages in that it placed 
some emphasis upon the quality of education. The government of General Chun Doo 
Hwan, Park’s successor, initiated a radical and comprehensive education reform in 1980: 
this was so called the 7.30 reform. This reform package contained a handful of 
educational innovations as follows: i) the abolishment of the college entrance exam and 
its replacement by the Scholastic Aptitude Test (the Korean SAT), ii) the expansion of 
compulsory education to 9 years, iii) the introduction of graduation quotas at universities, 
iv) the establishment of an education tax, v) the prohibition of private tutoring, vi) an 
increase of the enrollment quotas at universities, and vii) the extension of education 
college programs from 2 to 4 years. 
Another distinctive feature of educational policy in the 1980s was that the 
government undertook for the first time the long-term systematic planning of its 
education policy. This was to be done by the presidential commission for education 
reform. The first presidential commission was established in 1985 and lasted until 1987, 
and a second one served from 1987 to 1989 (Ahn, 1999). 
The mass political democracy movement was another feature of the 1980s which 
had an effect on education. During the 1980s, the teachers’ movement captured the 
public’s attention, particularly that of parents. This was triggered and encouraged by the 
socio-political environment that culminated with the announcement on the 29th of June in 
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1987, by the ruling party’s presidential candidate, of the Declaration of Democracy. This 
will be discussed in a later section. A group of teachers established Jeon Kyo Hyup (the 
Korean Teachers Association: KTA). They argued that education needed more autonomy, 
and that teachers should participate in the process of decision making on important 
education policies. Later, the KTA evolved into Jeonkyojo, the first teachers’ union in 
Korea. 
4.23.5 The Fifth Phase: Civilian Regime (1993-1997) 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, as quantitative expansion approached its 
ceiling, there was a growing consensus in Korean society that the education quality issue 
should come to the fore. Although Korea had, after decades of effort, achieved the 
universalization of primary and secondary education, it was confronting challenges that 
required a shift of the education paradigm and system innovation (Park, 2000). 
First, even though Korean education showed remarkable performance as 
evidenced by student scores in the international student achievement tests such as PISA 
and TIMSS, the precollegiate level was still very deficient in nurturing self-assured and 
creative students with self-motivated learning abilities. Second, the quality of higher 
education was still far behind that of advanced countries despite the fact that it had 
experienced a quantitative explosion during the previous decades, as could be seen in the 
enrollment rate of 80% in 2000, one of the highest levels in the world. Third, there was a 
serious systemic problem in Korean education. It had suffered from too many regulations 
and was highly centralized. During its development, the central government, with heavy 
regulations, took control of almost every aspect of education from elementary to tertiary 
education. This center-oriented system seemed to work well in the beginning stages of 
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education development. However, it became a major hurdle with respect to the qualitative 
improvement of education. 
It was out of a growing consensus on how to cope with the challenges described 
above that the Presidential Commission on Education Reform (the PCER) was set up in 
February, 1994. The PCER was asked to draft a comprehensive reform plan in response 
to increasing demands for education innovation. It presented a series of the reform 
proposals - the 5.31 Education Reform - in four separate reports between 1995 and 1997. 
The vision of education reform was to establish a New Education System for “Edutopia”, 
a utopia of education. Korea was to be “an Education Welfare State - a society of open 
and lifelong education to allow each and every individual equal and easy access to 
education at any time and place.” The major objectives of the reform were: i) to build an 
open education system, ii) to revitalize elementary and secondary education, iii) to lead 
higher education to full autonomy and diversification, and iv) to increase financial 
support for education to 5% of GNP (PCER, 1997; Moon, 1998). 
Table 4.7 Chronology of Major Korean Education Policies and Reforms 
1946 establishment of the ministry of education, the first national curriculum reform 
1949 promulgation of the education law 
1952 establishment of free and compulsory elementary education 
1964 discontinuation of the national qualifying examination for entrance and graduation 
from colleges and universities 
1968 i) promulgation of the Charter of National Education, ii) establishment of the 
preliminary college entrance examinations administered by the MOE, to be taken prior to 
the entrance exam administered by colleges, iii) abolition of middle school admission 
exam 
1973 i) reform of the high school admission system (“equalization of high schools”): all 
students to take a state qualifying exam, and to be assigned by lottery to a regional high 
school, ii) implementation of “the New Education System”, iii) elementary and secondary 
curriculum reform 
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1980 7.30 educational reform : i) abolition of individual college exams and its 
replacement by National Uniform College Entrance Preexamination, ii) weight to be 
given to high school academic records in college admission procedures, iii) establishment 
of college gradation quotas, prohibition of private tutoring 
1985 establishment of the Presidential Commission for Education Reform 
1987 publication of Korean Education Reform: Toward the 21s’ Centuiy 
1988 i) reorganization of the advisory council for education policy, ii) establishment of 
the presidential commission on education as a permanent advisory body to the president, 
iii) reform of college admission procedure (students to apply for college first, and take 
the-entrance exam later), abolition of college graduation quotas 
1994 establishment of the Presidential Commission for Education Reform 
1995 release of the first proposal of the 5.31 education reform 
Source: Adams and Gottlieb (1993), Ministry of Education (1998) 
CHAPTER 5 
CROSS-SECTIONAL COMPARISON OF 
EDUCATIONAL GOVERNANCE REFORM IN CHINA AND KOREA 
This chapter begins by briefly presenting an overview of the theoretical 
framework for comparing policy development and implementation processes across 
countries. After that, it goes on to describe education governance reform in specific cases 
- China and Korea - through the late part of the twentieth century. First, it examines the 
motivating forces underlying this education reform from political, economic, socio¬ 
cultural, financial, and educational standpoints. This is followed by a description and 
analysis of policy implementation including structural renovation and financial reform 
during the period 1985-1995. Then it identifies the consequences of these reforms such as 
the changing aspects of education finance - e.g., per student expenditures and revenues. 
Finally, it compares the two systems and discusses their commonalities and 
dissimilarities. 
5.1 Policy Process and Reform Stage 
This section reviews the policy process for a systemic comparison of educational 
governance reform in China and Korea. This includes the concept of the policy process, 
with various aspects or stages. It tries to identify how the three major stages of reform - 
motive, action, and consequence - are related to or overlapped with the key phases of the 
policy process. Then, the context in which the policy process takes place is followed. 
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5.1.1 Three Major Stages in the Policy Process 
The public policy process refers to “all mechanisms through which the decision 
making and the implementation of public policy are made in our society.” The policy 
process characterizes “how a political system goes about transforming public demand for 
governmental action, arising from the socio-economic environment, into public policy” 
(Miyakawa, 2000, p.2). 
Scholars do not agree upon the nature of the policy making process. Instead, they 
have different perspectives on how policy is made from formulation to termination, and 
to complicate matters, every policy does not necessarily take the same path. Some of the 
steps are often omitted when a final decision is suddenly made by a top manager. While 
the process can theoretically be separated into logical stages, it is in practice very 
complex and can not clearly be divided into separated stages (Ahn, 1984). 
Table 5.1 Policy Process 
Authors No. of Stages 
Adolino and Blake 5 
(2001) 
Ahn (1984) 4 
Anderson et al. 6 
(2000) 
Choi (2000) 4 
Jenkins (1978) 7 
Hogwood and 9 
Gunn (1984) 
Content by Stage 
Agenda setting, policy formation, decision 
making, policy implementation, policy evaluation 
Agenda setting (formulation), policy decision making, 
making, policy implementation, evaluation 
Problem definition, policy agenda setting, policy 
formulation, policy adoption, policy 
implementation, policy evaluation 
Agenda setting, policy formulation, policy 
implementation 
Initiation, information, consideration, decision, 
implementation, evaluation, termination 
deciding to decide, deciding how to decide, Issue 
definition, forecasting, setting objectives and priorities, 
options analysis, policy implementation, evaluation, 
policy maintenance, succession, termination 
Table 5.1 demonstrates a variety of ways in which different scholars view the policy 
process. Their theories have 4 to 9 stages, and there is considerable commonality. 
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although different wording may be used. The stages and contents of the policy process 
appear to depend on the econo-political system and stage of development of the society, 
e.g., capitalist vs. socialist societies, and advanced vs. developing countries. 
As can be seen in Table 5.1, however, three to five stages of policy making may 
be considered common to all cases. They include agenda setting, policy formation, 
decision making, policy implementation, and policy evaluation (Adolino & Blake, 2001; 
Ahn, 1984; Choi, 2000). 
The purpose of this chapter is to conduct a systemic analysis and comparison of 
three aspects of educational decentralization reform in China and Korea: motive, action, 
and consequences. That is, i) what were the primary motivating forces?, ii) how was the 
reform idea implemented?, iii) what were the major consequences?, and iv) what were 
the similarities and differences between the two countries? 
These three aspects of reform that have been selected for comparison are 
important because they comprise the major phases of the public policy process in any 
society as described earlier. It is possible to broadly parallel, if not tightly couple, these 
three empirical aspects of reform with three theoretical stages of policy. To be more 
specific, motive relates to or overlaps with problem identification and agenda setting, 
action relates to or overlaps with policy formulation and implementation, and 
consequence relates to or overlaps with evaluation. Table5.2 shows selected stages of the 
policy process and associated comparison variables. 
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Table 5.2. Selected Stages of Policy Process and Associated Comparison Variables 
Major policy process Major aspects of reform Specific contents 
problem identification/ motives political, economic, social, 
agenda setting and administrative reasons 
policy formulation/ actions 
law, 
enactment or revisions of 
implementation enforcement, election. 
evaluation consequences efficiency, equity, adequacy 
5.1,1.1 Problem Identification and Agenda Setting: Motives of Reform 
The policy agenda refers to a set of problems that are recognized as needing to be 
solved by the government. It has various forms depending on their contexts (Ahn, 1984); 
it means system (public) agenda or government (official) agenda depending on who is the 
subjective actor of the agenda: the general public or government. It constitutes a new 
agenda or an old agenda depending on whether it is repeated. Others classify these types 
of policy agenda as problem definition agenda, proposal agenda, and negotiation agenda , 
or optional agenda and required agenda. 
The policy agenda comes up, as a system agenda or a public agenda, with public 
problems based upon socio-political, economic, and educational matters. Attention is 
paid as to why some problems are successful in obtaining a government’s serious 
attention while others do not. One of the most important factors in a problem getting 
public policy agenda status is the political leadership, e.g., the president and legislature 
(Anderson et al. 2000). It is seen in the cases of China and Korea. 
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Depending on the social environment, the policy agenda appears to become set in 
various ways. Cobb and others (1976) identify the three different paths: outside initiation, 
inside initiation, and mobilization. 
In the outside initiation approach, a systematically organized interest group raises 
social issues and attracts public interest and concerns through mass rallies and 
advertisements. Based upon this public attention, they put pressure on the government to 
place the issue on its formal policy agenda. 
In contrast, inside initiation tries to capture government attention by collective 
group activities; they do not use advertisement or mass demonstration to attract public 
attention. Finally, in the mobilization approach, the government is actively involved in 
moving an issue from the systemic agenda to the institutional agenda. In this approach, 
the government fosters the establishment of non-government organizations (interest 
groups) that are keenly concerned with particular policy problems. Agenda items are 
presented by these interest groups and naturally take their place on the formal policy 
agenda. By this approach, the government is likely to obtain the support of the public, 
and avoid its criticism and opposition. 
According to Cobb et al. (1976), these three models are related to the political 
system of each society. The inside and outside initiation approaches are more commonly 
found in democratized societies, while the mobilization approach is more often seen in 
authoritarian regimes. 
5.1.1.2 Policy Formulation, Adoption, and Implementation: Actions 
When a problem gets official agenda status, it needs to become formalized in 
order to be developed into public policy. Policy formulation connotes “the development 
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of a pertinent and acceptable proposed course of action for dealing with public problems” 
(Anderson et al., 2000, p.15). It is one thing, policy adoption is another. That is, policy 
formulation does not necessarily mean the adoption of laws or orders. Once, the policy is 
adopted, implementation is supposed to follow. 
Implementation refers to “the carrying out of a basic policy decision, usually 
incorporated in a statute but which can also take the form of important executive orders 
or court decision” (Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1983, p.20). In the U.S., the major actors for 
policy formulation, adoption, and implementation are the president, the congress, and 
administrative agencies. 
The focus of policy implementation research has changed over time, showing a 
generational cycle. The first generation of research was most concerned with whether the 
results of a policy fulfill its stated goals. The second generation was interested in how 
different individuals and institutes responded to the policy, and is most concerned about 
conditions for the successful implementation of the policy across the board. Finally, the 
third generation tries to draw lessons from the two former generations, by establishing 
conditions for the achievement of the intended effects of the policy (McDonnell & 
Elmore, 1987). 
At one time, implementation was regarded as a less important step than policy 
formation and design. However, since the mid 1970s, many studies demonstrated the 
importance of implementation in policy, citing it as a crucial factor for the success of 
policy. That is, however well designed a policy program is, it will be useless or even 
counterproductive unless it is properly and fully implemented. 
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McDonnell and Elmore (1987) identify four generic policy instruments for 
implementation: mandates, inducements, capacity-building, and system-changing. In 
addition, Adolino and Blake (2001) suggest four types of policy instrument: direct 
government instruments, market instruments, voluntary instruments, and mixed 
instruments. 
As mentioned earlier, this study uses three stages of education reform - motives, 
action, and result - as a proxy for the commonly mentioned phases of the policy process 
with which they overlap. The stage of action covers three phases of the policy process: 
policy formulation, adoption and implementation. Based on these overlapping concepts, I 
shall analyze the cases of China and Korea in terms of how the reform motive and ideas 
were formulated or implemented. The examples explored include the introduction of nine 
year compulsory education and the enactment of the related law in 1986 in China, and the 
revival of local autonomy and enactment of local educational autonomy law in 1991 in 
Korea. 
5.1.1.3 Evaluation: Consequences/Results 
The last stage of the policy process is evaluation. The results of the 
implementation of the policy are evaluated by assessing how successful the policy has 
been in achieving its intended goals. For effective evaluation, it is important to specify 
what the original goals and objectives were, and to use some adequate evaluation 
techniques. Without that, it is not possible to conduct a valid evaluation: the results of the 
evaluation are likely to be biased or limited (Hogwood & Gunn, 1984; Hill & Hupe, 
2000) 
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Regarding the policy evaluation, Anderson et al. (2000) suggest two types: seat- 
of-the -pants or political evaluation and systematic evaluation. Adolino and Blake (2001) 
identify three arenas of evaluation: judicial, administrative, and political. Political 
evaluation is not a desirable method because it is “impressionistic in nature. At best, such 
judgments are based on fragmentary evidence and are often strongly ideological or 
biased” (Anderson et al., 2000, p.17). In contrast, both administrative and systematic 
evaluations are conducted by the government or by a professional evaluation agency. 
They try to obtain objective evidence in terms of statistics, for example, of the degree of 
success. They are the preferred approaches. 
This study uses systematic evaluation methods to assess the results of educational 
governance reform. However, because of limited data accessibility, several major policies 
that were implemented in the two countries, such as nine year compulsory education in 
China and local education autonomy in Korea, are evaluated using not only statistical 
analysis, but also non-statistical inference. 
5.1.2 Policy Making Context 
As described in the previous section, policy ideas have contextual sensitivity. 
Similar programs will appear different in terms of agenda setting, policy formulation, and 
implementation, depending upon their county-specific environments. For example, 
education reform ideas from industrialized nations, e.g., OECD member countries, may 
not be duplicated in less developed countries, e.g., China, Korea, and the East Asian 
countries. Therefore, to take this into account, policy making should be country-specific. 
For example, the political system theory emphasizes the relationship between input, 
throughput (conversion) and output, which are strongly influenced by environmental 
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factors. Most important are the socio-cultural, econo-political and the institutional 
environments in different countries (Easton, 1964; Adolino & Blake, 2001). Examples of 
each are described below. 
5.1.2.1. Socio-cultural Variables 
Education reform can be influenced by at least two important cultural factors. One 
is the attitude of the public toward the existing educational system. Public dissatisfaction 
with current educational services and demands for quality education lead to education 
innovation movements. In many cases, this is independent of the country’s 
developmental stage. The other factor is a shift of the ideological values that education is 
to pursue. For many nations, at some point in time, a dominating concern becomes, “Who 
is education for?” In other words, equality of opportunity in education can become the 
most predominant issue in a society. However, this ideology does not last forever; rather 
it soon yields to the next wave of values such as excellence, efficiency and market- 
oriented value. Such shifts in value orientation have forced educational leaders to initiate 
education reform policies (Cuban, 1990). This occurred in China and Korea: each 
restructured its educational governance system for this reason. 
5.1.2.2 Econo-political Variables 
The need for the development of a national economy in the competitive global 
market inevitably requires labor forces to be better equipped with knowledge and skills. 
In particular, education is required to be more responsive to the demands of the ever- 
changing industrial and information society. For example, business leaders tend to blame 
education when the economy declines. This is the so-called “scapegoat theory” that calls 
for educational innovation as a panacea for many or all of the existing problems. An 
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examination of the global trend in education reform reveals that it is based upon the 
perceived need to establish a human infrastructure for economic development in the age 
of information and high technology. Korea and China are just such cases. Investigating 
the political system can reveal how the education policy making process is affected by 
political actors such as interest groups, legislators, and partisan leaders. The influence 
that interest groups can have depends on the degree of democratic development. For 
example, under an authoritative regime, interest groups’ impact may be small when 
compared with the impact that they can have in a democratic society. 
5.1.2.3 Institutional Variables 
One of the common policy issues in the international comparison of public policy 
in education is, “Who controls education?” Different countries have developed dissimilar 
systems of educational governance, with different policy making processes in dissimilar 
contexts. For example, European countries such as France and the Scandinavian countries 
use a centralized decision-making process, unlike other countries in the European 
regions. In contrast, Anglo-Saxon nations such as America, England and Canada have 
highly decentralized policy making traditions (Castles, 1993). 
5.2 Motivating forces 
5.2.1 China 
As in many other countries, education reform in China since the 1980s was led by 
a variety of idiosyncratic forces including econo-political, socio-cultural, educational, and 
financial variables. 
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5.2.1.1 Econo-political Sources of Reform 
When they launched a broad reform in the mid 1970s, Chinese leaders led by 
Deng Xiaoping declared a set of paramount principles for national development, 
particularly for the recovery of the glory of China. These cardinal principles were the 
three orientations: modernization, the world, and the future, and the four modernizations: 
industry, agriculture, national defense, and science and technology. These strategic 
principles for national development focused on economic advancement. 
To realize national modernization, the Chinese government adopted two key 
strategic policies: the open door policy and the market-driven economic policy (Hawkins, 
2001). China initiated education reform as part of this broad economic reform, with the 
strong belief that education plays a key role in economic development by providing an 
infrastructure of human resources, i.e., a well-trained workforce. 
The market economy had a critical impact on Chinese education reform (Wang, 
2003). The market function working in the field of education resulted in increased 
productivity and efficiency in education. This was the economic foundation for education 
reform. The economic reform movement changed and broadened the mode of education 
from the traditional to a modem one. Consequently, the education policy stressed 
reformation of the existing education system by the introduction of market-driven 
programs; e.g., school choice and privatization. 
Since the establishment of the PRC in 1949, Chinese education policies fluctuated 
each time there was a change in political leadership. It is often said that Chinese public 
policy changed because each political leader had a different perception of “the national 
development”: they pursued different ideological directions (Tsang, 2000). 
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The two major ideological streams of the policy in modem China were the radical 
led by Mao Zedong, and the moderate led by Deng Xiaoping. The two factions had 
different primary goals for national construction. The radicals stressed ideological 
devotion to communism and human liberation. The moderates valued the material and 
moral improvement of people’s lives. The former paid much more attention to the 
continuous class struggle and revolution to change the social relations of production, 
while the latter pursued the practical and tangible improvement of the standards of living 
of the general public. 
5.2.1.2 Socio-cultural Sources of Reform 
Two social and cultural elements also provided impetus for educational reform. 
One was the public attitude toward the Cultural Revolution (CR), which lasted from 1966 
to 1976. In general, the CR was judged by the Chinese people to be a nightmare, having 
brought devastation, deprivation, and destructive turmoil. This severe perception helped 
to build a broad consensus on national construction and triggered a social innovation 
movement in China. 
What confronted the new generation of decision-makers was a harsh 
reality: very poor living conditions, deeply confused ideology, a national 
economy which was on the brink of collapse, and a closed society which had lost 
its confidence in constructive criticism. These problems were recognized as a 
serious impediment to social and economic development, and thus invited broad¬ 
ranging reforms. [Lewin & Hui, 1989, p. 7] 
The other was the cultural and historical factor, engraved in minds of the general 
public in China that had traditionally led education reform. The Chinese people were 
proud of their historical heritage, being the nation of great philosopher Confucius and a 
country of “the four great inventions” in the history of the world: printing, magnetic 
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compass, gunpowder, and paper. This national confidence that they can do anything and 
realize a great nation in the near future led the national reform policy in the late 1970s 
(Guo and Cummings, 2005). 
5.2.1.3 Educational Sources of Reform 
The conventional belief that education is a primary mover of national 
development had a strong influence on the launch of both the educational and economic 
reforms. From the outset of economic reform in the late 1970s, the Chinese leaders 
recognized the importance of skilled workers and the serious shortage of human 
resources for economic development in China as well. This was evidenced by Deng’s 
remark: 
....the economy of our country may approach the level of the developed countries 
at its 100th anniversary. One of the reasons we say so is that we possess the power 
to develop education well, to increase the scientific and technological level and to 
train hundreds of millions of all kinds of qualified manpower at all levels in the 
time before the 2040s. Our country, its power and the potential of economic 
development depend increasingly on the quality of labor and on the quantity and 
quality of the intellectuals. [ Deng Xiaoping, 1985, cited in Lewin et ah, 1994, p. 
17] 
His remark caused Chinese leaders to pay close attention to education, and to 
believe that without education innovation, no economic and national development could 
be achieved. They recognized that the education system at the time of reform would not 
able to meet the increasing demands of society, in particular with respect to the four 
modernizations (Hawkins, 2001). 
There were four problems that the Chinese government sought to correct by 
education reform in 1985 (CPC Central Committee 1985, Wan Li 1985, Lewin et ah, 
1994). First of all, elementary education was problematic because of its low quality; this 
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was having a negative effect on all subsequent levels of schooling. Secondly, vocational 
and technical education had failed to provide a properly trained workforce; there was a 
mismatch between the job requirements of the labor market and the levels and kinds of 
skill of graduates. Thirdly, the entire education system was not working as a social 
institution that leads societal changes, nor was it responding to the various needs 
stemming from the social, economic, scientific and technological, and cultural changes 
that were occurring. Fourthly, the educational governance system was being operated so 
rigidly by the highly centralized authority that it suffocated the eagerness of local 
governments to develop their own educational programs and systems for their people. It 
“deprived them of their vitality and initiative in serving the need of socialist 
construction” (Lewin et al., 1994, p. 19). 
The major goal of the 1985 education reform was to strengthen primary 
education. This was to be accomplished by the expansion of compulsory education, and 
by governance renovation and financial reform. In addition, reform of vocational and 
technical education was stressed. It was clearly announced in the CCP Decision on 
Education Reform in 1985 which said: 
Through the reform, we mean to usher in a new education situation in 
which elementary education will be substantially strengthened, vocational and 
technical education will be greatly expanded, colleges and universities will be 
able to exploit their potential and exercise their initiative to the full, outside 
school and after school education as well as regular school education will develop 
simultaneously, and education of all kinds and at all level will actively address the 
multiple needs of economic and social development. [CPC, 1985] 
5.2.1.4 Financial Sources of Reform 
Although the several motivating forces for reform in China have been described 
above, it is important to understand that the most imperative issue in education reform 
was school finance, not only its adequacy, but also its efficiency. Many countries in both 
developed and developing stages pursue school reform in the name of improving 
educational achievement, enhancing the involvement of stakeholders, or facilitating 
power redistribution. However, China initiated a radical transformation of its governance 
structure, from a highly centralized system to a decentralized one, for a different reason. 
The main purpose of this reform was to cope with ever increasing financial demands, 
primarily the result of its population expansion and the introduction of nine-year 
compulsory education. When China popularized basic education in the mid 1980s, the per 
capita income was $300; by comparison with other countries, this was regarded as 
inadequate to implement that policy. An adequate financial basis was recognized to be 
imperative for the effective implementation of the reform policy (Tsang, 1996). 
5.2.2 Korea 
Paralleling the discussion of China in section 5.2.1, this section examines the 
same three dimensions of educational governance reform in Korea: motivating forces, 
decentralization in action, and the consequences of reform. 
The driving forces underlying the decentralization movement in Korea are very 
complex in terms of their scope and density. While the financial problem was a strong 
reason for governance restructuring in China, political democratization had been a 
paramount agenda item for the Korean government since the mid 1980s. The major 
motivations that drove the education decentralization reform between 1985 and 1995 in 
the Republic of Korea are described in this section. 
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5.2.2.1 Socio-political Motivation for Reform 
As Huntington argues, one of the most impressive global features in developing 
countries such as those in East Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe in the late 
twentieth century was the global democratic revolution. More than 30 countries changed 
their political systems from authoritarian to democratic between 1974 and 1990 
(Huntington, 1991), and Korea was one of them. This revolution had a deep impact on 
the centralized system that was firmly rooted in Korea’s socio-political background. 
Boyer and Ahn (1991) present the main reasons for Korea’s solid and complete 
centralization. 
First, South Korea is an inheritor of the Confucian tradition of a center- 
down authority structure. Second, the legacies of centralization of the Yi dynasty 
(1392-1910) and Japanese colonialism (1910-1945) are still alive, and third, South 
Korea, similar to other developing countries, chose to follow the neoclassic top- 
down growth model of monolithic industrialization. Fourth, South Korea’s 
perception of North Korea as a continuing threat to its security provides a 
rationale for central control of all public affairs. Fifth, South Korea experienced a 
succession of military regimes from 1961 to 1987. [Boyer and Ahn, 1991, cited in 
Lee 1995, p. 23] 
Korea had been under authoritarian regimes for thirty years, from 1961 to 1991. 
During this period, decentralization was suspended despite the fact that the Constitution 
in 1948 clearly promulgated a national system of local autonomy. Furthermore, President 
Park’s so called Yushin Constitution” in 1972 prescribed that the local assembly would 
not be constituted until national unification was achieved. The fall of the Park regime in 
1979 gave new hope to the Korean people; there was an outpouring of demand for 
democracy and for the revitalization of the local autonomy system. 
2 President Park Chung Hee revised the national constitution in 1972 to include many 
undemocratic provisions such as the elimination of the presidential term and adoption of 
the indirect election of president. 
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During the political chaos - the so called Seoul Spring - followed by the 
assassination of President Park in 1979, General Chun Doo Whan captured power and 
became the next president. Not unexpectedly, the situation became even worse. Many 
political dissidents and student activists raised questions about the legitimacy and 
political authority of Chun’s government, and they argued consistently that the existing 
constitution should be revised to establish a democratic political system in particular, and 
a democratic society as a whole. This socio-political confrontation between the 
government and the anti-government groups culminated in April, 1980 when President 
Chun declared that his government would keep the existing constitutional system. This 
presidential announcement triggered a massive demonstration against the government. 
Hundreds of thousands of ordinary citizens joined this movement, demanding the 
resignation of the president and arguing for regime change. This incident was quite 
different from any that had occurred before; the general citizenry rarely joined in 
demonstrations against the government, even though they shared the sentiments of the 
activists, because they believed that this type of demonstration was the province of 
student activists and politicians only (Seth, 2002). 
This unprecedented situation brought about a historical turning point in Korean 
society. The presidential candidate of the ruling party, Rho Tae Woo, issued a political 
reform package that was called “The 6.29 Declaration.” This reform proposal included 
eight socio-political reform agendas, and chief among them was the revival of the local 
autonomy system. This political momentum stimulated wide-ranging discussions of 
educational decentralization reform in Korea. 
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5.2.2.2 Legal Motivation for Reform 
When the national assembly tried to draft a national constitution in 1948, one of 
the important issues was the local autonomy to be granted for administration and 
education. This had been a key topic of political conversation between 1945 and 1948 
under the US military regime. The American authority had sought to implant the US 
educational governance system into Korea, and this was incorporated into the first 
constitution without serious objection. Ever since then, Korea has had a legal basis for 
systems of local autonomy. 
The National Constitution stipulated local autonomy in its Chapter 8: 
i) the local self-governing authority shall manage local-based 
administrative affairs and national duties delegated from the central government 
under the jurisdiction of related laws. The provincial authority shall enact various 
ordinances for local autonomy within the laws (article 96). li) the organization 
and operation of local self-governing authorities shall be based on laws, and a 
local assembly is established in each jurisdiction, iii) laws shall be enacted for the 
organization, power, and election of local board members (article 97). The 
constitutional article on education says that laws shall be enacted to guarantee 
educational autonomy, professionalism, and political neutrality (article 31). 
The Basic Education Law also prescribed that: 
i) the central and local governments shall guarantee educational 
autonomy and professionalism, ii) they shall initiate educational 
policies which reflect well local-specific educational demands, iii) 
school autonomy shall be respected, and parents, students, school 
staff, and community leaders can participate in school operation 
according to the related laws and ordinances (article 5). The Local 
Educational Autonomy Law reasserted the above; its main purpose was to 
prescribe the organization and the function of local self-governed authorities over 
education, science, technology, and physical education, and to make contributions 
toward the educational development of each province (article 1). 
These three documents together - the Constitution, the Basic Education Law, and 
the Local Educational Autonomy Law - served as the driving engine to achieve 
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educational decentralization between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s. 
5.2.2.3 Administrative and Organizational Motivation for Reform 
When the discussion of local educational autonomy was getting heated in the late 
1980s, several problems with the existing system of administration and organization led 
to the relocation of educational power. Despite the legal ground, the laws relating to local 
autonomy didn’t come into full effect until 1991. This was because each law contained a 
supplementary provision stating that for a while, the central government would carry out 
the functions ultimately to be performed by the local assembly. 
Originally, the regional boards in the metropolitan cities and in the provinces were 
given the authority to handle all issues relating to general administration and education. 
The executive officers for general administration were the mayors or governors 
respectively, while those for education were the boards of education, which were to 
delegate the authority for educational policy design and implementation to the 
superintendent, a member of the board of education. 
These functions, however, were not fully implemented. According to the Local 
Autonomy Act, the functions of the local assemblies were to be exercised by the central 
government until they were legally constituted; the Ministries of Home Affairs and 
Education assumed the roles of the local assemblies and boards of education, 
respectively. 
Consequently, the members of the boards of education were appointed by the 
minister of education following the recommendations of the mayor or governor of each 
area. The superintendents were selected by the board of education and recommended to 
the central government for appointment. Finally, the president appointed the 
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superintendents. Thus, local autonomy in education became superficial; this contributed 
to renewed discussions of educational decentralization. 
5.2.2.4 Financial Motivation for Reform 
When it comes to the main purpose of governance reform, many developing 
countries like China treated solving the financial problem as the main goal of the reform. 
The financial centrality in Korea made some contributions to the discussion of 
decentralization. 
The financial imbalance between the central government and the provincial 
governments was the core issue that had to be addressed. A method for increasing or 
normalizing the local tax base, which was far smaller than the national tax base, was 
needed. Although democratization, including decentralization, was an overarching idea 
that had a strong influence on all sectors of society in 1989, the percentage of local taxes 
was only 18.8% of the total tax revenue. When compared to the OECD countries such as 
the United States (30.8%), Japan (25.9%), and Canada (43.3%), Korea’s tax base was 
very centralized. This weakness in the degree of local financial independence in Korea 
was one of the most important barriers to local autonomy (Park, 1992). 
The financial dependence of local governments on the central government was 
still the same in 1991. National taxes accounted for 81 percent of all taxes, and local 
taxes 19 percent. By comparison, Japan’s national taxes were 63.4%, local taxes 36.6%; 
and in the United States, 56.3% and 43.7%, respectively (Ito, 1992, p. 427). 
The low tax base for local governments is closely related to Korea's basic policy 
for development. The central government-driven development policies brought about 
several socio-economic contradictions. Chief among them were serious economic 
imbalances between regions, and large economic differences between urban and rural 
sectors. For example, Seoul (the capital), and its neighboring Incheon and Gyeonggi 
provinces were highly developed areas that accounted for 40% of Korea’s GNP, while 
two-thirds of the country’s 260 local administrative units (cities, counties, and wards) had 
been left behind in development, and could not even generate enough local tax revenue to 
pay the salaries of their government officials. 
In seeking a solution to this problem, local citizens argued that great investments 
should be made for regional social and economic development. They believed that the 
implementation of local autonomy would bring about locally balanced development, and 
changes in Korea’s centralized public finance (Kojima, 1992). 
There were at least three motives that led to financial decentralization in Korea 
(Park, 1992; Lee, 2003). First, fiscal decentralization would make it possible to 
implement the economic development projects more efficiently. If local governments, 
rather than the central government, design these projects, local governments will have a 
greater commitment to achieving efficiency and effectiveness in these public services. 
Second, decentralization is an economically efficient way of delivering local services. 
The uniform service provided by the central government may not meet specific local 
demands because various localities have diverse needs for particular public services. 
Third, decentralization enhances democracy through popular participation in the process 
of local decision-making on important financial matters. Local residents would have an 
increased voice as they determine the direction of local service delivery. 
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5.3 Decentralization in Action 
5.3.1 China 
Educational decentralization reform in China took various forms. Most important 
among them were the introduction of nine-year compulsory education, the structural 
reform, and school finance reform. 
5.3.1.1 Nine-year Compulsory Education 
Education reform in China appeared to pursue both quantitative and qualitative 
goals in the 1980s. The former is epitomized by the introduction of nine-year compulsory 
education while the latter is reflected in the policy of vocationalization of schooling. The 
latter diversifies the type of schooling in order to meet the needs of various customers 
including government, enterprises, private business and individuals. 
Government leaders in their educational planning were encouraged to take a long¬ 
term perspective, as the old Chinese saying: “It takes ten years to grow a tree, but it takes 
one hundred years to rear a human being.” They believed that it was most imperative to 
build an educational infrastructure for the future development of their nation. For 
example, reducing illiteracy was a basic task for the Chinese government to undertake in 
order to rehabilitate its old glory in the long-term perspective. The one feasible solution 
to this problem was the expansion of compulsory education. 
Compulsory education reform was an ambitious plan in terms of both scale and 
scope. It provided hundreds of millions of children with the opportunity to attend schools, 
and demanded that a huge amount of money be invested in education. In consideration of 
their economic status, education professionals adopted an incremental approach and the 
division of labor strategy between the central and local governments, and between the 
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governmental and non- governmental sectors. The Compulsory Education Act, the first 
education law in the modem history of China, provided a firm basis for the systematical 
implementation of the reform. 
The law required that (State Education Commission, 1986; Mulligan, 1991): 
1. Under the central government’s administration, nine-year compulsory education 
should be carried out by local governments in accordance with local conditions. 
2. All children who reach the age of six, regardless of their sex, nationality, or race, 
must receive compulsory education. In areas in which the conditions are below 
the standard, the age can be extended to seven. 
3. Those parents and guardians who refuse to allow their children who have reached 
the age of schooling to receive compulsory education will be criticized, and 
necessary measures will be taken by the local government to order them to send 
their children to school. 
4. The local governments are authorized to stop any work unit or individual person 
from employing children and adolescents through criticism or punishment, such 
as suspending a business license. 
5. Compulsory education is divided into two stages: elementary and junior high. 
The universalization of elementary compulsory education is a condition for the 
implementation of junior high compulsory education. 
6. The government encourages enterprise, institutions, and other social groups to 
establish various kinds of schools in accordance with the compulsory education 
law. 
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7. Compulsory education is tuition free. Students from poor families can receive 
some financial aid from the states3. 
8. The State Council and the local governments at all levels should guarantee the 
collection of the funds needed to implement compulsory education. 
In order for the new law to be effectively implemented, the State Education 
Commission took several concrete measures including financial measures, establishing 
standards, and prohibiting child labor (Mullligan, 1991). The introduction of compulsory 
education was expected to result in increased enrollments in primary schools, 
consequently causing additional financial needs. To cope with these financial demands, 
the State Council and the State Commission of Education initiated the so-called 
additional 1 percent tax, imposed on any unit of work and business. This additional tax, 
in addition to regular payments on product and business transactions, was supposed to go 
the local governments. 
Local governments responsible for providing the compulsory education service 
needed standards and requirements for the effective implementation of the law. The 
central government issued a regulation for this purpose in 1987: “The State Commission 
of Education’s Idea on Making Standard Conditions for Running Compulsory Education, 
and Steps, Targets, Plans, and Statistics in Implementing Compulsory Education” 
(General Office of the State Commission of Education, 1987). The standard was linked to 
the local conditions in terms of economic and societal circumstances. It provided two 
basic principles. One was that the local government policy should meet the standard of a 
Financial aid to students from poor families might be a political rhetoric because the 
Chinese government couldn’t afford even compulsory education itself with GDP per 
capita of $ 385 at that time (Tsang, 1996). 
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higher level authority. The other was that each level of government should operate with a 
division of labor. The township should implement compulsory education when its 
condition can meet the standard required by the new law. The county governments were 
in charge of inspecting and guiding the implementation of compulsory education. The 
provincial governments were responsible for managing a broad range of policies such as 
planning, regulation, and school financing policies. 
The Chinese government recognized that there were structural obstacles to the 
implementation of compulsory education. Chief among them was the problem of child 
labor and the dropout rate. In 1988, the State Commission of Education issued a 
regulation prohibiting the use of child labor. This measure was needed because for 
several decades many enterprises and private institutes had abusively hired young 
children under the age of sixteen. The use of child labor was viewed as the main cause of 
the dropout problem in elementary and secondary education. According to the 
government statistics for 1979-1984, the dropout rates in elementary and lower secondary 
schools in the whole county were 46 and 39 percent respectively (Bakken, 1988). The 
regulation strongly warned employers not to use child labor. 
Anyone who abusively hires and uses child labor will be ordered to return 
the child and pay a fine from three thousand yuan to five thousand yuan for each 
child hired. And in serious situations, authorities will take away the business 
registration. Private enterprise and business people should sign a contract when 
they hire people to avoid hiring child labor. Legal action will be taken against 
those who violate the law and hire child labor that results in an accident. 
[Mulligan, 1991, p.104] 
5.3.1.2 Structural Reform 
Structural changes that were realized during the education reform period in the 
1980s can be divided into several categories. In addition to the expansion of compulsory 
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education explained in the previous section, decentralization, recentralization, 
privatization, and vocationalization of schooling were also of momentous importance. 
Implementation of decentralization in China was influenced by both the global 
trend and Chinese-specific conditions. From the global perspective, many developing 
countries were decentralizing responsibility for managing and financing primary and 
secondary education. Three reasons for this worldwide trend were: i) dissatisfaction with 
highly centralized systems of education was increasing, ii) education systems were 
becoming larger and more complex, and iii) the financial capacity of the central 
government to provide quality education was limited (Rondinelli, 1989). 
In the 1970s, the Chinese society had witnessed a reform movement led by its 
new leadership: Deng Xiaoping and his followers. The Chinese leaders saw the pitfalls 
of the social system as a whole, particularly in the government system. They believed that 
the system was dominated by a rigid bureaucracy, that management operated in a very 
inefficient way, and that the decision-making structure was too highly centralized. In 
addition, it suffered from a chronic shortage of resources for the implementation of policy 
(Delany & Paine, 1991). 
In general, new leadership tended to initiate changes to distinguish itself from the 
previous regime, to legitimize its new authority and leadership. Under Deng Xiaoping 
decentralization was initiated with a different rhetoric, albeit with the same instrument. 
That is, “decentralization can serve purposes quite different from those stated, namely in 
resolving management conflicts, establishing legitimacy, and asserting control” 
(Cummings & Riddell, 1994, p. 766). 
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This movement had resulted in a change in the authority structure in the mid 
1980s. Important among them were i) delegation of authority to the local level, ii) 
delegation of administrative decision-making to experts, a departure from the party- 
dominated structure, iii) stress on efficiency and accountability, and iv) emphasis on 
market function in every social field (Wang, 2001). 
The structural change in China’s education system was rooted in the Decision of 
Education Reform by the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 1985. This resolution is 
comprised of five sections: i) restructuring education to improve the quality of the nation 
and produce as many skilled people as possible, ii) entrusting responsibility for 
elementary education to local authorities, and instituting nine-year compulsory education, 
iii) restructuring secondary education and vigorously promoting vocational and technical 
education, iv) reforming the enrollment plan at the institutions of higher education, and 
the system of job assignment on graduation, and extending their decision making power, 
and v) strengthening leadership and mobilizing all positive factors to ensure successful 
restructuring of education (CPC, 1985, p. 2). 
The basic principle of power relocation in Chinese education was characterized 
by the division of labor: central planning and local implementation. The authority and 
responsibility for primary education belonged to local governments. That is. 
Except for major policies and principles and general plans that are to be 
determined by the central authorities, all other responsibilities and powers are to 
be delegated to local authorities for drawing up and implementing specific 
policies, rules and regulations, and plans as well as for guiding, administering and 
monitoring the work for the schools. The authorities of the provinces, autonomous 
regions and centrally administered municipalities will define the functions and 
powers for administrative departments at all levels. [CPC, 1985, p. 236] 
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In Deng’s new decentralization in 1985, power and responsibility devolved to 
units at every level: provinces, municipal cities, county, township, and village 
communities. The first aspect of Deng’s decentralization was that village governments 
were accountable for primary education in terms of management and finance. They were 
specifically responsible for raising funds for education. Township governments took 
responsibility for providing junior secondary education, while county governments had 
the obligation of handling senior secondary education. At each level an authority had 
been created for financing the schools, and for the hiring and firing of teachers, with 
some limited control of the curriculum. To complete the picture, higher education was 
assigned to the provincial or the central government (Hawkins, 1996). 
The second aspect of Deng’s decentralization was the restructuring of power in 
schools. During the 1985 reform period, there was a change in principal assignment. 
Before reform, school principals were appointed by the upper level authority. This 
traditional practice was continued until it had evolved to a western type selection model 
in which the schools were allowed to adopt an open application system. In this new 
system, candidates applied and principals were selected by teachers and other educational 
professionals (Wang, 2001). 
Just what happened in school sites during education reform depended on the 
political situation. When the schools were hyper-politicized, the school administrators 
including principals were less powerful; instead party secretaries residing in the schools 
became dominant. However, in the times when education was depoliticized, school 
principals exercised major authority in school operations. 
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The third aspect of Deng’s decentralization was departure from state party 
intervention. Before reform in the 1980s, there was a dual system of school policy 
decision-making; both principals and the party representatives of schools participated. 
The party personnel had full authority over major decisions such as teacher staffing, 
curriculum, textbooks, and school finance. The internal party apparatus at schools had the 
final voice in deciding any administrative and social programs so that they would meet 
the community’s ideological standards. This dual system came to an end when Premier 
Zhao Ziyang pronounced at the 13th Party Congress in 1987 that there should be a true 
separation of the state and Party authority in schools. Since then, party influence in 
school administration declined considerably (Delany & Paine, 1991). 
Policy often goes back and forth like a ping-pong ball. During the reform period, 
China experienced two modes of policy oscillation, moderate and radical, and 
decentralization and recentralization. The ambition of the Chinese government to initiate 
nine-year compulsory education with limited economic capacity was accompanied by a 
power shift to local units from the centrality. In fact, decentralization of authority and 
responsibility was aimed largely at generating financial to support the new policy. 
However, “for a variety of reasons, including issues of equity, the central 
government in 1994 began a process of recentralization removing certain tax authority 
from the local governments” (Hawkins, 2000). The most frequently cited reasons for this 
recentralization in Chinese education involved psychological, practical, and political 
points. First of all, decentralization had caused a sense of crisis among central 
government officials. They feared losing control of education matters that had 
traditionally belonged to the central government. Secondly, because this central policy 
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gave local governments the authority to make major decisions independent of the central 
authority, it created the problems of inefficiency and ineffectiveness. When local 
governments insisted on having their own leeway for major projects that were sometimes 
against the will of the upper level authority, there were no appropriate tools to control 
them, thus despoiling the national policy. In addition, the local policy may not utilize the 
economy of scale that improves efficiency. Finally, decentralization encouraged localism 
and particularism. The rearrangement of intergovernmental relations increased the 
autonomy of local governments, and at the same time, it caused a lack of the national 
unity in terms of the consistency and coherence of the central policy (Wang, 2001). 
Consequently, the central government in 1994 withdrew the tax authority that had been 
handed down to localities in 1985. Again, the central government imposed taxes and 
levies to provide for education, including compulsory education (Hawkins, 2000). 
As the market function was introduced to the socialist economic system, the 
educational sector saw a range of changes. Critical among the structural changes were 
privatization and school choice. 
Traditionally, as in many other countries, Chinese education has evolved with a 
dual tracked-school system: private and public or government schools. Before the 
establishment of the People’s Republic of China, most private schools were founded and 
run by preeminent educators who were influenced by western civilization, or by foreign 
missionaries who entered China to teach new ideologies of development. 
This education system led to social stratification. However, the new Communist 
country founded in 1949 with an egalitarian and collectivist ideology was not very 
tolerant of the existing system. Since then. Private schools began to disappear or were 
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forced to merge with public schools, and did not reappear throughout the education 
reform period in the 1980s when the market driven national innovation was undertaken. 
The second phase of education reform began in 1993 with measures to revitalize 
private schools and to allow school choice. Private education then appeared in two forms, 
traditional private schools and semi-private schools; often called people-run schools 
(min-ban school). The reintroduction of private schools meant the establishment of a 
market environment in the education sector, thus weakening the monopoly of the public 
education system and improving school quality through the resulting competition 
between them. 
With the reemergence of private schools, the ideology of the market economy 
gave birth to a new policy that provided parents with an unprecedented opportunity to 
choose schools that their children would attend. The emergence of school choice 
appeared to be influenced by several socio-political and economic condition associated 
with the changing Chinese society. 
While the popularization of compulsory education was aimed at expanding the 
opportunities of school aged children in a quantitative manner, the vocationalization of 
education was intended to differentiate the school system to better meet the various needs 
of the stakeholders including the government, private companies, parents, and students. It 
was a trial of a qualitative change in the education system. 
There has been some tension between universalization and vocalization. When 
China initiated reform in 1985, two key problems facing secondary education were the 
major impetuses for vocationalization in education. One was the serious shortage of the 
middle level works and technicians that can support economic development. The 
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economic reform, to increase productivity and efficiency, required workers equipped with 
specific knowledge and skills. Thus the training and education system needed to be 
changed by formally establishing a dual education system with a general regular track 
and vocational and technical education tracks. 
The other was the pressure for admission from applicants to universities and 
colleges. Only limited numbers (e.g., 4% of total graduates in 1980) of senior high 
school graduates can progress to universities or colleges. To ameliorate this problem, it 
was imperative for the Chinese government to restructure the secondary education system 
into a dual track - general academic schools and technical-vocational schools (Lewin et 
al., 1994). 
As noted above, education policy changed with alteration of political leadership 
and its perspective on the relationship between education and national development. The 
vocational education policy has had a somewhat oscillating pattern throughout the 
Chinese history. When the leadership valued ideological function in education, vocational 
education diminished. When market-oriented groups came to power, it flourished. 
5.3.1.3 Education Finance Reform 
Several factors have led to the education finance reform in China. Most critical 
among them was increasing financial needs as mentioned previously. Coupled with the 
expansion of compulsory education, which needed a huge amount of additional funding, 
the increase of population and the ideological position that education is closely linked to 
economic growth also led to financial reform. 
Education finance reform was implemented as part of general financial reform. 
This means that educational policy was influenced by the general administration policy. 
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This finance reform has gone through several stages since the 1980s. Until the late 1970s, 
the financial system in China maintained its traditional center-oriented structure. Most tax 
revenues were collected by local governments, and remitted to the central government. 
The central funds then were reallocated to the local governments according to criteria 
established by the central authority. 
The 1980 reform changed the financial system from a centralized to a revenue¬ 
sharing system. More specifically, revenue was distributed in three ways: central revenue, 
local revenue, and shared revenue. During the first stage of reform in 1980-1984, 80% of 
the shared revenue went to the central government and only 20% to the local 
governments. During this period, a uniform formula for allocation was applied, creating 
an eagerness within local governments to generate financial resources. The new system 
created considerable surpluses in wealthy regions and deficits in poor regions. 
The second stage of fiscal reform came in 1985 when the Chinese government 
recognized the problem of regional disparity caused by the revenue-sharing system. They 
redesigned the fiscal system by introducing a different formula for each region, 
depending on its socio-economic situation. The main purpose of this reform was to 
narrow inequity among regions. The consequence was that the less developed regions 
were allowed to hold relatively more of the funds they had raised, while the advanced 
regions along the east coast such as Beijing and Shanghai were more tightly controlled by 
the central government. This policy gave rise to unexpected problems. That is, “a high 
share of remittance dampened the enthusiasm of the local governments to expand their 
tax bases” (Ma & Norregaard, 1998, p.3). 
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The third stage of reform in 1988 was intended to rekindle the local governments’ 
zeal for gamering resources. The State council introduced a new system with six types of 
revenue sharing between the central and the local governments. It increased the revenue 
of the major provinces such as Beijing and Shanghai. However, this system also was not 
free from shortcomings. It encouraged local governments to conceal their fiscal capacity 
in order to escape remittance to the central government. They did this by shifting 
budgetary funds to extra budgetary funds4. This resulted in a sharp decline of the 
budgetary revenue to GDP from 28% in 1979 to 13% in 1993 and the central 
government’s share from 51% to 28% in the same period. 
In short, the financial decentralization reform in the 1980s caused three critical 
problems. It increased the central government’s deficit, it widened regional inequity, and 
it weakened the central government’s capacity for microeconomic management. 
In search of a solution to these problems, the Chinese government initiated a tax 
assignment reform in 1993. It was designed to increase the percentage of the budgetary 
funds to the GDP, and to expand the revenue share of the central government. The major 
contents of the reform were a redefinition of revenue sources for the central and local 
governments, and this change was followed by a reassignment of national taxes and local 
taxes. The national tax bases were expanded. In addition, a new organization, the 
National Tax Service (NTS), was established to collect revenue for the central 
government. 
4 The two major sources of educational finance included budgetary funds mainly from the 
central government, and extra-budgetary funds from non government sectors such as 
social contribution, school-generated income, school fees, and surcharges and levies by 
local governments. 
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In order to mitigate the local governments’ resistance to this fiscal reform, the 
central government took a position of political compromise. For example, first, the 
reform was supposed to be carried out gradually; second, local interests were to be 
protected by keeping the local share more than it was in 1993; third, the increase in the 
central revenue should be from the shared revenue. 
This 1993 tax reform brought about a remarkable increase of the central 
government’s share of the revenue, from 22% in 1993 to 56% in 1994. This implied that 
the Chinese government had changed its policy direction, turning to recentralization of 
financial governance after eight years of implementing decentralization. 
In general, a government reform requires several reform instruments such as 
mandate, inducement, capacity building, and system change. Although each instrument 
might sometimes be used separately, these are generally utilized in a combined manner 
(McDonell & Elmore, 1989). In the financial reform in China, the methods of mandate, 
inducement, and system change seem to have been applied. China adopted the system- 
change strategy in decentralization and diversification of educational finance in 1985. It 
also took the mandate and inducement strategy that was seen in “the three-growth 
principle” and in “the minimum average growth rate principle” in 1993. 
The 1985 decentralization of education was done in response to financial issues 
rather than to matters of education quality (Cheng, 1997). The traditional model of school 
finance had been based on tong shou, tong zhi (complete collection, complete 
distribution) and chi daguo fan (eating from the one big pot). This means that providing 
educational services, including school finance, was the responsibility of the central 
government. This traditional mode was changed into feng zon chi fang (eating from 
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separate pots). The authority and responsibility for'education were transferred from the 
central to the locality since the reform in 1985, with the hope that it would be a more 
effective way to collect funds for education. 
The diversification strategy was another system-change strategy that altered the 
resource generation mode from central government-only to a multi-channeling mode. 
This diversified mode documented by the 1993 Reform Resolution of the CCP included 
six types of funding methods. These are: i) urban and rural educational surcharges levied 
by local governments, ii) contributions from industry and social organizations, iii) 
donated funds from community organizations and individuals, iv) tuition fees from 
students, v) income from school-run enterprises, and vi) funds from central authorities 
(State Education Commission, 1994; Hawkins, 2000). 
As mentioned above in the financial reform story of the 1980s, the system change 
epitomized by the 2-Ds methods (Decentralization and Diversification) was not 
successful, neither in terms of sufficiency nor of equality. Therefore, a more 
comprehensive reform package was released in 1993. The major reform document, 
“Guidelines on Education Reform and Development,” included the three-growth strategy 
as a mandate to the governments. 
The first growth was that, while the main source of education funds should be 
from the government, the education budget should increase every year at a higher rate 
than that of the regular government revenue at each level of government. The second was 
that the education expenditure per student should be increased year by year. The PPE (per 
pupil expenditure) is a popular barometer of the quality of education and a standardized 
index of the financial capacity for public education. The third was that the ratio of the 
111 
total education expenditures to GNP should be increased annually, and it should rise to 
4% of GNP by 2000 from 2.2% in 1993. 
Another mandate strategy for the generation of educational resources was the so- 
called minimum average growth rate principle. It was contained in The Eighth Five-year 
Plan (1991-1995) that “projected a minimum average of 15 % of government budgetary 
allocations to education during the 5 years.” (Wang, 2001, p. 98) 
5.3.2 Korea 
Educational governance reform in Korea was characterized by its macro-systemic 
reform and the restructuring of financial authority for providing pre-collegiate education. 
Horizontal decentralization at the local level accompanied by a vertical one is described 
below. 
5.3.2.1 Two Perspectives on the Implementation of the Governance Reform 
There are two major ways to implement governance reform. These were first 
proposed by the National Education Policy Investigation of South Africa (NEPI, 1993). 
One is a macro-systemic approach that emphasizes the relationship between the central 
and local governments. It assumes that any change in education is supposed to be 
affected by changes in intergovernmental structures. Governance reform, therefore, 
begins with systemic changes in intergovernmental relations at four levels including 
national, regional, local, and school (Wang, 2001). 
The other is a micro-systemic approach that deals with the dynamics of school 
site governance among the local actors such as parents, teachers, and community leaders. 
This approach focuses on school management, which is the responsibility of parents. 
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teachers, and students (Wang, 2001). The decentralization reform in Korea has evolved 
from the macro-systemic approach in the beginning of 1990 to the micro-systemic 
approach in the mid-1990s. 
5.3.2.2. Macro-systemic Reform of Educational Governance in 1991 
As described in the previous section, the local autonomy system introduced by the 
implantation of the western ideal in 1948 had been put on hold for three decades by the 
military regimes since 1961. In the late 1980s, the fall of the authoritarian government 
gave Korea a momentum to revitalize the local autonomy system, one of the core agenda 
items for democratization in the political arena. As seen in many other societies, reform 
tends to be more easily initiated when the political situation is unstable (Hanson, 1997). 
Korea was no exception. 
The local educational autonomy movement was fostered by the political 
environment in the 1980s. In the mid-1980s, the massive demonstration by political 
dissidents and student activists for democracy in Korean society encouraged actors at 
school sites to pursue democracy in education. The democratization campaign for 
education had centered on the decentralization of power and authority from the central 
government to localities, and to school sites. The education governance reform in Korea 
since the so called “Seoul Spring” in 1980 focused on the intergovernmental system 
innovation rather than on school governance reform, and the motivating force was 
political rather than economic or financial. 
The key actors for decentralization, political parties and various interest groups in 
the society, have competed in revitalizing and designing the local education autonomy 
systems. Chief among them were: i) political parties including the ruling party (DJP: 
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Democratic Justice Party) and three opposition parties, ii) the Presidential Commission 
for Education Reform (PCER), and iii) teacher groups such as the Korea Teachers Union 
(KTU) and the Korea Federation of Teachers (KFT). They all shared the belief that the 
existing system was so highly centralized that democratization in education could not be 
achieved without innovation in the governance system. 
The ruling party, the Democratic Justice Party (DJP), had a sense of political 
obligation because its presidential candidate, Rho Tae Woo, promised the revival of the 
local autonomy system in 1987 when he proposed a political reform package, known as 
“the 6.29 eight points proposal.” Before the presidential campaign in 1987, the ruling 
party took a first step toward keeping its political promise by revising the constitution 
with the cooperation of the opposition parties. The existing constitution was based on the 
former president Park’s 1972 Yushin Constitution that neglected local autonomy. Ever 
since the Park’s constitution, the local autonomy system was not a concern of the central 
government. 
This was partly revised by Park’s successor, Chun Doo Whan, in 1980. The 1980 
Constitution articulated in a supplementary provision (article 10) that the local assembly 
would be established in a step by step manner according to the financial capacity of the 
local governments, and the specific schedule is to be stipulated by the related law. After 
that, however, no effort was made to create a specific schedule for instituting local 
assemblies. In October 1987, the Constitution was amended by eliminating a 
supplementary article 10. With that, no reason remained for the government to postpone 
the implementation of the local autonomy system. 
With a victory in the presidential race in December, 1987, the ruling DJP moved 
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farther to implementation local autonomy. The ideas of the DJP for local education 
autonomy were reflected in amendments to the Education Law and to the Local 
Autonomy Act in April, 1988. The major contents of the revised Education Law were: 
(1) The board of education should be established at two levels, large and small 
administrative units in accordance with the units of the local government. (2) All board 
members should be selected by local assemblies. The term of office is 4 years. (3) The 
superintendent should be selected by the board of education. The superintendent should 
have more than 20 years experience in teaching, or educational administration as a 
researcher and/or supervisor. The term of office is 4 years. (4) Local assemblies would 
have the power to enact regulations. (5) The board of education or superintendent should 
consult with the governors, mayors, or chiefs of the small unit (district, county, and city) 
if they want to suggest regulations related to the residents’ financial burden or obligation 
and affairs associated with local government [6 April 1988, No.4009; Lee, 1995], 
However, this amended Education Law was not implemented because the political 
situation had changed: The ruling DJP failed to obtain a majority of the seats in the 
national assembly in the April election, 1988. The three major opposition parties were 
able to get a dominating position over the ruling party in the assembly, and tried to design 
a different system of local autonomy. 
The opposition parties, without the cooperation of the ruling party, had passed a 
revised Local Autonomy Law on March 9, 1989 that mandated that a local election be 
held by the end of September of that year. On March 24 1989, however. President Rho 
vetoed it. The political parties then began to negotiate with each other regarding the style 
and content of local autonomy. They reached an agreement in December, 1989. Most 
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importantly, this agreement stated that the election for the local assemblies and for the 
local chief executives at both large units and small units would be held in 1990. 
The agreement encountered a new political obstacle when the ruling party and 
two other opposition parties formed one big political coalition, the Democratic Liberal 
Party (DLP), in January, 1990, hence reversing the dominant position in the national 
assembly. With the political confidence that came from having the majority of the seats, 
the DLP tried to postpone the implementation of the heretofore agreed upon local 
autonomy. The only opposition party, the Peace and Democratic Party (PDP) led by Kim 
Dae Jung, who would later become President in 1997, objected vehemently. The ruling 
DJP and the opposition PDP agreed in November, 1990 that the election for local 
assemblies would be held by 1991, and for executives by 1995. Consequently, the revised 
Local Autonomy Act that reflected this political compromise was passed by the national 
assembly in December 1990 (Lee, 1995; Seth, 2002). 
The Presidential Commission for Education Reform (PCER) also played a role in 
designing the educational decentralization reform. The first PCER was created in 1985 
and it released a reform package at the end of 1987, entitled “Korean Educational Reform 
Toward the 21st Century.” That was when the political struggle between Chun’s 
government and anti-government groups reached its peak. 
Its principals recommendations were i) allow boards of education to be decision 
making bodies, ii) reallocate functions between central and local governments, iii) 
establish a reasonable relationship between educational administration and the 
municipal/provincial governments, iv) establish school-centered management, v) institute 
greater autonomy in the management of higher education, vi) establish a board of trustees 
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for national universities, and vii) establish a regional university development committee 
(PCER, 1987). 
This reform proposal had some shortfalls in its content and feasibility. Because 
the PCER was only an advisory commission, it lacked the power and authority for 
decision making and implementation. In addition, it had proposed a broad reform 
program rather than specific ideas for educational innovations that might be readily 
enacted. Nevertheless, it had some influence on the reform of local educational autonomy 
in the early 1990s (Lee, 1995). 
The teachers’ groups were among the key actors during the educational 
democracy movement of the 1980s. They played a crucial role in changing the existing 
political system and educational structure. Teachers exercised their influence on pending 
educational issues including decentralization through various teacher associations and 
unions. Political parties recognized teachers’ influence because they constituted a large 
fraction of the voters and their stances were critical to the success or failure of the 
election campaigns. There were two major teachers’ groups with different characteristics 
in their compositions and basic stance toward the direction of the government policy: the 
Korean Federation of Educational Associations (KFEA) and the National Educator’s 
Union (NEU). These two groups competed with each other in the development of local 
educational autonomy in the late 1980s. 
The KFEA, the largest teacher’s organization, was founded in 1948 and was the 
only nationwide teachers’ group until a group of teachers established a rival organization 
(NEU) in 1989. Its proposal focused on the reallocation of roles among central and local 
117 
authorities. However, it did not pay much attention to school-level autonomy. Some of its 
important proposals included (Lee, 1995): 
The function of the Ministry of Education would be limited as to (1) the 
nationwide policy making and planning, (2) support for regional balance, and (3) 
support for city and provincial boards of education. As to the function of 
metropolitan and provincial boards of education, it proposed (1) implementation 
of a national policy, (2) short and long term educational planning for local 
education, (3) the development of local curricula, and (4) guidance and support 
for the county boards of education [p. 127]. 
While the KFTA was criticized as being a sub-organization of the government 
for the purpose of controlling teachers, a group of teachers seeking policy change set up a 
new teachers’ organization called Jeon Kyo Hyup (National Teacher Association) in 
1987. It evolved into the National Teacher Union (NTU) in 1989, but its activities were 
not legitimized until 1999 when teacher unions were legalized. The NTU was a core 
force that drove education reform in the 1980s. It proposed a package of education 
reforms including decentralization (Lee, 1995). 
The central parts of their strategies for local educational autonomy were: 
(1) delegate most of the power of the Ministry of Education to city and provincial 
boards of education, (2) promote school level autonomy as well as the autonomy 
of the large and small units, and (3) promote the independence of the boards of 
education from the local governments [p. 112]. 
Unlike the KFTA, the NTU emphasized school level autonomy. Their proposals 
for school-site autonomy were: 
(1) each school should have a teachers association as a decision-making body; it 
should consist of all school teachers. (2) this association should have the power to 
approve the school budget, to review teacher personnel, student awards and 
punishments; and to enact school regulations. (3) the selection of the principal 
would be based on the teachers association’s recommendation [p. 112], 
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Because political parties were by and large concerned with the design of the local 
autonomy system focusing on the local elections and the division of electoral districts, the 
matter of educational autonomy seemed set aside. Therefore, the Ministry of Education 
drafted the Local Educational Autonomy Law (LEAL) in 1990. The major contents of the 
LEAL were as follows (Chung et al., 1989; Lee, 1995) 
(1) The board of education is established at only large units such as 6 metropolitan 
and 9 provincial areas. 
(2) The number of the board members will depend on the number of districts in each 
metropolitan city and the number of district offices of education in each province. 
(3) The role of the board of education will be to deliberate various educational affairs 
to be submitted to the local assembly, including the budget bill, regulations, the 
assessment of special levies, and commissions and fees regarding educational 
matters. 
(4) Superintendents will be selected by the board of education from board members 
who have had more than 20 years of experience in education. The term of office 
will be 4 years. A deputy superintendent will be appointed by the central 
government upon the recommendation of the superintendent. 
(5) There will be a local office of education, the small unit of educational 
administration, in level of city (si), county (gun), and district (gu). 
There was a controversy because the board of education was to be established 
only at the metropolitan and provincial levels. The Ministry of Education (MOE) 
provided three reasons for this (Lee, 1995): 
First, educational autonomy at the small-unit level would require a large 
amount of money for administrative expenses. Second, compulsory education 
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(elementary and middle school) should not be influenced by regional financial 
differences due to the implementation of local educational autonomy. Third, 
small-unit educational autonomy would harmfully influence the existing public- 
school-teachers-rotation system, [p. 141] 
The MOE draft of the Local Education Autonomy Act was passed by the National 
Assembly in March 1991. This marked a historical turning point in educational 
decentralization. The political dynamics of educational decentralization are summarized 
in the table below. 
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Table 5.3 The Dynamics of Education Decentralization Reform in Korea 
Major political events Issues for educational decentralization 
Democratic reform declaration by Rho 
(1987.6.29) 
Rho’s victory in presidential race 
( 1987.12) 
Ruling party (DJP) passed the Laws 
(1988.4) 
Ruling party fell into minority seats in 
April election (1988.4): Yoso yadae 
Among 8 item refonn proposals, 
educational decentralization included 
Ruling party began to revise related 
laws 
Education law revised 
Revised law not implemented 
Opposition parties revised Local 
Autonomy Law (1989.3.9) 
Local election to be held by Sept. 1989 
Rho’s Veto to the opposition parties’ 
Revised law (1989. 3.24) 
the law was dead 
Political compromise between DJP 
and opposition parties (1989.12) 
Local assembly election to be held in 
1990 and for local chief executives at both 
large units and small units 
Formation of new ruling party by 
Coalition of three parties (1990.1) 
the ruling DLP to postpone local autonomy 
the Ministry of Education drafted “Local 
Educational Autonomy Law” (1990.3) 
Opposition party (PPD) began political 
Boycott for 4 months, and political 
Compromise between DLP and PPD 
(1990. 11) 
Election for local assemblies to be 
held by 1991, for the executives by 
1995 
Local Autonomy Act passed (1990.12) political parties less concerned with 
education autonomy 
Moe-drafted LEAL passed (1991.3) 
Source: Lee (1995), Ministry of Education (2000) 
5.3.2.3 Educational Finance Reform 
To understand educational finance reform in Korea, one needs to look at the history of 
fiscal policy in education. It showed some cyclic patterns, a policy pendulum of 
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governance styles from decentralization to centralization since the national independence 
in 1945. 
As mentioned in the previous section, unlike the case of China where a paramount 
factor leading decentralization was the financial problem, Korea’s educational 
decentralization was triggered by the political situation. Therefore, during the late 1980s 
when the social discussion regarding decentralization had become heated, the issue of 
fiscal decentralization was not on the core agenda. Nonetheless, as a secondary effect, the 
general discussion of decentralization resulted in a power shift in fiscal authority in 
Korea. This section examines two types of decentralization in education finance: the 
vertical one between the central government and local authorities, and the horizontal one 
between general administration and educational administration. 
Unlike other countries, Korea has a unique tradition of a governance structure that 
is multi-faceted: centralization and decentralization have coexisted. While the discussion 
of decentralization sought to shift the central government’s authority to localities, there 
was another debate over power relocation between general administration authority and 
educational authority. It was emphasized that educational autonomy from a general 
administration was as important as local autonomy from the central government, to 
maintain educational professionalism and political neutrality. Many educational leaders 
argued that educational autonomy will only be authentically realized when educational 
governance is independent from local general administrations (Yoon, 1992). 
Despite Korea’s traditional center-driven system, the relationship between the 
central government and local governments changed over time. In particular, regarding 
educational governance, it oscillated, demonstrating a kind of policy pendulum. Since 
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national independence in 1945, educational administration was operated as part of the 
general administration, a horizontal centralization of education in local governments. 
This continued until 1952. 
This conventional mode of governance changed in 1953 when local autonomy 
was implemented for the very first time in the history of Korea; the function of 
educational administration at the district and city levels was separated from that of 
general administration. This illustrated a horizontal decentralization in the local level. 
Each school district gained the authority to levy taxes and to create its own budget. This 
authority was exercised by the local education office independent of the general 
administrative authority. The board of education, as an executive body, therefore enjoyed 
a higher level of local autonomy than that in the previous period. However, this 
horizontal autonomy in education was realized only at small local units of government 
such as the district, the county or the small city. Education in metropolitan areas and at 
the province level was still operated as part of the general administration, and horizontal 
centralization was maintained. This system functioned until 1961 when local autonomy 
was dissolved by the military regime. Since then, local autonomy experienced a dark age 
until the collapse of authoritarian regime in the mid 1980s, ultimately to face another 
turning point with its revival in 1991 (Song, 1996). 
When the military government dismantled the local education autonomy system 
in 1961, the educational leaders in Korea strongly objected. In response, the government 
made a gesture toward reviving autonomy in local education by revising the Education 
Law. It was, however, not meaningfully implemented because the formation of local 
assemblies had been postponed indefinitely. Instead, the functions of the local assemblies 
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and the boards of education were conducted until 1991 by the Ministry of Home Affairs 
and the Ministry of Education, respectively. In particular, educational finance remained 
centralized despite government rhetoric regarding the reinstatement of local autonomy. 
With the revival of local autonomy in 1991, the nominal institution of local 
autonomy seemed transformed into an authentic one. The local assemblies were formed, 
and consequently, the authority for educational matters exercised by the central 
government was delegated to the local governments. School finance followed the same 
path. 
To be more specific, the Ministry of Education decentralized its authority on 
educational issues toward local governments. This included; i) creating ordinances 
regarding local education, ii) allocating budgets, and iii) some other decision making 
power. Until 1990, local education was heavily subsidized by the central government. 
This subsidy was calculated on the basis of employee salaries, and operational costs. 
After the financial decentralization in 1991, the central government provided a lump-sum 
amount to the local authorities, giving them more leeway regarding their budgets (Yoon, 
1992). 
The Local Educational Autonomy Act (LEAA) reinstated local government 
authority. The chairman of each board of education was to be selected from its members, 
whereas previously the position was held by the governor or mayor - an additional 
responsibility for each of them. The board members were selected by the local 
assemblies, rather than appointed by the central government. However, the 
decentralization of educational finance was inadequate. The LEAA resulted in horizontal 
centralization at the provincial and municipal levels as the budgetary authority for 
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managing educational finance shifted downward just one step from the central 
government to the local general administration (Choi, 1996). 
5.4 Consequences of Decentralization 
5.4.1 China 
As described in the previous chapter, decentralization reform in China during the 
1980s had centered on the three major innovations: the expansion of compulsory 
education, structural renovation, and financial reform. Each measure had its own goals 
that can be represented by several indicators. 
The introduction of nine-year compulsory education plan was expected to 
increase the efficiency of the educational system. This could be assessed by using the 
proxies of enrollments, advancement, illiteracy rate, and educational conditions. The 
enrollment rate in primary school increased consistently since the inception of reform in 
the 1980s. 
Table 5.4 demonstrates the increasing enrolment rate from 93% in 1981 to 97.8% 
in 1990. This official rate is based on school-aged children enrolled at the beginning of 
the school year. It could have been overestimated because whether they actually attend 
school is another matter. 
Table 5.4 Net Enrollment Rate of Primary Schools, 1981-1990 
Year Enrollment rate Year Enrollment rate 
1981 93.0 1986 96.4 
1982 93.2 1987 97.1 
1983 94.0 1988 97.2 
1984 95.3 1989 97.4 
1985 95.9 1990 97.8 
Source: Tsui Kai-yuen (1997), p. 110, modified 
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The actual attendance rate turned out to be different from the net enrollment. For 
example, while the net enrollment rate in 1987 was 97.1% on national average, the school 
attendance rate average over 6 provinces was about 85%, far lower than the net 
enrollment. However, it also increased consistently since the reform as shown in Table 
5.5. 
Table 5.5 Provincial School Attendance Rates for Children between 7 and 11, 1987 and 
1992 
Province 1987 sample survey 1992 sample survey 
Neimenggu 84.2 92.5 
Heilonjiang 84.3 * 94.4 
Zhejiang 90.1 95.5 
Shandong 86.0 92.4 
Hubei 90.2 94.8 
Guangdong 75.4 92.8 
Source: Source: Tsui Kai-yuen (1997), p. 122, modified 
Another result of the new policy was an increase in the advancement rate, the 
percentage of students advancing to the next level of schooling. Table 5.6 shows the 
percentage of graduates entering higher level schools and the percentage of school-aged 
children enrolled. Since the education reform was launched in the mid-1980s, the 
advancement ratio of primary school graduates entering junior high schools increased 
from 68.4% in 1985 to 90.8% in 1995. The percentage of junior high graduates entering 
senior high schools went up from 41.7 % to 48.4 % in the same period. The increase ratio 
from the primary level is far higher than that from junior high school. It was consistent 
with the policy goal that placed the major emphasis on improving primary rather than 
secondary education. 
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Table 5.6 Percentages of Graduates Entering Higher Level Schools and Percentages of 
School-Aged Children Enrolled, 1985-1996 
Year % of primary school graduates 
entering junior high schools 
% of junior high graduates 
entering senior high schools 
enrollment rate 
(%) 
1985 68.4 41.7 96.0 
1986 69.5 40.6 96.4 
1987 69.1 39.1 97.2 
1988 70.4 38.0 97.2 
1989 71.5 38.3 97.4 
1990 74.6 40.6 97.8 
1991 75.7 42.6 97.8 
1992 79.7 43.4 97.2 
1993 81.8 44.1 97.7 
1994 86.6 46.4 98.4 
1995 90.8 48.4 98.5 
1996 92.6 48.8 98.8 
Source: Lo (1999) p. 37, modified 
One of the primary goals of the 1980s reform was to reduce the illiteracy rate, to 
establish an infrastructure for human resource development. Since the 1980s, the 
illiteracy rate among the population aged 15 and over has declined sharply, from 33.9% 
in 1980 to 18.5% in 1995. There was a gender difference in illiteracy rate: male illiteracy 
rate was consistently lower than that for females between 1980 and 2000. It can be 
estimated from Table 5.7 that the compulsory education policy might have some positive 
impacts on reducing the illiteracy rate. 
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Table 5.7 Illiteracy Rate (%) by Gender in China, 1980 - 2000 
Year illiteracy rate among illiteracy rate among 
population aged 15 and over population aged 15-24 
MF M F MF M F 
1980 33.9 21.4 47.3 9.6 4.1 15.6 
1985 27.5 16.6 39.9 6.6 3.0 10.5 
1990 22.1 13.0 31.9 4.8 2.5 7.2 
1995 18.5 10.1 27.3 3.2 1.4 5.2 
2000 15.0 7.7 22.6 2.0 0.7 3.4 
Sources: Wang (2001), p. 170, UNESCO (1999), p 11-47 
It is not clear how much impact the compulsory education policy had on the drop¬ 
out problem which, as mentioned in the previous chapter, is associated with the use of 
child labor. Table 5.8 demonstrates an increasing trend in the school attendance rate from 
1983 to 1992. It can be associated with the government measure that prohibited the use of 
school-aged child labor, a supplementary measure that had been taken to encourage the 
effective implementation of compulsory education. 
Table 5.8 School Attendance Rate, 1983-1992 
Age cohort 7 to 11 7 to 14 6 to 14 
total city county total city county total city county 
1983 84.9 _ _ 81.40 93.10 78.80 _ _ _ 
1987 83.8 92.12 81.70 83.90 93.17 81.59 76.70 85.00 74.60 
1990 89.5 93.65 88.28 90.80 92.48 84.02 81.03 85.96 79.68 
1992 94.82 99.40 93.45 92.81 99.04 90.96 91.12 98.76 88.88 
Source: Tsui, Kai-yuen (1997), p. 112 
Table 5.9 summarizes the effect of education reform on educational conditions 
between 1986 and 1992. The physical conditions such as school building and teacher 
quality were evidently improved. The percentage of primary and secondary schools 
equipped with standard laboratories and equipment rose from 10% in 1986 to 20% in 
1991. The enrollment of children aged 7-11 in primary school increased from 96.3% in 
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1986 to 98% in 1992, and the percentage of counties achieving universal primary 
education went up from 60% in 1986 to 70% in 1991. 
Table 5.9 Changes of Educational Conditions Since Education Reform, 1986-1992 
Index of conditions 1986 1992 
% of primary school buildings in dilapidated condition 7.5 1.9 
% of secondary school building in dilapidated condition 7.3 2.1 
% of primary school teachers with at least 12years of education 
% of lower-secondary school teachers with at least 14 years 
62.8 82.7 
of education 
% of primary and secondary schools equipped with standard 
27.1 55.6 
laboratories and equipment 10.0* 20.0* 
% of children aged 7-11 enrolled in primary school 96.4 98.0 
% of counties achieving universal primary education 60.0 70.0** 
% of population illiterate 
% of primary school graduates entering lower 
23 8*** 15.9** 
secondary schools 
% of lower-secondary school graduates entering 
69.5 79.7 
upper-secondary schools 40.6 43.4 
Figure denotes 1988; “**” 1991, “***” 1982 
Sources: Tsang (1996) p. 432 
The structural reform was intended to decentralize power and responsibility for 
education to local governments. The major goal of this decentralization was to enhance 
the financial capacity of governments for educational policy, largely by shifting the 
financial authority to local units. Figure 5.1 shows the percentage of education finance 
provided by the central and local governments from 1979 to 1997. The central 
government's share of revenue has certainly fluctuated over time. 
129 
Figure 5.1. Fiscal Relationship between the Central and Local Governments in China 
Source: Ma and Norregaard (1998) p.5, modified 
The fiscal authority had been centralized until 1984. As a consequence of the 
education reform that took place then, this trend took another path during the 
decentralization reform period, 1985-1993. The local governments’ share of the revenue 
increased, reversing the center-driven fiscal relationship. The fiscal status faced another 
fluctuation when the Chinese government initiated a tax assignment reform in 1993, 
taking fiscal power and responsibility back to the central government. This 
recentralization resulted in a sharp increase of the central government’s share of revenues 
from 22.0 % in 1993 to 56% in 1994, and therefore the local share decreased. 
In fact, the major goal of the reform had been to solve the financial problems 
(Cheng, 1997). Gamering sufficient financial resources was imperative for the 
government to implement reform policies. Two key strategies had been adopted: the three 
growth principle and the minimum average growth principle. Thus, the consequences of 
decentralization reform can be evaluated by reviewing whether these basic principles of 
financial policy were successful. 
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The three growth principles were supposed to increase the annual per pupil 
expenditure (PPE). 
Table 5.10 shows the annual PPE at both the primary and secondary levels from 1981 to 
1992. At the primary level, it increased from 53 yuan in 1981 to 139 yuan in 1992; at the 
secondary level, it increased from 142 yuan in 1981 to 301 yuan in 1991. This 
successfully met the first growth principle. 
Table 5.10 PPE (Per Pupil Expenditure), 1981-1992 (Yuan) 
Year primary education general secondary education 
1981 53 142 
1982 62 172 
1983 68 191 
1984 74 206 
1985 83 226 
1986 80 224 
1987 93 218 
1988 101 234 
1989 101 235 
1990 114 259 
1991 121 269 
1992 139 301 
Sources: Tsang (1996) p. 432 
The minimum average growth principle required that public expenditures be 
allocated for education at the rate of 15% of the total government budget during the 
Eighth 5-Year Plan (1991-1995). Table 5.11 shows how this principle was met since 
1991. It was satisfied only in 1994 and 1995 with 15.3% and 16% respectively. 
Education expenditures as percentage of GNP were only initially on track to meet the 
basic goal of 4% of GNP by 2000. It was only 2.5 % in 1995, far less than anticipated. 
131 
Table 5.11 Public Expenditures on Education as Percentage of the GNP and of the 
Total Government Budget 
Year education expenditures 
as % of GNP 
education budget 
as % of total government budget 
1981 3.52 10.60 
1982 3.61 11.60 
1983 3.66 11.80 
1984 3.75 11.60 
1985 3.69 12.40 
1986 3.85 11.60 
1987 2.51 11.70 
1988 2.30 12.60 
1989 3.20 13.10 
1990 3.10 12.60 
1991 3.00 12.60 
1992 2.70 12.15 
1993 2.50 12.20 
1994 2.60 15.30 
1995 2.50 16.00 
Sources: Wang (2001) p. 101, modified 
One of the key strategies of the 1985 finance reform was diversification or multi¬ 
channeling of resource generation. The govemment-responsible-for-everything mode was 
changed into a diversified one that included various non-government and private sectors: 
enterprises, communities, school factories, students and parents, and so forth. Table 5.12 
demonstrates that the central government’s share of funding sources decreased since the 
1985 reform, from 76.52% in 1986 to 62.85% in 1991 to 53.63% in 1997. It implies that 
fiscal decentralization has been working in the given period. 
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Table 5.12 Diversification of Funding Sources for Education, 1986-1997 
Sources 1986 1991 1997 
Government budgets funds 76.52 62.85 53.63 
Extra-budgetary funds 23.48 37.15 46.37 
Levies and surcharges 4.94 0.27 10.58 
Enterprise-run institutions 5.20 5.83 4.72 
Institution-generated 4.16 5.09 3.91 
resources 
Social contributions 4.59 8.59 6.74 
Tuition and fees 3.06 4.42 12.88 
Others 1.53 2.95 7.54 
Total 100 100 100 
Source: Tsang (2000) p. 598, modified 
Decentralization was not without cost. The restructuring of power and 
responsibility resulted in a considerable financial disparity among regions. The specific 
aspect of regional discrepancy can be reviewed by analyzing the per student expenditure, 
the contribution of the non-govemment sector, and the ratio of students’ advancement in 
different localities. 
One aspect of this disparity is seen in Table 5.13 that tells the variance of the per 
student expenditures and the per capita education expenditure at the county level in 1990. 
The per student expenditure varies considerably among regions according to per capita 
income level. For example, a county with 300 yuan per capita spends 85.15 yuan per year 
per student for primary education, while a county with 800 yuan per capita spends 154.9 
yuan per student, almost twice as much. 
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Table 5.13 Disparities Per Student Expenditures at County Level, 1990 
per capita income of 
county 
per capita education 
expenditures 
per student budgetary 
expenditures for primary 
education 
Less than 300 yuan 29.03 85.15 
300-400 yuan 30.21 65.46 
400-600 yuan 30.80 72.06 
600-800 yuan 38.93 84.07 
more than 800 yuan 55.67 154.19 
means of sample 34.48 82.84 
Sources: Tsang (1996), p. 435, modified 
A second aspect of this discrepancy is illustrated in Table 5.14. Various regions 
have different structures for resource generation. For example, major regions were 
garnering a considerable portion of their education funds from non-state sectors from 
1981 to 1991: Beijing 55.59%, Hebei 78.07%, and Sandong 86.76%. Other regions such 
as Guizou and Hainan were dependent largely on government budgets, with a small 
portion of their funding sources coming from non-governmental, multiple channel 
funding (MCF). MCF as % of the total budget in Guizhou and Hainan was 18.49% and 
36.49%, respectively, in the same period. 
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Table 5.14 Disparities among Regions in Multiple Channel (Non-Governmental) of 
Funding, 1981-1991 
Regions Total State appropriation Multiple Channel of 
Funding (MCF) 
MCF as % of 
the total 
Beijing 24.57 10.91 13.66 55.59 
Tianiin 18.87 6.99 11.88 62.96 
Hebei 39.76 8.72 31.04 78.07 
Sandong 55.00 7.28 47.72 86.76 *** m 
Shanxi 26.53 8.42 18.11 68.26 
!) Liaoning 39.80 17.90 21.90 55.03 
Jinlin 24.43 8.03 16.40 67.13 
Shanghai 39.35 18.95 20.40 51.84 i 
Tibet 2.20 2.00 0.20 9.09 ■/» 
Hainan 6.09 3.87 2.22 36.45 
.1 
i 
) 
i 
Guizhou 16.77 13.67 3.10 18.49 
Sources: Lo (1993), p. 22.17, modified 
II 
9 
\ 
! 
A third aspect of the disparity is identified in the ratio of advancement of students 
by gender, school level, or region. The percentage of primary graduates entering junior 
high is, in general, higher than that of junior high graduates entering to senior high. It is 
worth paying attention to the disparity between rural and urban areas. Even though the 
gap narrowed over time, it still remained considerable as shown in Table 5.15. The 
advancement ratio from primary schools in 1990 in urban areas was 104.6 %5, whereas 
that in rural areas was only 63.7%. 
5 When primary school graduates go to work first and years later they enter the junior 
high schools, the advancement ratio can be more than 100%. 
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Table 5.15 Disparities in the Advancement Percentage by Year and Region, 1962-1990 
Year Primary to Junior High (%) Junior to High-Academic Senior 
High 
City Town County City Town County 
1962 84.0 110.9 20.7 45.8 39.5 4.2 
1972 102.0 112.8 82.9 64.2 85.4 35.8 
1982 97.3 100.3 59.1 50.0 70.9 14.1 
1983 97.8 100.5 59.5 46.7 67.4 13.4 
1985 101.1 100.5 59.2 40.3 58.7 11.6 
1986 101.6 112.7 59.6 40.2 55.6 10.2 
1987 102.1 105.8 59.3 40.2 53.8 9.7 
1988 102.6 108.3 60.2 37.7 51.1 8.6 
1989 101.7 107.9 60.9 38.4 51.3 8.3 
1990 104.6 112.5 63.7 40.4 54.2 8.7 
Sources: Hannum (1999), p. 205 
To summarize, China’s educational governance reform was motivated by several 
driving forces or needs, including economic, political, and educational needs. These 
contextual conditions for reform had driven three major reform policies: the introduction 
of nine-year compulsory education, structural reform, and financial reform. There were 
both positive and negative consequences to this reform. The positive consequences were 
the improvement of efficiency in the educational system (increased per pupil expenditure, 
increased enrollment rate, and increased advancement ratio), and improvements to other 
educational conditions such as educational facilities and equipment. The negative 
consequence was the emergence of a disparity in educational conditions among regions, 
particularly between rural and urban areas; the per pupil expenditure depended on the 
economic conditions within each area. For example, the student advancement rate to the 
next level of schooling was lower in less affluent regions. Differences could also be seen 
in the non-governmental sources of funding for education. 
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5.4.2 Korea 
This section examines the results that the introduction of local educational 
autonomy has yielded in Korea since the late 1980s. It focuses primarily on three reform 
areas. The first is the aspect of the structural reform that was initiated by the macro 
systemic innovation of the governance structure. The second is a political feature of the 
reform that emerged from the local elections for the local assemblies and superintendents. 
The third is the financial aspect of reform; the conditions of school finance before and 
after governance reform are compared. Finally, in addition to its positive effects, it 
reviews some side effects and limitations of this governance reform. 
5.4.2.1. Structural Reform 
The major results of the governance reform were as follows (Choi, 1996; Kim, 1992). 
1) The basic system of governance in education changed from centralized to 
decentralized. As a vertical decentralization, local educational autonomy brought about a 
variety of shifts in power and authority from the central government to the local 
governments. It was intended to provide momentum to localities to develop and 
implement more creative and demand-sensitive educational programs that would meet 
local needs. 
2) The boards of education became decision making bodies. Before the reform, 
they had functioned as executive offices for the management of educational matters in 
each province. They exercised power through superintendents who held delegated 
authority. After the reform, the boards deliberated and resolved important educational 
matters by themselves and submitted them to the local assemblies. This meant that the 
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boards of education had changed their nature, from consultative or executive 
organizations to decision-making bodies. 
3) Educational management gained a degree of independence from general 
administration. Before the reform, the governor or mayor held a chair on the board of 
education of each province/municipality, as an additional post. They, as heads of general 
administration, could veto important education policies, for example, those that would 
impose financial burdens on taxpayers. This dependency of education on general 
administration changed in 1991 when each board could select its chair from among its 
members, and had the power to resolve major provincial education matters 
independently. 
4) Popular participation in the decision making process was institutionalized. 
After the revival of local educational autonomy, ordinary people including parents could 
take part in the process of decision-making, i.e., the election of superintendents and 
members of school boards. This had not been possible before the reform because the 
central government not only set the major educational policies, but also appointed the 
major actors; e.g., the superintendents. 
5) The local governments had more financial power and responsibility than 
before. Until 1990, local education was financed by grants from the central government, 
and each grant was earmarked in terms of the usage and amount of money. The local 
governments had little discretion. However, this changed in 1991: the central government 
provided a lump-sum grant and permitted local governments to plan their own programs. 
These structural reform aspects are summarized in Table 5.16. 
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Table 5.16 Aspects of the Structural Reform in Education 
Reform aspect Before reform After reform 
i) Governance system centralized decentralized 
ii) The boards of education executive office decision-making body 
iii) Horizontal relationship 
among local governments 
dependence independence 
iv) Popular participation less participatory participatory 
v) Financial authority earmarked grant lump-sum grant 
Despite these positive effects of the structural reform, several problems emerged 
(Choi, 1996; PCER 1997). First, the boards of education could exercise only limited 
authority as decision making bodies. They deliberated and resolved education policy 
issues, but the final decision was made by the local assemblies, although they usually 
respected the decisions of the boards of education on education matters. 
Second, the general public could not select their representatives directly. This 
may viewed as a structural pitfall in this local educational autonomy. The members of the 
boards of education were selected by the local assemblies, and the superintendents were 
selected by the boards of education from among their members. 
Third, the central government was still dominant in making the major 
educational policies. It appointed a vice superintendent in each province, and exercised 
power by the approval of “other” education matters. The central government emphasized 
the importance of decentralization, but it tried to maintain authority in major areas such 
as personnel administration, school finance, and even decision making. That made 
decentralization mostly rhetorical, and in fact a technical recentralization (Kim, 1998). 
Perhaps this was reasonable because, at least initially, the local governments lacked the 
management skills to handle the decentralized education. 
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5.4.2.2. Political Democracy and Popular Representation 
Educational decentralization in Korea showed, by and large, political features 
rather than financial or administrative aspects as seen in other developing countries. The 
main characteristics of the results of decentralization since the mid-1980s are reviewed 
from this perspective (Lee, 1995; Seth, 2002). 
First, the revival of local autonomy in 1991 of was paramount importance by 
itself because it meant a revitalization of grass-roots democracy. It was achieved in 1987 
by a political event called the 6.29 declaration, and was a turning point in the history of 
governance reform in Korea since the 1950s. The 30-year suspension of local autonomy 
by the military regimes came to an end with the growth of democracy in the society. 
Second, that revitalization of local autonomy proceeded in a democratic manner 
was an important product of the reform. Unlike the authoritarian government where 
crucial policy issues were decided by the president in a top-down manner, many people - 
e.g., members of political parties, interest groups, and teachers associations - took part in 
designing their local autonomy and in planning their course of action. 
Third, the establishment of a system for the general public to participate in the 
decision making process was an important aspect of decentralization. When the 
opposition parties defeated the ruling party in the national assembly election in 1989, 
they designed their own scheme of local autonomy, and negotiated it with the ruling 
party. The passage of a law in 1990 with the full agreement of the political parties led to a 
new wave of governance reform in Korea. Ever since then, the ordinary people, now 
enfranchised citizens, could participate in election of their representatives, e.g., 
governors, mayors, and members of their local assemblies. 
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The decentralization policy reached home in the local elections. In 1991, after 30 
years of authoritarian governance since the military coup in 1961, three rounds of local 
elections took place. The first election was in March of that year; members of the local 
assemblies at the small unit level (si, gun, and ku) were elected. The voter turnout was 
not as high as expected. Only 55% of the total electorate voted, and many electoral 
districts found no competition among candidates; 443 out of a total of 3,562 districts had 
single candidates. A plurality of the candidates, 45.2%, was from the ruling party, 12.6% 
from the opposition parties, and 39.3% were independent. 
The second election was held in June of that year to elect the members of the 
provincial assembly in each area. The voter turnout showed little change from the March 
election; 58% of qualified voters participated in electing their local representatives. The 
ruling party won a landslide victory. 
The third election was held in August; it was not a public one, instead, the 
members of the boards of education were elected indirectly. The local/district assemblies 
selected candidates for the boards of education, and recommended them to the 
provincial/municipal assemblies. The intention was that the school board members would 
be elected by these upper-level assemblies. The majority of the candidates elected were 
retired educators (51.8%), followed by professors (10.6%), doctors and pharmacists 
(4.9%), and others (25.7%). 
For all three of these elections, the general public showed a lack of interest. As 
identified by Bedeski (1994), the low voter turnout for local autonomy reflected the 
distrust that the people had toward national politics, and it also was affected by the strict 
regulations regarding the period of the election campaign: e.g., only two weeks for 
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elections campaign were given to candidates. In addition, the citizenry lacked 
information about what local autonomy really meant, and why it was important for them. 
This disinterest in, and complaints by, the citizenry about the new system were 
clear to see in the results of a survey done in 1992, just one year after local autonomy was 
reintroduced (Lee, 1995). When asked about what changes had occurred since the 
adoption of local autonomy, the majority of respondents (69%) answered that they found 
little or no changes. Some (18%) perceived the new system as just being a waste of 
money. Only 2.7% responded that they were satisfied with local autonomy. The voters 
tended to think that the members of assemblies were pursuing their individual interests 
first, above the public interest, and that assembly members lacked the knowledge and 
skill needed to deal with important local issues. 
In addition, the initial stage of local educational autonomy failed to stimulate 
people’s concern and interest because the existing system had been deficient in providing 
citizens with adequate opportunities to participate in decision-making on important local 
policies. In contrast, the general administration had allowed people to do so. 
Various conflicts among the key local actors led to inefficiency in local 
educational autonomy in the early stages. There were conflicts between the local 
assemblies and the boards of education, and between the superintendents and the boards 
of education. The indirect election system for members of the education boards was 
considered to be a pitfall of local educational autonomy because it played as a hurdle in 
incorporating local needs into education policy (Choi, 1996; Lee, 1995). 
5.4.2.3 Governance Reform and Financial Decentralization 
The changes in educational finance caused by the introduction of local autonomy 
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can be examined from two perspectives: vertical decentralization, mainly represented by 
grants from the central government for local education, and horizontal decentralization, 
represented by the transfer of funds from the general local administration. 
5.4.2.4 Vertical Decentralization 
In general, financial decentralization is measured as the ratio of expenditures or 
revenues of local governments to the government’s total expenditures or revenues (World 
Bank, 2004; Lee, 2003). Financial decentralization in Korea increased considerably after 
the revival of local autonomy in 1991. From the expenditure perspective, Table 5.17 
shows that the percentage of expenditures by local governments increased relative to that 
by the central government. The local governments’ share in 1986, when talk about local 
autonomy had just begun, was 29.9%, but it increased to 39.9% in 1991 at the time of 
local autonomy’s revival. This situation remained essentially the same through the mid- 
1990s. 
Table 5.17 Shares of Central and Local Government Expenditure (%) 
1981 1986 1991 1996 
Central government 76.8 70.1 60.1 61.1 
Local government 23.2 29.9 39.9 38.9 
Source: Lee (2003), National Statistics Office (2001), Ministry of Home Affairs and 
Administration (1982-1997) 
From the revenue perspective, the same pattern is found in Table 5.18. The local 
governments received 23.3% of the total national revenues in 1986, five years before 
local autonomy was reintroduced. This local share of revenues jumped up to 35.1% in 
1991, indicating that local autonomy had a considerable impact on shifting financial 
power and management from the central to the local governments. 
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Table 5.18 Shares of Central and Local Government Revenue (%) 
1981 1986 1991 1996 
Central government 82.4 76.7 64.4 64.8 
Local government 17.6 23.3 35.7 35.2 
Source: Lee (2003), National Statistics Office (2001), Ministry of Home Affairs and 
Administration (1982-1997) 
This pattern is also identified in the central and local government share of tax 
revenue. Table 5.19 shows that the local tax revenues among total nationwide tax 
revenues occupied around 11.7% in 1986, and this almost doubled to 20.9% in 1991. It 
remained the same in 1991, 21.1%. On the whole, the share of local finance in the total 
governmental expenditures and revenues increased after 1991. However, the pace of the 
increase changed from the mid 1990s: the local governments’ share declined little by 
little. Two reasons for this are offered. One is that the magnitude of national finance 
outpaced the increased local government finance (Lim, 2003). The other is that the 
central government was attempting to withdraw the decentralized authority from the 
localities, to recentralize educational finance as illustrated in the case of China in the 
early 1990s (Kim, 2000). 
Table 5.19 Shares of Central and Local Tax Revenue (%) 
1981 1986 1991 1996 
Central government 88.8 88.3 79.1 78.9 
Local government 11.2 11.7 20.9 21.1 
Source: Lee (2003), Ministry of Home Affairs and Administration (1982-2001) 
Financial decentralization in education showed a similar pattern, but its specific 
aspects were quite different, both in terms of the pace and the scope of decentralization. 
As seen in Table 5.20, the centralized system of school finance kept its traditional mode 
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until the inception of local autonomy: the central government maintained 75.6% of the 
fiscal share at its peak in 1990. The reintroduction of local educational autonomy 
drastically changed these shares after that. The local governments were responsible for 
providing 24.4% of total expenditures for local education in 1990, but this share 
increased sharply to 39.2% in 1991, reaching 40.6% in 1995. This was mainly because, 
with the revival of local educational autonomy, the central government changed its way 
of granting education funds to the local governments from the earmarked to the lump¬ 
sum subsidy, hence providing local governments with more leeway. 
Table 5.20 Fiscal Imbalances in Education between Central and Local Government (%) 
Year Central government Local governments 
1985 73.7 26.3 
1986 74.9 25.1 
1987 75.8 24.2 
1988 76.6 23.4 
1989 72.8 27.2 
1990 75.6 24.4 
1991 60.8 39.2 
1992 62.9 37.1 
1993 58.1 41.9 
1994 59.0 41.0 
1995 59.4 40.6 
Source: Ministry of Education, 1986 -1996. The national grants for local education were 
distributed on the basis of the population to each province/municipality by law since 
1991. Because both the actual plan and implementation were in the hands of local 
governments, these grants are counted as local governments’ budgets. 
Several other considerations led to this result. As can be seen in Table 5.21, 
education’s share of the total government budget had steadily increased since the 1960s 
in the hope that education would be a primary mover for national development. The 
education budget occupied 14.9% of the government budget in 1964, but it increased to 
22.8% in 1995. The major portion of this education budget was subsidized to local 
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governments by law as unblocked lump-sum grants. This enhanced local autonomy in 
school finance. 
Table 5.21 Total Government Budget vs. Education Budget by Year (in thousand won) 
Year Government Budget (A) Education Budget (B) B/A *100 (%) 
1962 69,481,150 10,367,630 14.9 
1965 94,652,348 15,331,155 16.2 
1970 446,273,301 78,478,212 17.6 
1975 1,586,931,050 227,925,711 14.4 
1980 5,804,061,441 1,099,159,170 18.9 
1985 12,532,361,835 2,492,308,215 19.9 
1990 22,689,432,968 5,062,431,258 22.3 
1995 54,845,022,310 12,495,810,267 22.8 
Source: Ministry of Education (1999) Education Statistical Yearbook, p.873 
S.4.2.5 Horizontal Decentralization 
As in the power balance of school finance between the central and the local 
governments, the relationship between the general administrative authority and the 
education authority in each province was important in deciding the degree of financial 
autonomy for local education. The Local Finance Law authorized the local governments 
to receive some revenues to finance education, chief among which were the tobacco tax 
revenues that would be transferred to the local education authorities. Table 5.22 
demonstrates the transfer of the tobacco tax revenues of each local government for public 
education since 1989 when it was created. Seoul metropolitan city, for example, 
transferred 110,117 million won in 1989 for public education, and it transferred more 
than twice as much, 237,043 million won in 1995. 
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Table 5.22 Transfer of Tobacco Tax from the Local Governments (million won) 
years Seoul Busan Daegu Incheon Gwangju Daejeon 
1989 110,117 38,580 20,190 14,800 8,870 9,428 
1990 121,075 40,925 24,742 18,628 8,854 10,786 
1991 124,525 42,680 26,871 21,268 12,163 11,416 
1992 122,228 43,800 26,925 24,861 11,817 12,240 
1993 130,714 44,550 28,030 23,968 11,800 13,306 
1994 247,615 42,548 51,051 44,562 22,635 14,264 
199-5 237,043 86,982 49,674 42,863 20,288 25,290 
Source: Song (1999), p.67 
Another important financial resource for education to be received from the local 
governments was the teacher salaries in public middle schools. Two major metropolitan 
cities were obliged to transfer money for middle school teacher salaries to the education 
authority in the area: 100% in Seoul and 50% in Busan. As seen in Table 5.23, the two 
cities paid 82,830 million, and 16,239 million won in 1989, respectively, and they 
increased their payment up to 220,500 million won in Seoul and 41,600 million won in 
Busan in 1995. 
Table 5.23 Transfer for Teachers’ Salary from the Two Metropolitan Cities (million won) 
Years Seoul Busan 
1989 82,380 16,239 
1990 99,150 21,624 
1991 119,652 24,012 
1993 138,107 26,698 
1994 148,144 40,384 
1995 220,500 41,600 
Source: Ministry of Education, 1990- 1996 
Table 5.24 shows the total education budgets and transferred funds from the local 
government each year, and the ratio of the transfer to total education budgets by year. 
The share of the transferred money increased temporarily around 1990, but went into a 
path of decline afterwards. The scale of the transfer reached its peak in 1990 at 5.47%, 
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and turned downward to 4.15% in 1993. This curve had turned upward again to 5.65% in 
1995. This implies that the local governments did not fulfill their obligation for 
education in the middle years. 
Table 5.24 Transfer from Local Government by Years (million won) 
years education budgets (A) transfer from local gov’t (B) B/A*100 (%) 
1990 6,313,075 345,083 5.47 
1991 7,798,446 404176 5.18 
1992 9,416,919 428,623 4.55 
1993 10,765,082 447,038 4.15 
1994 12,213,944 640,951 5.25 
1995 14,046,808 786,402 5.60 
Source: Ministry of Education, 1991-1999 
The amount of the transfer from the local governments for public education 
varied depending upon the economic conditions of each locality. As shown in Table 5.25, 
different provinces transferred various levels of financial resources for education after the 
revival of local autonomy in 1991. Altogether, a difference between the metropolitan and 
the provincial areas appeared in terms of the magnitude and stability of the transfer. For 
example, the Seoul and Busan metropolitan cities were stable in their commitment to 
education. 
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Table 5.25 Transfer from Local Governments by Region (hundred thousand won) 
Regions 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Seoul 7,817 8,317 10,720 10,669 10,748 
Busan 1,008 1,570 1,175 2,079 2,791 
Daegu 941 1,045 2,250 6,210 5,308 
Incheon 4,100 7,900 4,600 2,620 25 
Gwangjoo 9 340 550 150 1,882 
Daejeon 283 3,710 1,550 35 10 
Gyunggi 7,264 16,930 16,684 8,746 3,713 
Gangwon 965 937 5,166 5,240 3,906 
Chungbook 544 81 2,115 2,123 1,181 
Chungnam 380 347 3,158 2,714 2,706 
Jeonbook 380 321 1633 739 2986 
Jennam 398 389 3,271 2,858 2,463 
Gyungbook 933 1,220 5,677 3,210 2,409 
Gyungnam 961 597 781 2400 1,090 
Jejoo 261 1,635 2,877 3,131 3,429 
Total 26,244 45,339 62,207 52,954 44,776 
Source: Ministry of Education, 1994-1998 
5.4.2.6 International Comparison 
Regarding the degree of financial decentralization in Korea, there are two 
perspectives. One is a general viewpoint that Korea has had a centralized system for a 
very long time, with a degree of decentralization that is low when compared with other 
countries. However, according to a study shown in Table 5.26, Korea's financial 
decentralization was higher in expenditures than the average for OECD countries (Lee & 
Hyun, 2006). Lee and Hyun’s study maintains that decentralization is not always a best 
choice; rather it needs to seek an optimal fiscal decentralization in consideration of the 
country-specific conditions. In addition, the fiscal independence of the local governments 
in Korea is relatively high, mainly because of the transfer system of finance. Thus, their 
study concludes that it is wise to use the finance transfer system to leverage 
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decentralization, without emphasizing self-resource mobilization in each region (Lee & 
Hyun, 2006). 
Table 5.26 International Comparison of the Financial Decentralization in the 1990s (%) 
Countries Revenue Expenditure 
Sweden 39.6 58.1 
Japan 36.3 — 
Denmark 32.4 66.3 
Finland 29.8 40.8 
Austria 29.1 48.2 
Norway 25.6 55.3 
Australia 22.4 64.2 
Iceland 20.8 27.1 
Korea, Rep. 20.7 42.5 
Spain 20.7 53.4 
Czech Republic 20.6 30.7 
France 18.4 31.4 
Poland 13.9 42.8 
Turkey 12.9 — 
Luxembourg 8.3 29.6 
Source: Lee and Hyun (2006), p. 108-110 
Another indicator that Korea has a normal level of local finance when compared 
with the major advanced countries is suggested in Table 5.27. While the ratio of local to 
total finance in Korea was 42.2% in 1987, it was 61.5% and 28.0, respectively, in Japan 
and the U.K. With a ratio of 15.4%, France appears to be a much more centralized 
country than Korea. 
Table 5.27 International Comparison of Korean Local Finances in 1987 (%) 
Korea Japan U.K France 
Local finance/total finance 42.2 61.5 28.0 15.4 
Local fmance/GDP 8.6 18.1 13.6 7.4 
Total fmance/GDP 20.4 29.5 48.4 48.3 
Source: Ito (1992), p. 417 
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5.4.2.7. Limitation on Decentralization in Korea 
While local autonomy was historically significant in that it was a revival of 
grass-roots democracy, it faced, after five years of implementation, several obstacles. 
First, local autonomy was a foreign concept to the Korean people. Because the 
centralized system of society had predominated for such a long time, it was hard for them 
to accept the new system. Second, because it was suspended for 30 years after a short 
experience, local governments and citizens needed time to accumulate the knowledge and 
skills needed to operate under local autonomy. Third, there was a continuous debate as to 
whether decentralization would be the best choice for this small country. Korea had 
accomplished remarkable economic growth without decentralization. Lastly and most 
importantly, the general public distrusted local autonomy. They saw in local politics the 
same power struggles that they saw in the national politics, where individual and selfish 
interests were pursued over the public interest (Boyer & Ahn, 1991). 
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CHAPTER 6 
MAJOR FINDINGS AND LESSONS LEARNED 
This chapter compares and contrasts the educational governance reforms in China 
and Korea between 1985 and 1995, and draws some lessons for policy making. The first 
section presents the major findings of comparison of three aspects of their reform, 
motives, actions, and consequences. It identifies the convergent and divergent aspects of 
these reforms in the two countries. The second section outlines the environmental 
conditions and the technical strategies for successful decentralization. 
6.1 Major Findings Compared and Contrasted 
The assumption underlying this study is that decentralization theoretically has 
clear benefits. However, many empirical studies show little consistent evidence for this. 
This is because both the consequences of decentralization policies and their evaluation by 
stakeholders are likely to depend upon socio-economic and political conditions. This 
study attempts to uncover knowledge and information about decentralization by a cross¬ 
national comparison. The comparison is carried out using the framework discussed in 
Chapter 3, focusing on the general characteristics of decentralization, and the motivation, 
actuation, and results of the governance reforms enacted in China and Korea. 
6.1.1 General Characteristics of Decentralization in China and Korea 
An initial comparison of the general characteristics of decentralization in terms of 
types, country family, political system, and temporal oscillation reveal various features of 
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country-specific policy. 
6.1.1.1 Types of Decentralization 
Two types of decentralization are seen depending on whether the aspect of power 
relocation is horizontal (functional) or vertical (territorial). Horizontal or functional 
decentralization means that the power shifts from a single authority to two or more other 
units of governance that operate in parallel. Vertical or territorial decentralization refers 
to the redistribution of authority and responsibility to a lower level of organization within 
a system such as a state, province, region, municipality, district, or school site (Bray 
2003; Rondinelli 1981). 
The two cases of Korea and China show the complexities of the power structure. 
China had a basic governance system that could be rearranged vertically from the central 
government to localities, as is seen in almost all countries. In addition, China developed a 
somewhat unique system of governance. The education functions were horizontally 
divided and managed by two or more ministries in the central government (Cheng 1997). 
Korea’s decentralization was essentially the same as China’s. The only difference 
was that the horizontal decentralization occurred at the local level, rather than at the 
central level as in China. It was a vertically driven decentralization; the central authority 
shifted power and authority over education to local governments as part of the 
revitalization of local autonomy in 1991. The new system allowed the local educational 
authorities to establish local boards of education that were empowered as the decision 
making bodies, and it facilitated the transfer of educational funds from local general 
administrations to educational authorities. 
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6.1.1.2 Country-Family, Political Systems, and Educational Governance Structure 
As seen in Chapter 2, Castle’s analysis describes four families of nations 
categorized by the aspect and degree of decentralization. The degree of centralization 
decreased in the four families in the following order: Scandinavian, Latin, German and 
Anglo-American. 
The educational governance system appeared to depend on the political system. In 
general, a country with a federal system operates a decentralized system: examples are 
the United States, Canada, and Germany which all have highly decentralized structures. 
In contrast, countries with unitary systems tend to have relatively center-oriented 
educational systems. Korea had a unitary system and kept a highly centralized system 
that was deeply rooted in its cultural and historical heritage. China also had a unitary 
system, and so was regarded as having a centralized education system. Both initiated 
radical decentralizations in the 1980s. 
In addition, geographically large countries in general have decentralized 
educational systems; examples are India, Canada, and the United States. Relatively small 
nations tend to operate centralized systems, although exceptions are seen, e.g., Malta and 
Brunei. China, however, was an exception to this generalization. Despite its large 
geographic scale, China ran a centralized educational system. Korea, a small country with 
a centralized system, fitted this generalization. 
6.1.1.3 Temporal Oscillation of Educational Decentralization 
Many empirical studies identify oscillations in educational policy. In particular, 
the United States shows clear, ping-pong-like, centralization and decentralization policy 
swings; this was analyzed in Chapter 2. Korea introduced local autonomy in 1953 during 
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wartime despite its long standing centralized system. It continued for nine years until 
1961 when it was abruptly ended by the military regime. Since then Korea sustained a 
strong centrally controlled governance system that helped it to achieve its remarkable 
national development. This rigid system of governance was broken in the late 1980s 
when the 30-year-long authoritarian government was cast aside by the democracy 
movement, which revitalized local autonomy in 1991. Thus, Korea can also be seen to 
have experienced policy oscillations throughout its modem history. 
Cyclic patterns can also be found in China’s educational governance structures. 
According to Hawkins (2000), the Chinese education system, a highly centralized 
structure throughout its history, experienced radical change in the mid-1980s. When the 
Chinese political leaders proclaimed the importance of economic reform and an open- 
door policy for national development, education was regarded as a key sector that needed 
to be renovated. Education leaders in China initiated educational decentralization in 
1985. The power and responsibility for providing primary education were transferred 
from the central and provincial governments to regional and local governments. This 
decentralization, however, saw another change toward recentralization in 1993 when the 
central government took some of the authority to tax back from the local governments in 
the name of protection of equality among regions. This was China’s history of policy 
oscillation. 
6.1.2 Motivating Forces: 
What were the primary motives for the decentralization 
movement in China and Korea between 1985 and 1995? 
The educational governance reforms in China and Korea initiated since the mid 
1980s were similar, as were the econo-political environments in the two countries. 
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Nonetheless, differences could be seen in their political systems and their economic 
conditions, such as their major objectives and their stage of economic development. 
6.1.2.1 The Convergent Aspects of the Motivation for Reform 
Decentralization proceeded in China and Korea as part of a global mega-trend 
involving globalization, neo-liberalism, and a shift of the societal paradigm. For example, 
agricultural society evolved into an industrial society, and then to an information society. 
Following these changes, the governance system in society changed from decentralized to 
centralized, and back again to decentralized. This mega-trend pushed many countries all 
over the world, including China and Korea, toward decentralization. 
To be more specific, both countries undertook their decentralization reform drives 
in the similar environmental context: an econo-political system in transition and an 
emergence of new leadership. China has conducted a comprehensive and radical reform 
of its educational governance system continuously since the launch of the Deng Xiaoping 
government in 1975. The two major motivating forces of the reform were as follows. 
The first was the change in the political and economic systems. China initiated a 
set of radical reforms to break through its economic impasse. These included an open 
door policy and the introduction of a market-driven economy. These government actions 
created historical momentum for national development. The open door policy ended the 
period of the closed and hostile policy toward to western society that this big communist 
country had long maintained, along with its ally, the Soviet Union. Thereafter, the 
political leaders fostered the market economy as a key strategy for realizing their cardinal 
principles for national development: modernization, globalization, and the future. The 
introduction of the market economy played a galvanizing role for power rearrangement - 
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decentralization - between the central and local governments. This then became a core 
agenda item for many aspects of change. 
The second was the change in political leadership. One of the characteristics of 
modem Chinese politics is policy oscillation, a direct result of the struggle between 
moderates and radicals in communist ideology. The radicals, followers of Mao Zedong, 
were stuck to the ideology of revamping social relations through endless class struggle 
and human liberation. In contrast, the moderates represented by Deng Xiaoping since the 
early 1970s, pursued pragmatic programs that emphasized the importance of productivity 
and efficiency to enhance the standard of living of the people. They were tolerant of the 
western ideology of a market economy. As any new government tends to do, this newly 
launched regime tried to differentiate itself from the former one. It did so by adopting a 
massive reform, which included decentralization. 
Korea evolved very similarly. First, there was the historic turning point in its 
political system in the 1980s, the transition from the authoritarian military regime to a 
semi-democratic government. This would be part of the global trend toward democracy 
and was largely the result of the massive civil movement, as examined by Huntington. 
The authoritarian government, launched first by the military coup in the early 1960s, 
dominated Korean society for about 30 years. With the help of Korea’s rapid economic 
development, once called “the Han River miracle”, civil society matured. Society began 
to recognize that it was time for Korea to pay more attention to democracy; it demanded 
political reform from its government. This caused a serious socio-political conflict 
between the government and the dissident groups which included students, teachers, and 
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politicians. This confrontation culminated in June, 1987 when the government yielded to 
the people’s power by releasing “The 6.29 Declaration.” 
Second, the power transition saw the emergence of a new leadership based on 
political legitimacy in that the president was elected by the direct vote of the people. The 
new leadership, although it was a pseudo-democratic leadership,6 provided momentum 
for change in the nature of the political system. That is, Rho’s government took a series 
of political measures that differentiated from the former government; chief among them 
was deportation of his predecessor, Chun Doo Hwan. This advanced democracy for 
politics in particular and for society as a whole. The emergence of the new leadership 
facilitated a series of national discussions on decentralization. 
6.1.2.2 Divergent Aspects of the Reform Motivation 
Coupled with these similarities were clear differences between the two countries. 
The major goal of the reform and the condition of the national economy were not the 
same in China and Korea. First, China, as analyzed in the previous chapter, sought to 
solve its financial problem in education: it was their key issue. China’s leaders saw that 
educational development would be essential for the modernization of their country, and 
in particular that the introduction of nine-year compulsory education would be of 
foremost importance to enhance the level of national literacy. This expanded compulsory 
education was, however, too ambitious for their national economy to handle. The GNP at 
the time was just $300 per capita. The government then devised a new policy instrument, 
decentralization and diversification, to shift the financial burden to localities. 
6 The new leadership bom in the midst of the massive democratic movement in 1987 was 
not an authentically democratic one. Rather it was a pseudo democratic leadership 
because most of the power elite in the ruling party and government were officials of the 
former military dictatorship. 
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Decentralization transferred power and accountability for providing public education to a 
variety of stakeholders including the local governments at various levels. This 
diversification strategy sought multiple sources of educational finance. Decentralization 
to solve financial problems is often found in Latin American countries including Mexico, 
Argentina, and Chile. 
In contrast, the major reason for decentralization in Korea was the establishment 
of democracy in the society; the fiscal power shift was simply a part of the program. 
Since the foundation of modem Korea in 1948, the center-driven system dominated all of 
society; it was viewed as a more efficient route toward national development than a 
decentralized system. It worked during the age of national development from the 1960s to 
1980s, leading to miracle-like economic advancement. However, this economic 
advancement had been achieved at a cost: the democratic development of society had 
been stifled. As the national economy became strong, the civil society developed and 
began to keep close watch on governmental policies. It demanded decentralization as a 
course of democracy that was expected to check the uncontrollable military regime. With 
The 6.29 Declaration, a symbol of the triumph of the democracy movement in 1987, 
these civil demands became reform proposals, and afforded political activists and the 
government the leverage to revitalize local autonomy. The cases of Spain and Colombia 
provide other good examples of decentralization as a solution of political issues. 
These differences in reform motives, based on the expected goals of 
decentralization in the China and Korea, partly reflected the dissimilarity in the level of 
national economic development, which in turn had an impact on the success of each 
reform. China, one of the lowest GDP-per-capita countries in the world at the time of the 
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reform, targeted the financial issue, while Korea at a middle level of economic 
advancement, focused on political issues. Each used the same instrument, 
decentralization, to solve its country-specific problem. 
In addition, several indirect motives in each country played an important role in 
the initiation of reform. The Chinese reform was encouraged by cultural factors. When 
China was in despair after 10 years of Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976, the 
national pride of the people (China is the home country of Confucius) provided an 
impetus for launching a massive reform, which included decentralization. This was 
further supported by the general belief that education would be a key factor for the 
recovery of China’s old glory. 
Korea’s decentralization was secondarily motivated by legal demands to realize 
local autonomy, as stipulated in the Constitution, the Local Autonomy Law, and the 
Local Educational Autonomy Law since the inception of modem Korea in 1948. 
Managerial efficiency also necessitated power relocation to ameliorate the side-effects of 
the center-driven administrative system, such as inefficient bureaucracy. In particular, the 
fiscal imbalance between the central and local governments triggered the discussion of 
both horizontal and vertical decentralization in the 1980s. The above-described 
motivations for decentralization in China and Korea are summarized in Table 6.2.1. 
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Table 6.1 Motivating Forces of Reform in China and Korea 
Items China Korea 
Econo-political 
motivation 
System and Leadership change 
- From national isolation 
to open door policy, and 
from the planned communist to 
a socialist market economy 
System and Leadership 
change 
- From authoritarian to (semi) 
democratic government 
* - From Mao Zedong(radical) 
to Deng Xiaoping (moderate) 
- From Chun Doo Whan to 
Rho Tae Woo 
Socio-cultural & 
legal motivation 
Socio - cultural heritage 
- negative public attitude 
toward the Cultural Revolution 
- national confidence based 
on pride as home 
country of Confucius 
Legal foundation for reform 
- Constitution 
- Local Autonomy Law 
- Local Education Autonomy 
Law 
Educational and 
administrative 
motivation 
Role of education for reform 
- Leaders’ recognition of 
importance of education as 
a primary mover of 
national development 
-four major education 
problems identified in the 1985 
resolution 
Inefficiency of central control 
- superficial local autonomy 
- the central government 
control of all major issues 
Financial motivation Paramount reason for reform 
- decentralization as a solution 
of financial issues 
- increasing population, and 
introduction of nine-year 
compulsory education 
Improving fiscal imbalance 
-financial dependence of 
local government on the 
central government 
- three motives of fiscal 
decentralization 
6.1.3 Decentralization in Action: 
How were the reform ideas and motives actuated 
in China and Korea between 1985 and 1995? 
How the reforms were actuated in China and Korea can be analyzed by 
considering the following three aspects of reform: overarching actions, structural reform, 
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and fiscal reform. These are summarized in the Tables 6.1.3.1, 6.1.3.2., and 6.1.3.3, 
respectively. 
6.1.3.1 Overarching Actions 
For China, there were two momentous events that stirred educational 
decentralization from 1985 to 1995. One was the central government’s resolution in 
1985: “Decision of the CPC Central Committee for Reform of China’s Educational 
Structure.” The other was “Programs for China’s Education Reform and Development” 
issued by the State Council of Education in 1993, which was released as way of updating 
the process and contents of the 1985 reform. 
For Korea, several events triggered the decentralization reform action, chief 
among them were a set of reform proposals: the one for political reform, “The 6.29 
Declaration,” and the other by the presidential commission for reform, “Education 
Reform toward the 21st Century”. Each called for educational decentralization reform 
outlining its broad direction and providing specific reform programs. In particular, The 
6.29 Declaration provided momentum for the revitalization of local autonomy. 
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Table 6.2 Overarching Actions for Decentralization in China and Korea. 
Items China Korea 
Overarching Actions 
- Resolutions and Proposals 
by the central authority 
(party, education ministry, 
presidential commission for 
reform, political leaders) 
1. “Decision of the CPC 
Central Committee for 
Reform of China’s 
Educational Structure” 
(May 27, 1985) 
- entrust responsibility for 
elementary education to 
local authority 
- institute nine- year 
compulsory education 
2. “Programs for China’s 
Education Reform and 
Development” (State 
Education Commission, 
March 1993) 
1. “The 6.29 Declaration for 
Political Democracy 
Reform (June 29, 1987)” 
- realization of local 
autonomy and education 
decentralization 
- constitutional revision for 
presidential election by 
direct vote and six other 
proposals 
2. “Educational Reform 
toward 21st Century” 
(Presidential Commission 
for Education Reform, 
December, 1992) 
6.1.3.2 Structural Reform 
China instituted at least three major structural reforms in education. Firstly, it 
enacted the nine-year compulsory education law that rearranged the power and 
responsibility for providing education between the central and local governments. After 
that, a set of supplementary measures such as education finance, a standard of obligation, 
and prohibition of child labor followed. Secondly, the system of school site governance 
also was restructured; this included the introduction of the open application system for 
principal selection, and the separation of the party and the school in administration. 
Thirdly, the central government withdrew its previously delegated authority to tax from 
the localities in 1993. This was done in the name of the protection of equity, eight years 
after the implementation of decentralization in 1985. 
Korea’s decentralization movement, launched by the 6.29 Declaration, brought 
about a series of specific actions for implementation. First of all, the basic structure of 
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local autonomy was mapped out by political negotiation among various parties. Second, 
the Local Autonomy Act that outlined the general principles of decentralization was 
enacted. It, in particular, described educational autonomy. However, this enactment could 
not take effect because of the political situation. Thirdly, the Ministry of Education 
drafted a new law, the Local Educational Autonomy Law, which was passed by the 
National Assembly in 1991. Fourthly, the elections for local leaders - local assembly 
members, superintendents, governors and mayors - were held in 1991 and 1995. 
Table 6.3 Educational Structural Reform in Action in China and Korea 
China Korea 
Structural Reform 1. Enactment of law and 
supplementary measures 
- “Nine-year Compulsory 
Education Law (1986)” 
- financial measures, 
standards of obligation, 
prohibition of child labor 
2. Three major reforms by 
Deng Xiaoping 
- division of labor, school 
site reform (separation of 
party and school) 
3. Recentralization etc. 
- withdraw tax authority 
- privatization 
- vocationalization 
1. Enactment of laws 
- Education Law 
- Local Autonomy Law 
- Local Education 
Autonomy Law 
2. Political negotiation 
- major contents of the law 
- activities of key actors 
3. Local Elections 
- local assemblies 
- local government heads 
: mayors, superintendents, 
Governors 
Strategies for Reform 1 .Incremental approach 
2. Asymmetric approach 
3. Policy synchronization 
4. Active role of the 
central government 
1.Incremental approach 
2. Asymmentric approach 
3. Policy synchronization 
4. Active role of the central 
government 
6.1.3.3 Financial Reform 
As an essential element for the effective implementation of reform, China 
undertook four stages of financial reform beginning in the early 1980s. The basic 
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principles of this reform were diversification of financial sources and decentralization of 
fiscal power. This was supplemented by three growth principles: 1) the growth rate of the 
education budget should be higher that that of the total government budgets, 2) the per 
student expenditure should increase yearly, and 3) the education budget as a percentage 
of GNP would increase from 2.2% in 1993 to 4% by 2000. 
Korea undertook a reform initiative that represented both vertical and horizontal 
decentralization in educational finance, while fiscal power relocation oscillated between 
centralization and decentralization. The vertical decentralization changed the way the 
financial resources were distributed from the central to the local authorities. It went from 
an earmarked subsidy to a lump-sum grant. The horizontal decentralization facilitated the 
transfer of funds from local governments to educational administration. These actions 
enhanced the responsibilities of local authorities for education by establishing a standard 
of transfer. 
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Table 6.4 Educational Finance Reform in Action in China and Korea 
China Korea 
Finance Reform 1. Four stages of fiscal 1. Oscillating stages of 
reform fiscal 
reform in education 
2. Basic principles for fiscal - decentralization and 
reform 
- decentralization and 
recentralization 
diversification 2. Selected types of power 
- six channels of funding for redistribution 
education - vertical decentralization 
- horizontal decentralization 
3. major strategies 3. major strategies 
- three growth policy - from the earmarked to 
- two - leg policy the lump - sum grants 
- transfer for education 
from local government 
6.I.3.4. Summary: Convergent and Divergent Aspects 
As examined above, both cases of decentralization in action reveal isomorphic 
and idiosyncratic aspects. The similarities include: i) the central authority drove the 
education reform in a top-down manner, ii) the major concerns were the structural and 
financial aspect of reform, and iii) the strategies employed for effective reform 
implementation were incremental, asymmetric, synchronic, and center-driven. 
Along with the isomorphic aspects of these decentralizations, dissimilarities are 
also seen. Although the central authorities were heavily involved in the process of power 
transfer in both countries, the background and types of involvement were different. China 
took a top-down approach. The central leadership, Deng Xiaoping and his followers, 
designed the programs of power relocation and issued center-driven resolutions, orders, 
and laws for implementation. These were triggered to revitalize the glory of China 
through modernization. 
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Korea’s story was more complex. Decentralization was realized as part of the pro¬ 
democracy movement after the collapse of an authoritarian regime. Although the central 
authorities, including the ruling party, the presidential commission for reform, and the 
ministry of education, took major actions for implementation, they were actually passive 
actions taken in response to the people’s demands for democracy. It would be safe to say 
that Korea’s decentralization was based on the bottom-up approach, while China’s was 
top-down. 
6.1.4 Consequences of Reform: 
What were the major results of decentralization in 
China and Korea between 1985 and 1995? 
As seen in the previous sections, the background for and the major goals of the 
decentralization policies were different in China and Korea. Thus, the consequences of 
the reforms have been evaluated by different criteria. The results of the reforms are 
summarized below in Tables 6.1.4.1. and 6.1.4.2., which focus on administrative 
structure and finance. 
6.1.4.1 Results of the Structural Reform 
For China, the structural reform had centered on securing adequate financial 
resources for providing pre-collegiate education. Fiscal responsibility was transferred to 
lower levels of government. To be more specific, the authority and responsibility for 
elementary, junior secondary, and senior secondary education were delegated from 
township, county, and province to village, township, and county governments, 
respectively. The reform resulted in the enhancement of the efficiency of the educational 
system as can be seen in Table 6.1.4.1. The system efficiency is represented by the 
enrollment ratio of school age children, the advancement ratio to upper level schools, the 
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school attendance ratio, the literacy rate, and the teacher quality in terms of the average 
number of years of schooling. However, these accomplishments were accompanied by 
some side-effects that included regional disparity in per pupil expenditures, advancement 
rate, and financial resources from the diversified sources. 
For Korea, the structural rearrangement was different. It focused on the 
accomplishment of democracy in the governance structure and administration. Its 
achievement included procedural, structural, and electoral reforms. First of all, the 
revitalization of grass-roots democracy was the most important outcome of the reform7. 
This was evidenced, in the early stage of the reform process, by many stakeholders, who 
participated in discussions of how the decentralization policy would be designed and 
implemented. Secondly, the function and role of the board of education was changed 
from advisory and executive committee to a decision-making body, and horizontal 
decentralization between local government and educational administration was also 
emphasized. Thirdly, the framework of local autonomy was solidified by three rounds of 
local elections for local leaders such as governors, mayors, local assembly members, and 
superintendents. 
7 
While revitalization of local autonomy is viewed an important outcome of 
decentralization reform in the Korean context, it could be interpreted as a cause of 
decentralization because the central authority initiated power relocation based on 
people’s demand, rather than on decision of its own to restoring local autonomy. 
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Table 6.5 Consequences of Educational Structural Reform in China and Korea 
Reform areas/Results China Korea 
1. The administrative system 1. Revitalization of grass- 
Structural Reform of power and responsibility roots democracy 
for education changed - process democracy 
- primary education: village - popular participation 
- lower secondary: township - three rounds of local 
- upper secondary: county elections 
. 2. Efficiency of the 2. Basic governance system 
education system enhanced changed 
- Enrollment rate - the role of the board of 
- Advancement rate education changed 
- Attendance rate - popular participation 
- Illiteracy rate - horizontal decentralization 
- Teacher quality 
3. Limit of reform 
- rhetorical decentralization / 
technical recentralization 
- disparity per PPE at the 3. Limit of reform 
county level - disinterest and complaints 
- disparity of diversified of citizenry 
funding among regions 
- disparity of advancement 
rate among region 
- conflicts among actors 
6.1.4.2 Results of Financial Reform 
From the perspective of educational finance reform, China achieved remarkable 
success with its new policy instrument, diversification. The share of non-government 
budgets (extra-budgetary funds) in the total education budget increased from 23.48% in 
1986 to 37.15 % in 1993. Their total education budget also increased. Significantly, the 
indicators of financial adequacy (per pupil expenditures, the size of the education budget 
as a percentage of the total government budget and GNP, and educational facilities and 
equipment) all improved. 
Korea altered the authority for educational spending from the central to the local 
governments. The new method, the lump sum approach, resulted in a higher level of local 
autonomy in school finance than the old method, the earmarking approach. The reform 
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enhanced vertical decentralization by increasing the percentage of the local education 
budget in the total budget, and this went in company the improved horizontal 
decentralization because the local governments were obliged to increase the amount of 
transfer fund for teacher salaries and school operations. 
Table 6.6 Consequences of Educational Finance Reform in China and Korea 
China Korea 
Financial reform 1. Fiscal source of education 1. Vertical decentralization 
decentralized and diversified increased 
- government source: - share of expenditures 
government appropriation, between central and local 
education tax, special government 
education funds, and - share of revenues between 
student loans the central and local 
- non government sources: government 
tuition and fees, donations, - share of education budgets 
school factory, study-work between central and local 
programs, private company, government 
NGO etc. - education budget as % of 
*23.8% (’86) -» 37.2%(’91) total budget and GNP 
2. Increased adequacy of 2. Horizontal decentralization 
educational finance increased 
- Per pupil expenditure - transfer from local 
- Education expenditure as % government (tobacco tax) 
of GNP - transfer from local 
- As % of total government government (teacher salary) 
budget - transfer from local 
- Diversification of funding government (total) 
source 
3. enhancement of the 
- transfer from local 
government (region) 
physical condition of 3. International comparison 
schools - international comparison 
- % of pre-collegiate school of financial decent 
building in dilapidated - international comparison 
condition of local finance 
6.1.4.3 Summary: Convergent and Divergent Aspects 
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Decentralization in both countries turned out to work. China showed a remarkable 
increase in the efficiency of its educational system as measured by various indexes such 
as enrollment ratio, illiteracy rate, and per pupil expenditures. Korea also accomplished 
considerable enhancement of local autonomy in educational administration and finance. 
These were evidenced by the enactment of the Local Educational Autonomy Law, 
vertical and horizontal power shifts, and three rounds of local elections for local 
education leaders. However, the focus was different. While China placed the policy 
priority on education finance reform, Korea stressed the importance of democracy in its 
administration and management of education. 
Despite these achievements, there were some limitations to the decentralization 
policy. In both countries, the central government did not give up its lingering desire for a 
centralized system. For example, the Korean Ministry of Education still exercised a 
strong influence on major policy agenda items such as personnel administration. The 
Chinese central government decided to take the taxing authority delegated in 1985 back 
from local governments in 1993. Both cases can be called “rhetorical decentralization and 
technical recentralization’’ 
6.2 Lessons Learned and Policy Implications 
The cross-national analysis of the decentralization reforms in China and Korea 
and the broader global experience discussed in the previous chapters provide several 
lessons and policy implications for reform. This section outlines the environmental 
conditions and technical strategies for effective decentralization. This knowledge and 
information can be applied to new cases in various settings. 
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6.2.1 Environmental Conditions that Affect Decentralization 
Decentralization is often regarded as a crucial means, rather than an end in itself, 
of achieving policy values such as efficiency, productivity, and equity. However, 
decentralization does not automatically achieve these values; the prevailing conditions 
need to be considered for decentralization to succeed. Some of these conditions are socio¬ 
political, financial or economic, and managerial. Cultural variables are also important. 
6.2,1,1 Socio-Political Conditions 
Many empirical studies have identified two social and political elements that are 
crucial for effective reform: consciousness of crisis in society and political leaders with 
positive attitudes. First, in the initial stage, most reforms suffer from a lack of a broad 
consensus for reform because of the systemic resistance of individuals and groups who 
fear the loss of vested interests. However, when society is at economic and political risk, 
it easily reaches a broad consensus for reform, thus overcoming such obstacles (Corrale, 
1999; Hanson, 1998; Kemmerer, 1994; Prowda, 1993; Rondinelli, 1981; Weiler, 1987; 
Winkler, 1989). Spain’s experience in 1978 is just such a case; when society was in 
chaos after the death of General Franco; the government initiated a radical 
decentralization to avoid national disorder. Colombia followed the same track when it 
faced societal confusion in 1991. 
Second, for a reform to have a safe and sound implementation, it is critical to 
have the support of political leaders at the different levels of government. When the 
national leaders are positive about transferring power and authority to lower levels of 
government, the chances for success increase. It is the same when they accept and 
encourage the involvement of local stakeholders in the decision-making process. By the 
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same token, if the local elite are accepting of responsibility handed down from the upper- 
level authorities, the smooth implementation of decentralization at the regional level is 
facilitated (Corrale, 1999; Hanson, 1998). 
When Deng Xiaoping became president of China in 1976, Chinese society was 
really in confusion, as observed by Lewin and Hui (1989): “What confronted the new 
generation of decision-makers was a harsh reality: very poor living conditions, deeply 
confused ideology, a national economy which was on the brink of collapse, and a closed 
society which had lost its confidence in constructive criticism.” (p.7) 
Deng’s reform, initiated in the late 1970s after the death of Mao Zedong, was 
launched in the midst of social disorder. Deng and his followers demonstrated a firm 
stance toward education reform as evidenced by the remarks of higher government 
officers.8 
For Korea, the political confusion caused by the public demonstrations for 
democracy in the early 1980s provided an impetus for reform. Chief among these outcries 
were “Seoul’s Spring” in 1980 followed by the death of Park Chung Hee, and the 6.10 
national demonstrations for democracy in 1987 that concluded in The 6.29 Declaration. 
This transitional situation gave rise to serious social confusion and disorder, and 
galvanized the necessity for reform in all sectors of society including education. Political 
s The State Education Commissioner, Li Tieying, emphasized at the world public 
education conference in March, 1990 that “first priority must be given to education in the 
overall development of the nation...China’s education must adhere to the reform and 
open policy, and be geared to China’s modernization, to the world, and to the future.” 
A local leader, the deputy-governor of Guangdong province, also maintained the 
importance of education in national development by saying “Education should contribute 
to our overtaking Asian’s Four Little Dragons” 
173 
leaders demonstrated firm attitudes toward reform. For example, the ruling party felt a 
responsibility to honor The 6.29 Declaration, its promise for decentralization reform, The 
opposition party was also steady in their will to revitalize local autonomy, and its leader, 
Kim Dae Joong, even went on a hunger strike when the government in 1990 displayed a 
reserved attitude toward reform. 
6.2.1.2 Economic and Financial Conditions 
For decentralization to be effectively implemented, some assert that a minimum 
level of economic development is needed. Most policy programs are inevitably related to 
financial matters; only a few limited programs that can be initiated without financial 
support. The financial factors affecting effective decentralization include an increased 
investment in public service. Therefore, financial power relocation is a core subject in the 
discourse of education decentralization. Two aspects of the financing need to be taken 
into account. One is the transfer of expenditure distribution and allocation, and the other 
is that of the self-revenue generation. In particular, the shift of taxing authority for 
revenue generation is viewed as a key component for meeting various local financial 
demands. Empirical studies show that central governments have a tendency to hold on to 
their taxing authority, even when decentralization is comprehensive (Fiske, 1996; 
Hanson, 1998; Prowda, 1993, Rondinelli, 1981; Winkler, 1989). 
There is an alternative policy approach to the center-driven governance system: 
privatization of education (Cummings and Riddell, 1994; James, 1987; Riddell, 1997). 
James (1987) described two paths to privatization. One is based on “excess demand” that 
is mostly found in the secondary private schools in developing countries. When a 
government does not have the financial capacity to satisfy an increasing demand for 
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public education, it may choose to transfer the power and authority for education to lower 
levels of government or to individual institutions 
The other is based on “differentiated demand” that is dominant at all levels of 
private schools from primary to tertiary in industrialized countries, which is independent 
of the financial capacity of the central government. “It is common in this category for an 
important religious or cultural group to deliver a separate education system from 
preschool through to tertiary level.”(p.757) James identified at least eight OECD 
countries (the United States, France, Canada, Australia, Greece, Spain, Denmark, and 
New Zealand) in the differentiated demand category. Decentralization in many 
developing countries, including many in Africa, has been the result of excess demand, 
and it has enhanced educational opportunities for the general public. However, this is 
accompanied by a wider gap between rich and poor regions in quality of education. 
When China initiated its reform in 1985, its economic and financial capacity for 
implementing national innovation was regarded as far below the normal standard (Tsang, 
1996). Nine-year compulsory education, therefore, was typical excess-driven demand 
decentralization. Korea had a sound national economic status in comparison with China 
when its reform started in the late 1980s. Since the major goal of Korea’s decentralization 
reform in the transitional period was the realization of democracy, the power shift policy 
was not based on excess-driven demand or differentiated-driven demand; rather it might 
be said to be a politically-driven demand reform. 
6.2.1.3 Administrative and Managerial Conditions 
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Decentralization requires an appropriate arrangement of administrative functions 
among the different levels of government. A clear legal infrastructure of law, regulation, 
and directives should define the role and function of each agency. A well written 
management manual with well defined procedures makes it easier for local employees to 
implement a reform program. The probability of success may depend on the technical 
capacity of both the central government and the local governments to manage the 
decentralization (Berman et al., 2002; Hanson, 1998; Litvac et ah, 1998). 
The importance of building administrati ve capacity is well evidenced in the cases 
of China, Cambodia, and Indonesia. In particular, China implemented support programs 
in the areas of personnel training, improving data collection and utilization skills, and 
providing consultation in decision-making. This effort substantially facilitated the 
introduction of their compulsory education policy (King and Guerra, 2005). 
In addition, the development of a new flexible system of administration may 
make it easier to change the previously arranged functions at each level of authority into 
the new environment. Regarding the regional organization for decentralization, empirical 
case studies showed several types (Hanson, 1995): the establishment of new regions as 
seen in Venezuela (1969); merger or combination with the existing system as seen in 
Spain (1978); and the utilization of the existing system as seen Argentine (1991) and 
Colombia (1993). Korea also utilized its existing system. 
6.2.1.4 Psychological and Cultural Conditions 
The result of reform is likely to be influenced by psychological and behavioral 
factors, and by the organizational culture. Positive attitudes and behaviors by officials in 
the central government play an important role in the process of decentralization. Some 
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appropriate instruments for overcoming resistance and getting cooperation for 
decentralization need to be developed. It is important to build trust and respect between 
the central government and the local authorities, and between citizens and governments. 
In local provinces, the leadership needs to recognize the importance of exchanges of both 
personnel and information between the central government and the local governments. 
Furthermore, it is crucial that an effective incentive system that encourages the 
performance of decentralization be established both in the central ministry and in the 
local provinces (Hanson, 1998; Rondinelli, 1981). 
When the Chinese government decided to withdraw taxing authority from the 
provinces in their 1993 reform, they feared at least two things. One was the loss of central 
control over the localities in the name of decentralization, and the other was the 
emergence of sectionalism or localism that might seriously hurt China’s national identity 
and threaten its stability. 
The organizational culture makes a difference depending on whether it prefers 
the top-down or bottom-up approach. In bottom-up decentralization, it is assumed that the 
society has a cultural basis for local autonomy. However, top-down is a bit different in 
that the centrally initiated decentralization does not always guarantee the cultural 
infrastructure for effective restructuring of power among the different levels of 
government. In some cases, the local governments do not want the transfer of power; this 
was seen in Mexico. In an environment where the localities prefer centrally designed 
plans and implementation, decentralization cannot be successfully realized (Kemmerer 
1994). Korea experienced this in the early stages of its reform, as seen in the results of 
the local elections in 1991; the citizenry, who were well accustomed to the culture of 
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center-driven policy, simply lacked interest (Kemmerer, 1994; Rondinelli,1981; Winkler, 
1989). 
6.2.2 Technical Strategies for Effective Decentralization 
A positive environment is a crucial condition for the success of a reform. 
However, it does not automatically guarantee that the desired results will be achieved 
without well designed strategies. Some technical strategies for effective decentralization 
reform are presented in this section. 
6.2.2.1 Consensus Building 
It is often said that the success of a reform depends upon how much the 
stakeholders share the vision of the programs to be adopted. In general, any reform is 
accompanied by conflicts among various vested groups and individuals (Hanson 1998). 
With respect to establishing a consensus on decentralization, Hanson suggests the 
following eight strategies: (i) identify the stakeholders and their interests, (ii) build their 
legitimate interests into the model, (iii) organize public discussion, (iv) clarify the 
purpose of the decentralization, (v) respect the role of the various actors, (vi) provide 
adequate training, (vii) analyze the obstacles to decentralization, and (viii) develop a 
monitoring system. 
There have been many cases in Latin America, in Colombia, Mexico, and 
Chile, for example that illustrate the importance of consensus building. These cases are 
considered partial failures, mainly because they did not pay much attention to the 
importance of consensus building. On the other hand, Spain and New Zealand recognized 
the importance of soliciting support by encouraging national debate and discussion 
178 
regarding decentralization. The success that these two countries achieved is attributed to 
their effective consensus-building programs (Fiske,1996; Hanson, 1998). 
It is not clear whether China employed systemic consensus-building strategies as 
seen in industrialized countries. Chinese leaders were likely to emphasize the inevitability 
of reform on various occasions as seen in Deng Xiaoping’s “Southern Inspection Tour in 
1992”g and in other government officials’ remarks for the mobilization of reform (Lo, 
1993; Sun, 1993). In the meantime, one of the key characteristics in Korea’s reform for 
local educational autonomy was the participation of the stakeholders. During the reform 
period in the 1980s, the teachers groups played very important roles in the process of 
crafting the reform policy, and parents also joined in the discussion of decentralization 
reform in the 1990s. In addition, the media campaign was an important instrument for 
building consensus for the 1995 reform (Park, 2000). 
6.2.2.2 The Incremental Approach 
The approach to reform can be classified into two major categories according to its 
speed and scope: incremental and all-encompassing. Both have pros and cons with 
respect to the effectiveness of a reform. Many empirical cases show that the incremental 
approach is more effective than the radical and all-encompassing one. To be more 
specific, a radical reform brings about a so-called vision jump for the stakeholders. It is 
often caused by the wide gap between the suggested vision of the reform and the status 
quo, hence resulting in some frustration among individuals and organizations about what 
9 “To reassert his economic agenda, in the spring of 1992, Deng made his famous 
southern tour of China, visiting Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and spending the New 
Years in Shanghai, in reality using his travels as a method of reasserting his economic 
policy after his retirement from office. On this tour, Deng made various speeches and 
generated large local support for his reformist platform.”(Lo, 1993, p. 22.4) 
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to do. Therefore, reforms need to focus on a limited issue at the outset, and then gradually 
expand their scope. It is important to show some tangible effects to stakeholders on a 
short-term basis, particularly to those who are in doubt about the utility of the reform or 
to those who actually oppose it (Hanson, 1998; Winkler, 1989). 
For example, China planned to implement its nine-year compulsory education 
plan in an incremental manner, rather than with an all-encompassing approach. China had 
regions with different socio-economic conditions. The implementation schedule of 
compulsory education was set in three categories according to the uneven regional 
conditions (CCP 1985): i) the developed regions (coastal areas) by 1990, ii) the semi- 
developed regions by 1995, and iii) the underdeveloped regions (minority-inhabited 
areas) by a regionally planned time. The expansion schedule for educational finance from 
2% to 4% of GNP by 2000 took the same approach. 
Korea also employed the incremental approach for the realization of local 
autonomy. So that the new system would have a soft landing, it established local 
assemblies first at the lowest levels (si, gun, gu), and later at the provincial and 
metropolitan level. The local elections for the leaders of the si, gun, and gu were first held 
in 1991. Then, after four years of “testing” the implementation of local autonomy, the 
governors and mayors were elected in 1995. 
6.2.2.3 The Asymmetric Approach 
A country may consist of diverse provinces and regions with different financial 
capacities, organizational culture, administrative structure, and political environment. The 
pace and scope of decentralization should differ depending on these conditions: one size 
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can’t fit all, and different things need to be treated differently. China and Korea both took 
an asymmetric approach for their reforms in accordance with regional conditions. 
Two approaches can be taken here for the asymmetric implementation of 
decentralization. One is the capacity-based approach at the different levels of the same 
governmental system. The central government would better decentralize power and 
responsibility for providing education to a limited number of local governments that have 
proven their capacities to implement decentralization (Hanson 1998). The other is the 
outsourcing approach; this privatizes the provision of public education. The central or 
provincial government shifts a public function such as education to the private sector, in 
the hope that it can be more effectively implemented by the private institutions than by 
the public sector (Hanson, 1998; Litvac et al., 1998). 
6.2.2.4 The Synchronization Approach 
In order for decentralization to be successfully implemented as intended, it should 
function as a part of the greater governance and administration system, rather than trying 
to go its own way. A decentralization policy has a complex architecture that is 
intertwined with various functions of government such as the administrative, fiscal, and 
political ones. For example, the transfer of fiscal authority means giving both the power 
of resource generation and of expenditure allocation. In many cases, the central 
government decentralizes the expenditure authority without providing appropriate 
revenue sources; this was seen in Russia when it was the center of the former Soviet 
Union. The simple shift of power without providing for capacity building may complicate 
the decentralization efforts and lead to failure because of a lack of efficiency in resource 
utilization and management. Furthermore, local policies should sometimes be closely 
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linked to the national standard as is often demonstrated in the health policies of 
developing countries such as the Philippines, Colombia, and Eastern European countries 
(Corrale, 1999; Latvac et al., 1998). 
When Chinese leaders set their cardinal principles for national development - 
modernization, globalization, and the future - education became a key instrument for 
their achievement. Consequently, educational reform went hand in hand with economic 
policy. Decentralization of educational finance was implemented as part of the general 
fiscal reform, thus enhancing the reform synergy. However, the shift of power on 
expenditures was not accompanied by one on revenue generation. 
In contrast, Korea’s local educational autonomy was by its nature not independent 
of general administrative autonomy. This was due to the structural features of government 
in Korea; there were two different entities of local government - general administration 
and educational administration - at the provincial level. Therefore, local educational 
autonomy proceeded hand in hand with general local autonomy. Fiscal reform followed 
the same course. 
6.2.2.5 Positive Involvement of the Central Government 
When it comes to stating the key factors that affect the success of 
decentralization, the role of the central government often comes to the fore. The functions 
of this central unit in power relocation vary depending upon the environmental situation. 
Important among them are the roles of planner, coordinator, facilitator, and supporter. 
When the central government is positively involved in the whole process, the chances of 
success increase. Basically, its positive role derives from changes in attitude and behavior 
by the officials of the central ministry (Hanson, 1998; Tatto, 1999; Winkler, 1989). 
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However, the central government should be aware of a potentially serious side- 
effect when it undertakes an active role in decentralization. Countries with a tradition of 
centralization are not familiar with self-governance, with the election of representatives, 
and with the appropriate way to exercise their right to make their ideas known. For 
example, despite decentralization to the commune council in the mid-1980s, China was 
criticized as lacking popular representation. The central government in Cambodia still 
appointed provincial majors and governors. Many Indonesian schools, although they have 
their own school councils, rarely meet to discuss important school policies and programs 
(World Bank, 2004). Korea experienced this also when the general public showed a lack 
of interest in the local elections in 1991, partly because the central government had not 
foreseen the need to provide technical assistance to increase the turnout rate. 
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CHAPTER 7 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
I have conducted a set of longitudinal analyses and cross-sectional comparisons of 
educational governance reform in China and Korea between 1985 and 1995. What 
fostered this study was the need to reconcile the theoretical benefits of decentralization 
with the empirical evidence that often showed that the benefits were not being achieved. 
Theoretically, the benefits of decentralization include the enhancement of democratic 
participation, managerial efficiency, and the improvement of financial deficiencies. 
Empirically, however, there is little consistent evidence for this. The consequences of 
reform vary in accordance with country-specific conditions: they appear to turn out to be 
successful, mixed, or failed. 
This study has sought answers to several questions surrounding the 
decentralizations that occurred in China and Korea in the late twentieth century. The 
questions were (1) What were the primary motivating forces behind the decentralization 
movement? (2) How were the reform ideas implemented? and (3) What were the major 
consequences of decentralization in each country with respect to the changes in the 
educational governance structure, and the dynamics of control of the school finance 
system between the central authorities and the localities? 
The following sections present a summary of the comparison between China and 
Korea, outline some policy implications focusing upon conditions and strategies of 
successful decentralization, and suggest some recommendations for future research. 
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7.1 A Summary of the Major Findings 
Below are major findings from the systemic comparison of education reform in 
China and Korea. 
First, regarding the primary motivating forces for governance reform in the two 
nations, both had common econo-political, socio-cultural, financial, and administrative 
conditions from the micro perspective, although they differ in their details. To be more 
specific, the major similarities in the motivation for reform in the two countries were the 
transition in the political system based on national crisis, and the emergence of new 
political leadership. Differences included the key objective of reform and the national 
economic condition; these are essential elements affecting decentralization reform. While 
solving an educational finance problem was China’s principle objective of 
decentralization in 1985, Korea stressed the political aspect of educational 
decentralization because it was developed as part of a political reform, one key aspect of 
which was revitalizing the local autonomy. 
Second, regarding how the reform ideas were actuated, both took the center- 
driven approach. China’s central authority played a key role in mapping out the reform 
plan. For example, when China launched its reform in 1985, the CPC (Communist Party 
of China) issued a resolution entitled “Decision for Reform of China’s Educational 
Structure” (May 25, 1985) which suggested implementing nine-year compulsory 
education, and entrusting responsibility for elementary education to local authorities, 
among other reform proposals. In the second phase of reform in 1993, the State 
Education Commission of China issued “Programs for China’s Education Reform and 
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Development (March, 1993) which extended educational reform by updating on-going 
programs. 
Korea also actuated reform ideas by central authority. The ruling party proposed a 
comprehensive socio-political reform package in 1987 which was released in the form of 
a presidential candidate’s pronouncement, “The 6.29 Declaration.” The Presidential 
Commission for Education Reform issued a comprehensive reform proposal entitled 
“Education Reform toward the 21st Century” in 1987, outlining a broad policy direction 
and some specific reform programs including educational decentralization. Both 
galvanized the discussion of governance renovation in education. 
Each country enacted laws to facilitate its reform proposals. China drafted the 
Compulsory Education Law in 1986, the first law regarding education since the inception 
of modem China in 1949. It promulgated power and responsibility to different levels of 
government for the provision of pre-collegiate education. Korea legislated several laws 
for the implementation of decentralization, and the realization of local autonomy. Chief 
among them were the Local Autonomy Law and the Local Educational Autonomy Law 
(the Local Education Self-Govemance Law). It prescribed the reinstatement of local 
assemblies, which had been dead for a long time, and reshaped the roles of the boards of 
education from advisory committees to decision-making bodies. 
Third, regarding the major consequences of the reform, both countries 
demonstrated considerable achievement in terms of the efficiency of the educational 
system and the enhancement of political democracy in education. China showed some 
intriguing results in its governance reform. With its structural reform, the Chinese 
government transferred the authority and responsibility for pre-collegiate education from 
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province, county, and township to county, township, and village, respectively. Fiscal 
responsibility followed the same decentralization path. The consequences of these 
measures turned out to be remarkable: enrollment ratio, illiteracy rate, per pupil 
expenditure, and extra-budgetary fiscal resource all improved. 
Korea achieved a variety of outcomes from its governance reform: procedural, 
structural, and electoral. First, the most meaningful outcome was the revitalization of 
grass-roots democracy itself in that decentralization encouraged the democratic process in 
various aspects of educational administration. Second, the educational governance system 
was revamped from a center-driven to locally-empowered structure. It covered both 
vertical decentralization at the central level and horizontal decentralization at the local 
level. Lastly, decentralization reform was solidified by three rounds of local elections for 
local education leaders such as superintendents, governors, and mayors. In particular, 
horizontal decentralization at the local levels led to an enhanced responsibility for local 
governments; very importantly, it allowed them to generate additional financial resources 
for education. 
7.2 Policy Implications and Suggestions 
This empirical case study of China and Korea yielded salient policy implications: 
environmental conditions for policy makers, and implementation strategies for 
educational administrators. It provided four aspects of environmental conditions that can 
affect educational decentralization reform, which confirmed the admonition of Stephen 
that “there is a lesson (and a warning) for policy makers: a common policy idea can be 
interpreted and acted upon differently when it is transferred to a different setting.” Chief 
among environmental variables suggested for particular considerations are socio- 
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political, econo-financial, psychological and behavioral, and administrative and 
managerial. 
Whether decentralization reform can be smoothly launched depends upon the 
social and political conditions in a society. As Hanson noted, if society is having serious 
difficulties and the people share a sense of crisis, the reform easily follows its own path 
without resistance. Furthermore, any reform is decisively influenced by the attitude and 
will of the political leaders toward the newly launched policies. The more positive the 
leaders are toward the reform, the greater its chance of success. 
The financial capacities of the local governments are important to the 
implementation of fiscal decentralization, which requires a minimum level of fiscal and 
economic capability to administer the reform. As seen in most cases, fiscal 
decentralization tended to focus on the power shift of the expenditure allocation, rather 
than of the resource generation. Without the transfer of taxing authority, 
decentralization is only half done. 
The attitude of Ministry of Education officials is crucial. When they are 
preoccupied with a sense of loss of central control over local governments, 
decentralization does not proceed easily. The organizational culture also affects the 
feasibility of decentralization. When an organization is accustomed to a top-down 
culture, the likelihood that decentralization will succeed decreases. 
Without considering the management capacity of the local government, the 
simple downloading of power is not enough for effective decentralization. When a local 
government has well organized systems and infrastructure, the possibility of success in 
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decentralization increases. Chief among the administrative and managerial properties of a 
local government are clear legal systems and well written management manuals. 
Coupled with the environmental conditions are technical strategies for the 
effective actuation of decentralization. These include the consensus building approach, 
the incremental approach, the asymmetric approach, the synchronization approach, and 
the central involvement approach. 
First, since reform is accompanied by conflicts among various vested groups and 
individuals, reform success depends upon the degree of consensus among stakeholders 
regarding the vision of the programs to be adopted and the policy changes to achieve the 
vision. Hanson’s eight steps for consensus building presented in Chapter 6 provide salient 
implications for policy makers. 
Second, the incremental approach for reform is better than an all-at-once one. In 
general, any radical reform causes a vision jump for the stakeholder in the short-term, 
which results from the wide gap between the suggested vision of the reform and the 
status quo. It brings about frustration among individuals. Therefore, the reform needs to 
focus on a limited issue at its inception, and then to expand its scope incrementally. 
Third, the economic, political, and other condition may be different in various regions. 
The scope and pace of reform should differ depending on these. One size cannot fit all, 
and different things need to be treated differently. Fourth, public policy has a complex 
architecture, as does decentralization because it is intertwined with other governmental 
functions. It is important that decentralization be implemented with other related 
programs for forward-moving synergy. Fifth, the active role of the central government is 
one of the most influential factors for increasing the chance of success. The central 
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involvement needs to play the roles of planner, facilitator, coordinator, and supporter of 
the reform. The central government’s role varies according to environmental conditions. 
7.3 Recommendations for Future Research 
This study examined the dynamics of decentralization reform in China and Korea 
from the macro-perspective. It centered on the issues surrounding three aspects of reform: 
the driving forces for reform, the ways in which reform is actuated, and the consequences 
of reform. Mainly due to limited data accessibility, the analysis was conducted at the 
macro level. Therefore, this study suggests several recommendations for further studies 
as follows. 
First, education policy is supposed to be authentically realized at the school site. It 
would be crucial to examine whether any education reform program including 
decentralization works at the front line, at the school level. I advocate studying 
decentralization at the micro level from an international comparative perspective. 
Second, when it comes to the key goal of educational policy, student achievement 
comes to the fore. How decentralization contributes to the enhancement of student 
accomplishment is not well known. This is partly because, as King and Guerra (2005) 
have written, “educational development is rarely the rationale for decentralization, there 
is no guarantee that the reform will, in fact, improve educational outcomes” (p.180). I 
recommend studying the effects of redistributing the power structure between the central 
government and localities on student outcomes. 
Third, many studies on decentralization appear to focus on financial issues. In 
particular, many studies on decentralization in China seem to assume that its fiscal aspect 
is the only point of the power relationship between the central and local governments. 
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Although financial matters are important in decentralization policy, there is more. I urge 
researchers to study the impact of the extra-fiscal aspects of decentralization such as 
personnel administration, information sharing, and reward systems. 
Fourth, the central government got involved in decentralization in the name of the 
protection of equity and technical efficiency, as clearly evidenced in the case of Mexico 
in the 1970s. Nonetheless, the central efforts for decentralization were often regarded as a 
buck-passing down to local government as seen in Argentina in 1975. A further study 
needs to be conducted by the international comparative approach, focusing on the aspects 
and effects of the central involvement in decentralization 
191 
APPENDIX A 
REFORM OF CHINA’S EDUCATIONAF STRUCTURE 
DECISION OF THE CPC CENTRAL COMMITTEE, MAY 1985 
CONTENTS 
I. The fundamental aim of restructuring education is to improve the quality of the 
nation and produce as many skilled people as possible. 
II. Entrust Responsibility for Elementary Education to Local Authorities, and 
Institute Nine-Year Compulsory Education 
III. Restructure Secondary Education and Vigorously Promote Vocational and 
Technical Education 
IV. Reform Enrollment Planning of the Institutions of Higher Education and the 
System of Job Assignment on Graduation and Extend Their Decision-Making 
Power 
V. Strengthen Leadership and Mobilize All Positive Factors to Ensure successful 
Restructuring of Education. 
I. The fundamental aim of restructuring education is to improve the quality of the nation 
and produce as many skilled people as possible. 
The decision made by the Twelfth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party at 
its Third Plenary Session on the reform of the economic structure has broadened 
prospects for the vigorous development of China’s productive forces and of its socialist 
material and spiritual civilization. A vital factor for the success of our cause lies in the 
availability of skilled people, which requires the vigorous development of education as 
economic growth allows. 
Education must serve socialist construction, which in turn must rely on education. 
Our massive socialist modernization programmed requires us not only to give full rein to 
the skilled people now available and to further enhance their capabilities, but also to train, 
on a large scale, people with new types of skills who are dedicated to the socialist cause 
and to the nation’s economic and social progress into the 1990s and the early years of the 
next century - a task which we cannot accomplish without greatly increasing the entire 
Party’s awareness of the importance of education so as to gear it to the needs of 
modernization, the world and the future. We need to train millions upon millions of 
workers in industry, agriculture, commerce and other fields, who are well-educated, 
technically skilled and professionally competent. We also need to train tens of millions of 
factory directors, managers, engineers, agronomists, economic experts, accountants, 
statisticians and other economic and technological personnel who are equipped with 
modem knowledge of science technology and economic management and imbued with a 
pioneering spirit. And we need to train tens of millions of educators, scientists, medical 
workers, theoreticians, cultural workers, journalists, editors, publishers, workers 
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theoreticians, cultural workers, journalists, editors, publishers, workers in the fields of 
law, foreign affairs as well as Party and government workers who can keep abreast of 
developments in modem science and cultural and the technological revolution. All these 
people should be persons of moral integrity with lofty ideals, well education and 
disciplined, have an ardent love for the socialist motherland and the socialist cause, and 
work with dedication for the prosperity of the country and the people. They should 
constantly pursue new knowledge and cultivate the scientific spirit of seeking truth from 
facts, thinking independently and daring to make innovations. This presents a tremendous 
and arduous task in the development of China’s education and the reform of the 
educational structure. 
Since the founding of New China, our education has taken a tortuous course in its 
development. By taking over and transforming education has taken a tortuous course in 
its development. By taking over and transforming education in the early days of 
liberation and effecting educational reform through the re-arrangement of college and 
university faculties, we succeeded in turning Old China’s semi-colonial, semi-feudal 
education into a socialist one. In the past thirty years or more, thanks to the painstaking 
efforts of countless educational workers, we have accomplished remarkable achievements 
in education, registering an enormous progress unparalleled in Chinese history. The 
overwhelming majority of educated workers and the backbone activists working in all 
fields of endeavor today were trained after the founding of the People’s Republic. 
However, for many years since the late 1950s, due to the Party’s failure to shift its focus 
to economic development and the influence of the ‘Left’ theory that stressed ‘class 
struggle as the key link,’ education was not given the prominence its deserves. Instead, it 
was constantly disrupted by ‘Left’ political movement. The ‘left’ error reached its 
culmination in the years of the ‘cultural revolution,’ when the need for knowledge was 
negated and education abolished. As a consequence, our educational cause was seriously 
damaged and large numbers of our educational workers were bitterly persecuted. The 
educational of a whole generation of young people was disrupted, and the educational 
gap between China and developed countries, which had been narrowing, widened again. 
Following its Third Plenary Session, the Eleventh Party Central Committee 
realigned the guiding principles and issued a series of new judgments and policy 
decisions on education, thus enabling it to revive and develop vigorously. However, 
erroneous ideas that belittle education, knowledge and skilled people have persisted, the 
influence of‘Left’ ideas in education have yet to be eradicated, and a fundamental 
change is require into order to gear education to the needs of socialist modernization. The 
backwardness of our education and the defects in the educational structure have become 
all the more obvious in face of current development resulting from our policy of opening 
to the outside world, invigorating the domestic economy and carrying out a 
comprehensive restructuring of the economy and in face of the new-rising technological 
revolution worldwide. The major problems are as follows: 
1. Government departments in charge of educational administration are exercising 
too rigid control over the schools and, particularly, over the colleges and 
universities, depriving them of their vitality. On the other hand, these departments 
have failed to mange effectively matters that are well within their jurisdiction. 
2. In matters of educational structure, our elementary education is inadequate, there 
are not enough good-quality schools and there is a serious shortage of qualified 
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teachers and basic facilities. Besides vocational and technical education, which is 
most urgently needed for economic development, has not expanded as expected, 
while there is a lop-sided arrangement of various disciplines and levels of higher 
education. 
3. In matters of the guiding ideology, course content teaching methods, not enough 
attention has been paid to helping students develop, from early childhood, the 
ability to live and think independently and fostering students’ high resolve to 
make the motherland prosperous and strong. Nor have enough efforts been made 
to educate them in Marxism in a vivid and lively way. Many course textbooks are 
outdated, teaching methods stereotyped and practice sessions ignored, and the 
specialties now offered cover a very limited range of academic subjects. All this 
indicates that education in our country is divorced, to varying degrees, from the 
needs of economic and social growth and lags behind the scientific and cultural 
development of the present-day world. 
The Party Central Committee holds that in order to bring about a 
fundamental change in the situation, it is necessary to start with a systematic 
reform of the educational structure. In reforming the administration system, 
while strengthening overall-control, we must take resolute steps to streamline 
administration, devolve power on units at lower levels so as to extend the 
schools’ decision-making power in the administration of school affairs. In 
readjusting education structure, we should also reform the labor and personnel 
system. Moreover, it is necessary to reform any guidelines, course content and 
teaching methods that are at odds with socialist modernization. Through these 
reforms we mean to usher in a new educational situation in which elementary 
education will be substantially strengthened, vocational and technical education 
will be greatly expanded, colleges and universities will be able to exploit their 
potential and exercise their initiative to the full, outside-school and after-school 
education as well as regular school education will develop simultaneously, and 
education of all kinds and at all levels will actively address the multiple needs of 
economic and social development. 
Education cannot be promoted without increased funds. For the 
foreseeable future, central and local government appropriations for educational 
purposes will increase at a rate faster than the increase in the state’s regular 
revenues, and the average expenditure on education per student will also increase 
steadily. There are now some leading cadres at every level who would rather 
spend money on unnecessary items and are not upset at prodigious wastes, but 
who would not have the smallest sum of money allocated for the development of 
education. This must change. However, we must be aware that the amount of 
state investment in education is, after all, determined by the growth of the 
national economy, and we can only gradually overcome the shortage of funds for 
education and raise teachers’ relatively low salaries. Therefore, the problem now 
is to make the most of our limited financial and material resources to strengthen 
education so as to meet the pressing needs of socialist modernization. To this end, 
it is necessary for us to carry out a series of reforms to mobilize effectively the 
initiative of governments at all levels, of countless students, teacher and other 
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employees and of people from all walks of life, so that all of them, united as one 
and working with one mind, will help advance education year by offering 
proposals and putting their potential to the best use. This goal cannot be attained 
without strenuous efforts. All comrades of the Party and the people all over the 
country should work hard to this end. 
I. Entrust Responsibility for Elementary Education to Local Authorities, and 
Institute Nine-Year Compulsory Education 
. The promotion of nine- year compulsory education and having local authorities take 
charge of elementary education, which is to be administered by departments at 
different levels, constitute a basic link in developing education and in reforming its 
structure. Compulsory education is national education which all school-age children 
and youths receive by law and which the state, community and families are required 
to support. Being essential to production and to modem life, such education is a 
hallmark of modem civilization. 
China’s elementary education is still backward. This is in sharp conflict with the 
people’s urgent demand for building a prosperous and powerful socialist country 
which is highly democratic and civilized. Under no circumstances can we allow this 
state of affairs to continue. At present, we consider it entirely necessary and feasible 
to introduce nine-year compulsory education, place it at the top of our agenda as a 
matter of vital importance for the improvement of the quality of the nation and for 
the prosperity of the country, and call on the entire Party and people of all our 
nationalities to go all out to put it into effect step by step. To this end, we must 
formulate a law for compulsory education which, after being examined and approved 
by the National People’ Congress, will be promulgated. 
China being a vast country, with uneven economic and cultural 
development, the requirements and contents of compulsory education should vary 
from place to place. Theses places fall roughly into three categories: 
The first category comprises cities and economically developed areas in 
the coastal provinces and some parts of the interior, where one quarter of the 
country’s population resides. Junior middle school education has become universal in 
many of these areas, while the rest must step up their effort to make it universal by 
1990 in accordance with the required quality and quantity. 
The second category is composed of economically semi-developed 
townships and villages, where about half of the country’s population resides. These 
areas must, first of all, make primary school education universal and up to standard 
and, at the same time, make preparations to complete the spreading of regular junior 
middle school education or junior middle vocational and technical education around 
1995. 
The third category is made up of economically under-developed areas 
where one quarter of the country’s population resides. These areas must, as economic 
development permits, take a variety of measures to spread elementary education in 
varying degrees. The state will do its best to assist these areas in educational 
development. 
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State assistance will be provided to areas inhabited by minority 
nationalities to speed up the development of education there as well. 
Local people’s congresses will draw up regulations concerning 
compulsory education in light of local conditions and will make decisions on the 
measures, methods and deadlines for the enforcement of the nine-year compulsory 
education system. 
While implementing the nine-year compulsory education system, we 
should strive to develop pre-school education and special education for the blind, the 
deaf and mute, the handicapped and retarded children. 
Building a mighty contingent of qualified and dedicated teachers is a 
fundamental guarantee for the success of compulsory education and for better 
elementary education. To this end, it is necessary to take specific measures to raise 
the social status and material benefits of the teachers of secondary and primary 
schools and kindergartens and to encourage them to make education their lifelong 
career. In the meantime, further training for existing teachers and assessments of their 
performance should be conducted in earnest. Developing normal school education 
and providing teacher training are measures of strategic significance for the 
development of education. Teachers should be encouraged to teach themselves and 
each other in the subjects they are teaching. Correspondence courses as well as radio 
and television lessons should be arranged for them. Schools and colleges that provide 
advanced studies for teachers should be well run, and all facilities now available 
should be used for further training on a rotation basis. Furthermore, it is necessary to 
encourage, select and organize a number of teachers and senior students from 
universities and colleges, research workers form research workers from research 
institutions as well as qualified cadres from Party organizations and government 
departments to assist in further training of secondary and primary school teachers. In 
short, the purpose is to ensure that in the next five years or so, the great majority of 
teachers will be qualified for the jobs they hold. After that, only those who have 
received the required schooling or obtained qualification certificates are allowed to 
serve as teachers. Vigorous efforts should be made to step up and strengthen the 
training of teachers for secondary and primary schools and kindergartens. Teachers’ 
schools and colleges must adhere to the principle of serving elementary and 
secondary education, and all their graduates must be assigned to schools to take up 
the job of teaching. A certain number of graduates from other colleges and 
universities should also be sent to schools to be teachers. No government 
departments or any other units shall be allowed to transfer qualified teachers from 
secondary or primary schools to other jobs. 
The power for the administration of elementary education belongs to local 
authorities. Except for major policies and principles and general plans that are to be 
determined by the central authorities, all other responsibilities and powers are to be 
delegated to local authorities for drawing up and implementing specific policies, 
rules and regulations, and plans as well as for guiding, administering and monitoring 
the work of the schools. The authorities of the provinces, autonomous regions and 
centrally administered municipalities will define the functions and powers for 
administrative departments at the provincial, municipal (perfectural), country and 
township levels. In addition to state appropriations, all local authorities are required 
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to allocate a proper percentage of their reserve funds for educational purposes so as 
to promote education in all places. Most of township revenues should be used for 
education. The local authorities may levy an extra tax for education, which shall be 
used for education. The local authorities may levy an extra tax for education, which 
shall be used exclusively to improve teaching facilities for elementary education. 
They should encourage state-owned enterprises, public organizations and individuals 
to run schools and provide them with guidance. Also, they can encourage units, 
collective undertakings and individuals to make financial donations to help develop 
education, but of their own accord, not be exaction. In order to ease the schools’ 
- economic burdens, fees charged to schools by various quarters must be strictly 
controlled. 
V. Strengthen Leadership and Mobilize All Positive Factors to ensure successful 
Restructuring of Education. 
In the restructuring of education, it is essential to take into account the special 
features of educational work and adhere to the principle of seeking truth from facts 
and proceeding from realities. While fundamental principles should be the same 
everywhere, concrete methods should be flexible and varied. In no case must we rush 
reform into mass action and implement it by force. It should be carried out firmly and 
cautiously, with the stress on experiment. All reform measures that have a bearing on 
the general situation or cover extensive ranges should be approved by higher 
authorities. 
Throughout the educational restructuring, it is imperative to keep the 
fundamental aim in mind, namely, to enhance the nation and produce as many skilled 
people as possible. The fundamental criterion for appraising the performance of a 
school is the quantity of people it has trained, not its economic gains. One would lose 
one’s bearings in the reform unless one adheres to this criterion. 
In order to strengthen Party and government leadership over education, the 
State Commission of major principles and policies concerning education, make 
overall arrangements for the development of educational undertakings, coordinate 
educational reform. While administration is being streamlined and power being 
devolved on subordinate units, legislation regarding education should be stepped up. 
From now on, local authorities will have more power and bear greater responsibility 
for the development of education. Party committees and governments a t all levels 
should, in accordance with the policy decisions made by the Twelfth Central 
Committee of the Party, give strategic priority to education and make its 
development one of their chief tasks and an essential factor in their appraisal of their 
subordinates’ performance. It should be pointed out, in particular, that after the 
institution of the responsibility system for production in the rural areas, the Party’s 
grass-roots organizations there should devote more attention to the cultural and 
technical as well as ideological and political education of Party members and the 
masses and to educational undertakings in their own villages or townships. The 
Central Committee of the Party believes that under the new economic and 
educational structures, local authorities will have greater opportunities to quicken the 
development of education by making better uses of their economic and cultural 
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resources. It should be acknowledged that economic and cultural development is 
uneven not only between the various provinces, municipalities and autonomous 
regions, but also within every province, city and country. It is, therefore, imperative 
to encourage some areas to develop first and in the meantime encourage some areas 
to develop first and in the meantime encourage the developed areas to help the less 
developed ones to catch up with them. 
In reform, it is necessary to allow more initiative to all quarters and, most 
importantly, to teachers. In China, there are nearly 10 million teachers, the 
overwhelming majority of whom live up to the high standards of their profession, 
having been, over the years, unswerving in their faith in the Party, in their love for 
the socialist motherland and in their devotion to the people’s educational cause, 
despite hardships and political upheavals. In restructuring education, we must firmly 
rely on the teachers, heed their opinions and let them play their role to the full. Major 
reform measures concerning specific schools must be taken without prior discussion 
by those schools’ teachers. With the growth of the national economy and the states’ 
financial resources, governments at all levels and the relevant departments should 
make a point of solving several practical problems for teachers every year from now 
on. We should foster and carry forward the fine tradition that all teachers are held in 
high esteem, making teaching one of the most respected professions in the 
community. At the same time, we should also encourage the initiative of ideological 
and political workers, administrative and managerial personnel, service and other 
personnel. They should be given appropriate material rewards and encouragement 
according to their performance. 
The system under which the principal or president assumes full 
responsibility should be gradually applied. Where conditions permit, an 
administrative committee or senate headed by the principal or president and 
composed of a small number of prestigious people should be established to exercise 
the power of review and supervision. The system of congresses of teachers and other 
employees, with teachers as the core, should be established and strengthened in order 
to ensure more democratic management and supervision. Party organizations in 
schools should abandon the practice of monopolizing the management of everything 
so as to concentrate on strengthening Party building and improving ideological and 
political work. They should unite the teachers and students, strongly support the 
principals or presidents in the execution of their functions and powers, guarantee and 
supervise the implementation of the Party’s various principles and policies and the 
fulfillment of the state’s educational plans. They should persist in educating the 
teachers and students in Marxism, inspire them with the resolve to forge ahead 
courageously and contribute to the prosperity of out motherland, and guarantee that 
students develop morally, intellectually and physically, so as to help make the 
schools truly sturdy bulwarks against the corrosive influence of capitalist and other 
decadent ideas and firm bases for the building of a socialist civilization of a high 
cultural level. 
We should mobilize and urge the entire Party and people from all walks of 
life throughout the country to support and get involved in the restructuring of 
education and help develop our education. We should encourage all the democratic 
parties, mass organization, public bodies, retired cadres and intellectuals, collective 
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economic units and individuals to contribute actively and voluntarily to the 
development of education in various ways in accordance with the principles and 
policies laid down by the Party and government. 
To benefit the restructuring of education, we should analyze our past and 
present experience and, at the same time, draw on both the positive and negative 
experience of other countries in their effort to develop education. In particular, the 
new technological revolution, the new scientific and technological achievements, the 
opening up of new areas in science and technology as well as the emergence of new 
means of acquiring and transmitting information have exerted an enormous influence 
- on education. The experience acquired by advanced countries in these fields merits 
special attention. We should increase our exchange with foreign countries through all 
possible channels and build our education on the basis of the achievements of 
contemporary world civilization. 
The present decision focuses on the question of restructuring school 
education. Adult education, which involves cadres, workers and other employees, 
and peasants, and radio and television education are essential components of China’s 
education as a whole. The State Commission of Education should make a separate 
decision on improving and strengthening the work in these fields. 
As for education reform in the army, decisions will be made by the Central 
Military Commission. 
The Central Committee Party is convinced that reform of the educational 
structure will succeed and that socialist education with Chinese characteristics will 
flourish as never before, provided that Party committees and governments at all 
levels exercise better leadership and adhere to sound policies and the entire Party 
membership, people from all walks of life and from all our nationalities in the 
country work together. This success will give a strong impetus to China’s socialist 
modernization and help raise to a new high the cultural and scientific level of its 
people and greatly broaden their mental horizon. 
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APPENDIX B 
EDUCATION REFORM TOWARD THE 21st CENTURY (KOREA) 
INCREASING AUTONOMY OF EDUCATION ADMINISTRATION 
The major thrust of innovative efforts in educational administration will be 
directed toward decentralizing the centralized function and allowing local administrative 
authorities to be self-reliant and flexible about issues which influence local education. 
An urgent task is to provide the institutional base, which allows local administrative 
authorities to realize true autonomy. Local autonomy suggests that the administrative 
authority be restructured, that functions be reorganized between central and local 
government and that staff be re-educated to serve the public professionally. 
The principle of educational administration is that the creativity and self-reliance 
of each school should be respected. Control and direction imposed from the top down 
undermines the diversity and autonomy of the school. Educational administration is 
given a mandate to affect a shift of concern from control and direction to support and 
encouragement, which enlarge the span of discretion on the part of the school. 
The importance of autonomy is greater in higher education for two reasons-by 
virtue of the university’s being usually administered by professional experts of long 
experience holding earned degrees of the highest order, and by virtue of the university’s 
serving local needs. The services of universities for the regional community may be 
heightened by the organization of a regional university consortium which facilitates the 
sharing of resources and cooperation among member universities. 
A. Board of Education As a Decision-making Body 
1) Rationale 
The municipal or provincial board of education is currently an executive body; 
whereas, the local district board of education which is not organized yet, should be the 
decision-making body. The superintendent is the head of the executive body. Therefore, 
the provincial board or education should not serve as a decision-making body, even 
though its name denotes it. Rather, the provincial board should serve as a committee 
which deliberates important issues but does not make decisions. The limit of the 
superintendent’s responsibility is not clearly delineated, particularly in relation to the 
local board of education. 
As local autonomy is planned for implementation in the near future, the time is 
ripe to make education administration independent of general administration. Its 
independence will be ensured by endowing decision-making power on local boards of 
education, so that educational issues are dealt with in a professional capacity free of 
intervention from higher up. Independence, professionalism, and community initiative are 
the principles which underpin educational administration. The importance of 
professionalism suggests the necessity of having a democratic process of decision¬ 
making which brings together expertise and far-sighted vision of local professionals in 
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managing the education system. Community initiative carries a mandate that the local 
community participate in, and be responsible for, education in its area. 
Educational autonomy brings forth important issues to be addressed. One is to 
determine the level of administrative hierarchy which is given autonomy. The questions 
read, ‘At which level, the province or local district, should autonomy be introduced? Or 
‘Should autonomy be implemented at both levels?’ The number of civil servants who sit 
on the board and the method of selecting them are other matters to be determined in the 
context of the answer given to the first issue. Autonomy may require that the criteria for 
the qualification be revised. 
2) Strategies 
a. The local board of education should change its role and status from an executive 
body to a decision-making body. The role of the superintendent, as the head of 
an executive body, should be articulated in relation to the decision-making body. 
By creating the decision-making board of education at local levels, it is possible 
to give a full degree of independence to education administration, independent of 
municipal and provincial governments. 
b. The decision-making type of board of education should be adopted at two levels, 
large administrative districts (special and independent cities and provinces) and 
small administrative local districts (city and country). The kinds and range of 
decisions which can be legally made on these two levels should be clearly 
spelled out in pertinent legal enactments. The board members should be divided 
into ex-officio members (mayor, governor, and superintendent) and elected 
members. At the special city or provincial levels, the number of board members 
should range from 15 to 30. At the country level, it should range from 7 to 9, 
depending on the size of the population. The adoption of a governing system at 
the two levels is meant to be simultaneous with autonomy granted to general 
administration. 
c. The qualification requirements of board members should be articulated by law. 
They should be appointed by the local assembly to serve a term of four years. 
Their membership may be extended up to two terms. The board members are 
not supposed to be affiliated with a political party. 
d. The superintendent is elected by the board of education. The qualification 
requirement of the superintendent should be upgraded by setting forth criteria 
which consider teaching experience in particular should receiver greater 
attention. The term of the superintendent is four years, subject to extension by 
one term, as presently practiced. 
B. Reallocation of Functions between Central and Local Governments. 
1) Rationale 
Control and direction are the hallmarks of educational administration. As these 
denote, administrative authority is centralized, with the central government - the Ministry 
of Education - snowed under by myriads of works, including not only policy formulation 
and budgetary planning and allocation but personnel management and details that are not 
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worth while to be considered. Responsible for an unmanageably wide range of works, 
the central government ministry wields an unchallenged power up to now over local 
governments. This creates a pyramidal type of power structure, and the same can be said 
of the provincial government in relation to local district administrative units. 
Inherent in the hierarchical structure of administration, local administrative units 
are plagued by direction and orders imposed from the top down and are put into a straight 
jacket, stripped of leeway for creative approach to administrative issues. With the 
imminent implementation of local autonomy, it is inevitable to examine the 
administrative functions and structure in terms if their relevancy to new needs and to 
reorganize them across different levels of administration. 
The functional and structural reorganization will necessitate changes in workload 
and personal requirement. As new demands confront the educational system, needs and 
problems should be identified. All of these should be brought into the picture in planning 
for the reform of the administrative system. 
2) Strategies 
a. The Ministry of Education should limit its functions to the following : 
(1) Planning, coordination, and major policy making, 
(2) Formulation of criteria and the framework for works which need to be 
standardized nationwide, e.g., educational goals, the procedure of developing 
curriculum and textbooks, qualification requirement of teachers, standard 
requirements of school facilities, etc., 
(3) Hosting and administration of educational events on the national scale and 
establishment of government test, international events, etc., and 
(4) Guidance and support for municipal and boards of education. 
b. The municipal and provincial boards of education should expand their functions to: 
(1) application of major policy measures into implementation strategy and regional 
planning for education development, 
(2) hosting and administration of educational events to take place at the provincial 
level, 
(3) liaison and coordination between the Ministry of Education and district 
administrative units, and 
(4) guiding and supporting the local district offices of education. 
c. The local district office if education is responsible for other administrative work 
than that performed by higher authorities. It consists chiefly of planning, guiding 
and supporting primary and secondary schools in the district. 
d. Through the reorganization of functions, the Ministry of education should examine 
its structure in terms of its relevancy to the new emphasis on policy formulation and 
planning. To strengthen its new roles, an Educational Policy Deliberation Council 
should be created to strengthen the rational basis for the decision-making process. 
Regarding important policy issues, the Council should be empowered to formulate 
policy measures in cooperation with professionals and on the basis of research 
finding. The Bureau of Educational Financing should be created to secure 
necessary funding. 
e. The structure of local boards of education and superintendent’s office should be 
legally stipulated, lest their functions encroach on the autonomy of the local 
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schools. Emphasis should be placed on their roles in the development of materials, 
information services, occupational and career guidance, and guidance for teachers, 
f. The size of the executive branch under the superintendent and its subordinate agency 
should be readjusted so as to suit the size of population. 
C. Relation between Educational Administration and the Municipal and Provincial 
Government. 
1) Rationale 
The Education Law stipulates that the mayor or governor, who represents the 
municipal or provincial Government, becomes an ex-officio member of, and the 
chairman of the municipal or provincial board of education (Article 15.) Article 30 
empowers him to veto approval on issues which impose excessive financial burdens on 
people. Although this provision is intended to ensure on organic relationship between 
educational and general administration under the present system, it may encroach 
somewhat on the autonomy of the board of education, when it serves parliamentary 
functions in its true sense. On the other hand, claim for the absolute independence of 
educational administration from general administration may create an insurmountable 
barrier between the two, excluding the possibility of cooperation. There is need to 
establish an institutional mechanism ensuring fiscal responsibility and still effecting 
cooperation and coordination. A cooperative relation is ensured when functional division 
is legally provided to delineate the scope of responsibility. 
2) Strategies 
a. By having the superintendent and the governor or mayor as ex-officio members 
of the board of education, it is possible to establish a cooperative relation between 
the board of education and the municipal or provincial government. Repealing the 
provision which appoints the mayor or the governor to be the chairman of the 
board of education would make it possible to put the two entities on a part in 
status. The chairman should be elected by vote among the board members. 
b. The provincial board of education should be empowered to initiate the legislation 
of provisions or acts related to education regarding the local district’s board of 
education, while having the power to repeal the provision which empowers the 
mayor or governor to veto it. 
c. The local civil assembly should be empowered to elect the board of education 
members and review special financial accounts of education legislates specific 
policy measures and oversees personnel management. The functional division 
should be stipulated by law. This will remove the possibility of feuds and effect 
cooperation between the two entities, while enabling each to maintain autonomy 
and independence from the others. 
d. Steps should be taken to stabilize the financing of local education as the 
prerequisite for regional planning for educational development and the 
formulation and implementation of policy measures. This demands that the local 
government be responsible for a greater share of the financial requirement. The 
financial responsibility of the local government should be specified in law in 
terms of proportion by component. The board of education is responsible for (1) 
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the salary of secondary school teachers in its entirety (Seoul) and 50 percent of it 
in other major cities, (2) the purchase of land for schools, and (3) the construction 
of social education facilities, including public libraries, gymnasiums and youth 
centers. 
D. School-centered Management 
1) Rationale 
The present administrative system places primary and middle schools under the 
supervision of the district office of education, high school under the supervision of the 
provincial board of education, and colleges and universities under the Ministry of 
Education. Orders and directives are the major medium of control by administrative 
authorities. Since the issuance of orders is not bound by law, there is a strong tendency 
among administrators to overuse them as a means for control and supervision, To make it 
worse, they are blamed for touching on trifling matters which are the concern of the 
school. Unnecessarily frequent reliance on orders undermines the autonomy of the 
school. Putting an end to this is a must for heightening the professionalism of teachers 
and administrators. The operation of the school should be dependent on the spontaneous 
and creative participation of teachers. 
The way in which the school is operated has a direct bearing on education. 
From this viewpoint, the importance of autonomy and of democratic procedures is 
highlighted at the school level, since they make indelible imprints on the minds of 
students in the formative stage. 
(2) Strategies 
a. The administrative authorities should reduce orders to the minimum while giving 
the school principals full autonomy. The school is the place where most learning 
actually takes place, and autonomy will motivate principals to be creative in 
managing their schools. Autonomy will also contribute to flexibility in 
organizing education programs in view of local needs. 
b. Educational programs and the styles of administration should have the consensus 
of teachers or faculty members. 
c. Extra-curricular activities should be reorganized to improve the self governing 
ability of students. These activities should be comprehensive enough to acquaint 
students with the democratic process of decision-making, participation 
awareness, and leadership skill. 
d. To effect cooperation between school and the community, the dormant role of the 
P.T.A. should be reactivated. In this connection, it is essential that the school 
keep its door open to the local community so that their voices are heard in the 
management of the school. 
e. The lump-sum funding system, which presently applies to small schools having 
less than 24 classes, should be extended to all schools. This will give each school 
flexibility in school management, free it from frequent calls for reporting the 
financial status, and relieve the pressure for meeting the deadline of the calendar 
year. 
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f. As a means to break schools loose form the rigid control of the administrative 
authorities, they should be encouraged to introduce the Management by 
Objectives system for school management. This system not only enables schools 
to assess their performance against goals, but inspires competitiveness among 
schools, which leads to higher efficiency of school management. 
g. School administrators should have ready access to training programs which 
enhance their professional performance. 
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